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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Sustainable Development in the Arctic 
 
A follow-up meeting to the United Nations’ Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) was held in June 1997 to evaluate the 
progress made towards sustainable development since 1992. The 
different Arctic states at the meeting voiced concerns regarding global 
threats to the northern environment. The Canadian prime minister Jean 
Chretien (1997, p.2) stressed the interdependent nature of 
environmental problems: 
 
Toxic chemicals do not respect borders. They even travel from distant 
sources to contaminate arctic food chains. This kind of threat can only be 
fought through international cooperation. 
 
Circumpolar and global developments are also connected  at an 
institutional level. Michael Grubb (1993, p.40) claims that ‘almost all 
international institutions are potentially affected by the implications of 
sustainable development and the UNCED agenda’ in the evaluation of 
the UN led process to advance a sustainable development world wide. 
However, efforts to define and enhance sustainable development are 
many. This is also the case in the Arctic.    
The Arctic Council was established as ‘a high-level forum’ for 
cooper-ation on common Arctic issues, including environmental 
protection in the fall of 1996. International environmental cooperation in 
the circumpolar region was proposed almost ten years earlier, in 1987. 
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev (1997, p.22-23) suggested cooper-
ation in the exploitation of the northern natural resources and in develo-
ping a comprehensive plan for the protection of the Arctic environment. 
Two years of preparatory meetings initiated by the Finnish government 
led to a ministerial conference in 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland. Here, a 
Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and an Action 
Programme, known as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS), was agreed. The eight Arctic states are Sweden, Denmark, 
2 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
 2 
Iceland, Norway, Finland, Russia (then the USSR), Canada and the 
United States of America.      
The proposal for the Arctic Council was presented first at the 
AEPS ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi in 1991 but the idea did not 
develop. This was  mainly due to the negative attitude of the U.S. 
government. The new  Arctic Policy of the United States of America in 
1994 provided the basis for a U.S. engagement in Arctic international 
forums and the strengthening of institutions of cooperation. Negoti-
ations to establish the Arctic Council could be started the next year, 
following the meeting of U.S. President Bill Clinton and Canadian 
Prime Minister Jean Chretien in Canada. Negotiations were not easy; 
the establishment of the council was the result of a process in which 
concerns relating to the content, structure, and participation in the work 
of the Arctic Council was thoroughly discussed. Defining sustainable 
development and applying the idea in practice was one main 
disagreement among participants during the negotiations. 
 
 
Theoretical Approaches in Research 
 
Several writers have followed developments in Arctic cooperation. 
Three theoretical approaches in this study on cooperation have 
emerged during the last few years. They are based on:  
 
1. the concept of security, particularly focusing on the role of natural re- 
    sources and the environment in security thinking,  
2. on different theories about regions, regionalism and regionalisation, 
and  
3. approaches deriving from regime theory, emphasizing either the 
legal       
    content or political significance of international cooperative efforts.  
 
In contemplating the development of cooperation in the northern 
regions, the relationship between security considerations and natural 
resources is often considered more of a hindrance, rather than a 
source of cooperation (Möttölä, 1988; Dosman, 1989; Huitfeldt, Ries 
and Øyna, 1992). The importance of natural resources in security 
issues has been discussed by Archer (1988), Archer and Scrivener 
Introduction 3 
 
 
(1989) and Bergesen, Moe and Østreng (1987). Concern for the 
environment, however, has been a common feature for all the Arctic 
states. This has formed a new basis for cooperation  since the late 
1980’s, which has led to a new combination of security notions and 
environmental concerns (Heininen, 1991). The importance of collective 
environmental security has been discussed in the Barents Euro-Arctic 
cooperation (Bröms, Eriksson and Svensson, 1994; Bröms 1995, 
1997).  
Studies in environmental security raise an interesting question 
about how the environment is defined in international relations theory. 
The words ‘environmental’ and ‘ecological’ are often used 
interchangeably. Richard Langlais (1995, p.268)  makes a difference 
between these two words when security is involved:  
 
Where the environmental implies a sense of surround, of surroundings, 
with the observer sharply defined as separate from the surroundings, the 
ecological, or, more precisely, the human ecological, denotes 
involvement that whenever possible includes the observer in the field that 
is being considered.  
  
There is a fundamental difference in their use. This difference is about 
how the relationship between the actor and his or her environment is 
defined. Peter Bröms notes that ‘the environment cannot be studied 
except through the understanding of the people’. The environment 
cannot be understood more than in ‘social terms’. It cannot be 
comprehended solely as, an ‘objective, real restraint’ without regard to 
what the actors may think (Bröms, 1995, p.41).   
The main question for regional studies is whether the Arctic has 
an identity as internationally meaningful region. In 1988, Franklyn 
Griffiths claimed that the Arctic was in a phase of transition, from a 
minimal political region with very little cooperation across borders to a 
‘coordinated region’ where there are some efforts to establish cooper-
ation (Griffiths, 1988, p.11). Young claimed in 1993 that the Arctic is 
emerging as a distinct region through current processes of cooperation 
(Young, 1993a, p.4). The development of Euro-Arctic Barents 
cooperation has increased interest among researchers into the prob-
lems of regionalism and regionalization (Stokke and Tunander, 1994; 
Dellenbrant and Olsson, 1994).  
The  process of region building is shaped into a ‘bottom-up’ 
process (‘regionalism’) as opposed to a process from the ‘top-down’ 
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(‘regionalization’). Regionalism is said to include spontaneity and a 
new grass-root level in the processes of cooperation, including 
intensively into cooperation actors other than states. Regionalization, 
on the other hand, is seen as an important strategy for peripheral 
states in strengthening the position of their relationships with centers 
and to defend that position in the world economy. The current proces-
ses of cooperation have been evaluated as far from the ideals of 
regionalism. The ideal would be for a regional actor to emerge in the 
north.  This, however, is considered very unlikely (see, for example, 
Käkönen, 1996). It is more likely that region building serves other 
interests and the interests of actors other than local. Environmental 
cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic region, for example, is 
considered a part of Europeanization processes (Nilson, 1996). 
Regionality is about framing problems and solutions about a 
distinct geographical region. Environmental concerns are also framed 
in regional terms. Framing implies that both political decision makers 
and the public find it ‘natural’ to address certain matters on a regional 
level (Castberg, Stokke and Østreng, 1994, p. 72-75). In emphasizing 
the discursive side of regionality, Iver B. Neumann (1994, p.59) 
suggests that ‘regions are talked and written to existence’.  
From this perspective, studying regions becomes a project of 
analyzing the processes by which identities are created and evolved. 
This includes studying self-images and discourses and understanding 
the processes by which particular identities are shaped by histories, 
cultures, domestic factors and the ongoing processes of interaction 
with other regions (Hurrell, 1995, p.352-353). The relevant question in 
region building is the role the environment (and the concern for the 
environment) plays in regional identity building and the interaction 
among different actors. 
The regime approach is particularly well established in the study of 
international environmental cooperation (Brown et al., 1977; Young, 
1989; Gehring, 1994; Vogler, 1996a). Regimes can be defined as 
‘arrangements for institutionalized collaboration on topics and issues 
characterized by complex interdependence’ (Haas, 1980, p.358). They 
can also be defined as, ‘social institutions composed of agreed upon 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that govern 
the interactions of actors in specific issue areas’ (Osherenko and 
Young, 1993, p.1). The regime theory has survived till the present, 
despite attacks on its being a woolly concept to which people apply 
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different meanings (Strange, 1982), for its use of economic analogies 
and ignoring the context of cooperation (Walker, 1989; O’Meara, 1984), 
for repeating the problems of the state-centric approach (Milner, 1992) 
and for its claims of the false promise of international institutions 
(Mersheimer, 1994/95). 
As Levy and colleagues (1995, p.267) note, the regime theory is 
‘alive and well’. There is a body of work on regimes and the develop-
ment of the regime theory based on neoliberalism. This could be 
labeled as ‘mainstream regime theory’ or ‘standard regime theory,’ or 
as Robert O. Keohane (1988, p.381) calls the ‘rationalistic study’ of 
international institutions.  
Constructivist, or reflectivist thinking, has challenged the standard 
regime theory’s ontological and epistemological basis (Kratochwil and 
Ruggie, 1986; Czempiel and Rosenau, 1989; Rosenau and Czempiel, 
1992; Behnke, 1993; Caporaso, 1993; Milner, 1993; Hurrell, 1993; 
Finnemore, 1996). The puzzle for a constructivist is how the human 
subjects constitute a social world, which in turn comprises the possible 
conditions for the actions of those subjects (Wendt, 1987, p.359). In a 
recent article Marlene Wind questioned whether the regime theory is 
worth saving from the constructivist critique of the rationalist, voluntarist 
and individualist assumptions of mainstream regime theory. To her, 
‘rationalist regime theory is and remains... a dead-end with severe and 
up until now unresolved ontological and epistemological inconsisten-
cies’ (Wind, 1997, p.258). My answer is positive ‘yes’. The regime 
theory is worth saving. The current theoretical discussion provides 
ideas for rethinking the regime theory. Regimes are what ‘we’ - as 
students of international relations - decide to make of as  concepts, 
research objects and theories about the nature of international 
relations. 
One of the most important sources of influence in this book had 
been a short concise article by James Keeley on Foucaultian regime 
analysis (1990). This led me to study the works of Foucault. However, 
this is not a work on Foucault’s thinking but one of using Foucaultian 
ideas to develop a regime theory restricted only by my limited 
understanding of Foucault. The point in this work is to reflect on the 
relations of power, knowledge and regime-building following 
Foucaultian ideas. That regime theory and power relations need to be 
more thoroughly analyzed is suggested by a recent evaluation of the 
state of the art in regime study by Hasenclever and colleagues (1996, 
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p.205). 
 Foucault’s ideas question the mainstream understanding of power 
relations in international relations theory and in particularly the idea 
that power considerations could, somehow, be external to a regime. 
This means that regimes are embedded in the networks of power. 
Foucaultian ideas challenge the macro-level analysis of power relations 
suggested by international relations theorists. Rather, power should be 
studied as events, in different space-time forms of its emergence, at 
the micro-level. Power is not only restrictive, but productive. 
Foucaultian politics are not those of the critical theorist attacking the 
visible world of power relations. Power is not external to human 
activities and interaction. Power is present in all human activities. All 
human activities take place in networks of power (Foucault, 1980a, 
p.98). 
Foucault provides a very special view on the processes of 
institutionalization. Institutionalization is a process of power; institutions 
are concentrations of power.  Institutions govern human relations. To 
govern ‘is to structure the possible field of action of others’ (Foucault, 
1982a, p.221). Governmentality is a question of analyzing ‘a ´ regime of 
practices` -  practices being understood here as places where what is 
said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned 
and the taken for granted meet and interconnect’ (Foucault, 1991a, 
p.75). A study  on governmentality is focused, not to the institutions 
and the process of institutionalization as such, but on the practices of 
power created and maintained through institutionalization.   
 
 
The Research Problem 
 
One may ask why there is a need for environmental cooperation since 
there are already several agreements covering the Arctic. Three 
explanations have been given. First, the existing agreements have 
been evaluated as inadequate because the existing arrangements do 
not address the specific needs of environmental protection and the 
regional conditions. Second, some existing arrangements have been 
evaluated as narrow and shallow. There is a problem of coverage for 
existing mechanisms; not they have signed or ratified all the 
agreements by all the states in the region. Finally, it has been claimed 
that not enough attention has been paid to the existing mechanisms of 
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environmental interdependence. Many environmental issues and 
problems that have a transboundary nature are not handled within  the 
current environmental protection regime. The problem is that the Arctic 
environment is in need of more extensive protection than individual 
states or existing various legal arrangements can provide (Stokke, 
1990; Hoel et al., 1993; Rothwell, 1994). 
The present state of Arctic environmental cooperation does not 
seem really to tackle the identified problems of the Arctic environment 
and its protection. Current cooperation does not produce the new 
agreements or binding conventions  for the protection of the Arctic 
environment.  These would deal with  the application of the agreements 
or their existing problems. The cooperation is not creating new 
mechanisms for helping Arctic states to comply with existing arrange-
ments. What is really needed are an implementation, and some 
consideration of the  special situation and requirements of the Arctic. 
The critical issue is the financial and technological help for the cooper-
ative parties that have problems in implementing existing agreements, 
particularly considering the  special conditions of the Arctic.  
None of these aspects, however, are part of the existing 
cooperative arrangements. Instead, cooperation so far has produced 
recommendations, action programs and guidelines that do not 
necessarily improve the quality of the environment or ensure more 
efficient measures to protect the environment from new threats in the 
region. Thus, the question is what is happening in the Arctic 
concerning international environmental cooperation. To study this 
problem, this research aims at answering three questions:  
 
1. what is the meaning of environmental cooperation in the Arctic?  
2. what does the establishment of the Arctic Council and inclusion of 
AEPS 
    activities to its mandate mean for international environmental 
cooperation  
    and the protection of the environment in the Arctic? And  
3. what does studying the Arctic case give for the development of 
regime  
    theory and research? 
  
On a very superficial level the meaning of cooperation is, of 
course, ‘to protect the environment’. Different people attach a variety of 
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 meanings to this idea, and these reflect varying sets of human values 
in relation to the environment. Regimes are packed with meanings, 
which are under continuous negotiation and renegotiation through 
processes of definition and redefinition. Social institutions, such as 
regimes, and their purposes are associated with particular meanings 
(Conca, 1994, p.11-12). 
The question about the meaning of cooperation has to be directed 
to the representatives of the different participants, not only to the 
diplomats and government officials. Although individuals were inter-
viewed, the focus is not on individual meanings but in intersubjective 
meanings created in the cooperation. Intersubjectivity stresses that 
meanings are for subjects but they are not produced in a vacuum; they 
are produced for a subject or a group of subjects. Meanings are not 
separate from each other. Meanings cannot be identified except in rela-
tion to others. Those meanings are collective, that is, intersubjective  
(see Taylor, 1987; Fay, 1987). With an environmental protection 
regime, the struggle is over the meanings attached to the human-
environment relationship. ‘Imposing a meaning’ suggests that regimes 
could also be seen as arenas for conflict and the exercise of power. 
From this perspective, regimes are foci and loci of struggles in 
meanings produced by different participants. Regimes not only react to 
a configuration of power but also to a configuration of dominant social 
purposes (Keeley, 1990, p.95). 
The second question -  the meaning of institutionalizing  
international environmental cooperation - refers to the reason for 
establishing the Arctic Council. This question cannot be understood 
without taking a closer look at the role of regimes in international rela-
tions. For the mainstream regime theorists, governance is an effort to 
manage two systems, the natural and the human, and means to control 
the increasing problems of interaction between these systems (see 
Choucri, 1993; Young and Druckman, 1992). Efforts at environmental 
governance include creating systems aimed at reconciling the conflic-
ting interests of the actors while minimizing human-induced disturban-
ces of the natural system (Young, 1993a, p.6). 
 The mainstream regime approach  is agnostic about the changes 
in the human-environment relationship even when the studies focus on 
environmental protection regimes. According to this view, ‘truly effec-
tive international environmental institutions would improve the quality of 
the global environment...’ (Keohane, Haas and Levy, 1993, p.7). 
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Because of the short-time of cooperation, such impacts are difficult to 
detect. The focus is on behavioral change, not an improvement in the 
quality of the environment.  
One might ask what is the point in studying international environ-
mental cooperation without at least a minimal interest in the effects of 
cooperation on human-environment relationship. Even if changes in the 
quality of the environment cannot be detected right now, changes in 
the meanings attached to the environment can be noticed. 
Concentrating on the ‘mentalities’ of governing rather than the 
effectiveness of the regulatory processes means studying ways of 
understanding the world and being in it. Studying mentalities is an 
effort to capture changes in collective ways of being; that is to study the 
collective meanings, norms, attitudes, knowledge, conventions, and the 
ways to perceive the world and respond to it. The word ‘mentality’ 
refers to the slow-changing collective understandings of human 
existence and relations with the environment (see  Peltonen, 1992, 
p.15).  
For the mainstream regime theorists, governance is ‘any purpose-
ful activity intended to ‘control’ or influence someone else that either 
occurs in the arena occupied by nations or occurring at other levels, 
projects influence into that arena’ (Finkelstein, 1995, p.368).  Regimes 
decrease states’ vulnerability from independent action and reduce 
uncertainty stemming from uncoordinated activity. States maintain 
some degree of control over each other’s behavior through regimes 
(Keohane, 1982, p.351). 
For those who see international relations more as a society than 
as a system the problem of governing is not of control but of 
constitution. Governmentality is about creating and maintaining order. 
By emphasizing that international regimes are ‘not simply by some 
descriptive inventory of their concrete elements, but their generative 
grammar, underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the 
manner of their formation and transformation,’ (Ruggie, 1982, p.380) 
the constitutive quality of regimes is emphasized. For Lynton Keith 
Caldwell, international environmental diplomacy over the last two 
decades has produced a ‘new international order’ in the field of interna-
tional environmental politics. There are institutions, regimes, treaties, 
nonbinding guidelines and financial mechanisms to make this order 
(Caldwell, 1990a, p.128). 
 Finally, Arctic cases of environmental cooperation have also been 
10 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
used earlier to discuss some basic assumptions of the regime theory. 
For example, the study on Arctic environmental protection regimes by 
Young and Osherenko (1993) aims to develop a multivariate model for 
the study of a regime.This point questions the tradition in the Arctic of 
emphasizing the exotic and unique features of the region. Of course, 
the negotiation process itself is unique but  emphasizing the exotic 
character of Arctic developments results in setting the region apart 
from the concerns of mainstream study (see Young, 1992, p.13). 
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The Strategy and Structure of Study 
 
The debate on the problems of the international relations theory overall 
has accompanied attempts to produce empirical knowledge on inter-
national reg- 
imes. Studying governmentality not only means questioning the 
ontological status of international regimes, but also the methods of 
investigating them. An interpretive approach can be used to gain new 
insights into the constitution and functioning of regulatory international 
institutions. An interpretive approach  not only offers the means for 
understanding the self-interpretation and self-definition of human 
collectivities. It  can also generate insights into the very orders in which 
regulatory international institutions are embedded. Both institutions and 
orders are constituted by intersubjective meanings. Regulatory 
institutions and their underlying orders consist of social practices 
(Neufeld, 1995, p.90). 
As a methodological tool a textually oriented discourse analysis is 
used in this work. The research is based on a textual analysis of 
documents produced in negotiations and the answers given in inter-
views and documents. Foucaultian discourse analysis, that is 
interpretive analytics, claims that a discourse is not only a statement 
but also a statement connected to social practice. A textually oriented 
discourse analysis treats discourse three-dimensionally and aims to 
find the relationship between text, discourse and practice; any 
discursive event is seen as ‘being simultaneously a piece of text, an 
instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social practice’ 
(Fairclough, 1992, p.4). Therefore, even if texts have been studied, the 
interest is not in the texts as literary works but in the meanings and 
practices of governing that can be traced into those texts (Dryzek, 
1997, p.76). 
Talk about the environment within a regime is an example of 
‘discursive diplomacy’ (Wettestad, 1994). Studying this talk directs 
attention to the main content of international environmental diplomacy 
(verbal acts as speeches presented and arguments exchanged over 
the negotiation table) and to the discourse of environmental diplomacy 
(see Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969 about speech acts). Discourse is that 
‘which is produced (perhaps all that was produced) by  groups of signs’ 
(Foucault, 1972, p.107). In the discourse, the objects and subjects of 
international environmental politics are defined by using different 
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concepts, enunciative modalities and strategies that constitute the 
human-environment relationship. How concern for the environment is 
constructed in diplomatic discourse is not only talk. Discourses do not 
reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or 
constitute them. When embodied in practices, a discourse becomes a 
creative part of the reality it purports to understand (Woolin, 1988, 
p.184). 
Making sense of Arctic developments requires understanding and 
 interpretation of  meanings and practices of cooperation. 
Understanding aims to give an ‘insider view’ of the world as it is 
experienced by the actors, and provide an account of what constitutes 
meaningful action. This method directs attention to the practices and 
self-understandings of the actors.  The practices of cooperation and 
their effects are analyzed, not as to legal rules (this would be the 
approach by the new institutionalists), but for meanings and changes 
over the meanings on the human-environment relationship. The aim of 
interpretation is not to say what is wrong or what is right. The focus is 
on: 
 
... pointing out what kind of assumptions, what kind familiar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practice that we 
accept rest (Foucault, 1988a, p.154). 
 
Interpretive analytics are based on the idea that the researcher 
and the researched are assumed to be part and parcel of a single 
process. The researcher and the research object share the same 
world, although they do not have same experiences of it (Hollis and 
Smith, 1991, p.72-73). However, only a researcher can give  meaning 
to research itself, which they connect to the chosen themes of the 
research. Studying the ‘mentality of governing’ means analyzing the 
effects of power; what makes some form of activity thinkable and 
practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is 
practiced. Governmentality asks what the purpose of power is and how 
it works. Political rationality, however neutral it may seem, includes 
purposive or value rationality. Political rationalities conceptualize and 
justify goals as well as the means to them (Gordon, 1991, p.3).  
Discourse about the Arctic environment and its future can be 
found in the documents produced in ministerial meetings, the meetings 
of senior Arctic affairs officials, and in the documents and papers of 
working groups. These texts are relevant, since it is possible to find the 
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objectified world ‘in common’ in them. These texts coordinate the acts, 
decisions, policies and plans of the actual subjects. In addition, inter-
views have produced additional material that, in the main, supports the 
search for what was essential in diplomatic environmental discourse.  
The AEPS and the Arctic Council negotiations have produced a 
formidable amount of paper in such a short time. The interviews helped 
to determine the main themes of the discussion. They were  open-
ended and centered around four questions: the problem of the human-
environment relationship in the Arctic, the issue of participation in 
cooperation, the meaning of knowledge in the process and the point of 
cooperation in the Arctic. Interviews were continued until they became 
repetitive; until no new themes or issues were raised. Most of the 
interviews were held while the negotiations to establish the Arctic 
Council continued. Some follow-up discussions were conducted after 
the interviews. 
The material used in this study is not perfect and collecting it was 
not a simple task. The record-keeping for the negotiation process after 
1991 has not been continuous. It forms no logic, at least not one that I 
have not discovered, and the host countries and their practices differ. 
Therefore, for example,  material obtained from the Nuuk meeting in 
1993 is not complete. I had to rely on individuals to provide the material 
for me. I also noticed differences, probably national ones, in the 
openness and ease of the process of obtaining drafts and documents. 
Another problem was with the material from the Russian side. Because 
of my lack of linguistic skills and the lack of response to my inquiries by 
the Russians, the material leaves room for improvement. Despite these 
inadequacies, with the help of interviews there was enough material 
available to reconstruct developments.   
 The structure of this work is based on the texts and issues that 
arise from them. Three power-related themes arise from the analyzed 
texts:  
 
1. who has the power to take care of the Arctic, its environment and 
peoples - 
    that is, how the role of the actors is constituted in the Arctic,  
2. whose understanding of the Arctic environment and its state counts 
the 
    most - that is, whether or not knowledge is power and vice versa, 
and  
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3. how the human-environment relationship is defined in the Arctic - 
that is,  
    constructing this relationship is an act of power.  
 
These themes are discussed in relation to regime theory and its 
assumptions. The special relationship between states and indigenous 
peoples is studied in Chapter 2. This relationship needs to be 
understood to make sense of the cooperative processes. Having 
knowledge of historical background is important, since the present can 
be only understood through knowing the past. The issue is the variety 
of claims on the environment by the sovereign states, indigenous 
claims to self-determination in environmental issues and their 
recognition from those states as relevant actors. In addition, even if the 
states are the recognized actors in international environmental politics, 
the nature of current environmental conditions challenges the range of 
action for the individual states. The question is whether Arctic states on 
their own, or in  cooperation with each other, can actually deal with the 
problems at hand. 
With environmental cooperation, knowledge of pollutants and 
anthropogenic emissions is important in the management of the 
problems but there is more to this than instrumental knowledge. The 
constitutive character of knowledge refers to different environmental 
world views and the various kinds of  knowledge their carriers have. 
This aspect of cooperation is discussed in Chapter 3. The discourse on 
the environment and the ways it has formed itself into cooperation is 
studied. Issues, such as who knows what, are central to  Arctic 
environmental cooperation. The relationship between scientists, Arctic 
organizations and the indigenous peoples and its effect on the content 
of the Arctic environmental cooperation is discussed. 
  The human-environment relationship can be found in different 
world 
views. These world views include aspects of ethical stances on 
relations between man, the environment and the world. Chapter 4 
discusses the human-environment relationship in Arctic environmental 
cooperation and the changes in it over almost ten years of 
negotiations. This chapter looks into the internal dynamics of this 
discourse and the interests in the process defined by both states and 
others. An explanation for developments is not sought outside the 
negotiation process itself.  Analysis of the reasons and explanations of 
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the actors themselves is the focus of the study. 
   Finally, in Chapter 5, the transfer from the AEPS to the Arctic 
Council  
era is described and analyzed. The point in studying governmentality 
is not to tell the story how it ‘really’ was but to study how the autho-
rities and the rationalities of governing have made the world as it is 
now understood (Simons, 1995, p.38). It is through discourses that 
make it seem as if the governmental techniques of addressing a 
problem are based on shared logic and principles. Studying 
governmentality challenges self-evident political rationalities, even for 
the protection of the environment. Foucaultian doubt about one 
rationality of governing opens the possibility of studying different ways 
and rationalities of governing. 
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2 Discourse on Sovereignty 
 
 
 
 
The Need for Special Measures 
 
State Sovereignty in the Arctic 
 
In international practice, sovereignty is a claim about the way power is 
or should be exercised. Sovereignty is a rule that provides order in 
international relations; it is ‘both theory and practice aimed at es-
tablishing order and clarity in an otherwise turbulent and incoherent 
world’ (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, p. 1). Above all, sovereignty is an 
issue of identity and the constitution of iden-tities. The theory and 
practice of state sovereignty formalize a specific answer to questions 
about who ‘we’ are as political beings. Sovereignty defines a social 
identity; its core is the notion of political authority as lying exclusively in 
the hands of spatially differentiated states (Walker and Mendlovitz, 
1990;  see also Bloom, 1990; Wendt, 1994). 
The issue of sovereignty has been a part of the Arctic 
environmental cooperation from the beginning. The Swedish 
delegation reminded the participants of Principle 21 of the United 
Nations’ Conference on the Human Environment, UNCHE (1972) at 
the first preparatory meeting on the protection of the Arctic 
environment in 1989. According to this principle, sovereignty over 
natural resources and the environment belongs to the state. According 
to this principle: 
 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the respon-
sibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction (A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1). 
 
This principle states that the activities of one country must not be 
allowed to affect negatively the environment of other countries. The 
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principle  was reaffirmed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992  in the UNCED.  
‘Needless to say, this principle is applicable to the Arctic region as 
well’ (Statement by the Swedish Delegation, 1989, p.3). 
For Norway in particular, the issue of sovereignty seemed 
important at the first preparatory meeting of the AEPS: 
 
The challenges of securing safe and rational management of resources, 
protection of the environment and strategic stability are linked up also 
with questions of jurisdiction and sovereignty (Statement of the 
Norwegian Delegation, 1989,  p.1). 
   
The Norwegian position in these areas is determined by Norway’s 
strategic location emphasising ‘... our role as the state having sover-
eignty over the Svalbard archipelago as well as Norway’s jurisdiction 
over large sea and shelf areas’ (Statement of the Norwegian 
Delegation, 1989, p.10-11).  
In the negotiations to establish the Arctic Council, the dispute over 
the marine border between Canada and United States emerged for a 
short while, but this was put aside. Besides their boundary delimitation 
conflict, there are also other jurisdictional conflicts in the Arctic 
between Canada and the USA. The USA disputes the legal status of 
the northern waters in the Canadian Arctic. According to Canadian 
interpretation these waters are ‘internal’ but the Americans claim that 
the North West Passage is ‘international’ waters (Brelsford, 1996a).  
The problem of state sovereignty over the environment and 
natural resources is emphasized by the awareness that there is a 
growing number of ‘international’ environmental problems. The 
international character of environmental problems is also evident in the 
Arctic: ‘The pollution problem of today does not respect national boun-
daries’ (AEPS, 1991, p.1). It follows that the limits of state sovereignty 
have to be discussed in dealing with the problems at hand in the 
Arctic.  
Some consider state sovereignty as the main problem in the 
management of environmental problems (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, 
p.185-186). For example, the Norwegian representative pointed out 
that two relevant categories of the participating countries the states 
which have sovereignty and jurisdiction in these areas and other 
states whose nationals are engaged in activities in the same region. 
According to the Norwegian view: ‘with regard to the High Arctic the 
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group of states participating in this preparatory meeting is at one and 
the same time too broad and too limited’. It is ‘too broad in relation to 
the issues concerning exercise of national jurisdiction and too limited 
with regard to issues concerning obligations on states active in the 
areas in question’ (Statement of the Norwegian Delegation, 1989, 
p.14).  
These comments by arctic states suggest the issue of sovereignty 
is a living concern for at least a part of the participants in the 
cooperation. Jens Bartelson (1995, p.45) suggests the rule of state 
sovereignty is ‘a parergon’ -  frame.  A parergon does not exist in the 
same sense as that which it helps to constitute. There is a ceaseless 
activity of framing, but the frame itself is never present, since it is, 
itself, unframed. At times, however, the frame can be seen.  
 
‘Arctic’ States 
 
Different states used environmental concerns to construct their ‘Arctic’ 
iden-tity. For some participating states the connection to the Arctic is 
obvious; ‘Some are Arctic rim states with coast lines to the Arctic 
Ocean and with jurisdiction over land areas in the High North’. For 
others, the connection to the Arctic is not so obvious; ‘Other have 
territory north of the Arctic circle which in climate and nature clearly 
differ from the region of the High North’ (Statement of the Norwegian 
Delegation, 1989, p.14).  
Most of the other participating countries had a clear Arctic identity 
and concern for their Arctic environment. According to the Russian 
view the ‘Arctic region provided and provides a lot for our country’. The 
Russian representative emphasized the concern for the situation in the 
Arctic; ‘its clear tendency to deteriorate is a cause for anxiety’ (A-
ddress of the Soviet Representative, 1989,  p.1). Norway presented 
herself as ‘a coastal state to the Arctic Ocean the northern parts of 
Norway have from the oldest times been dependent of the living 
resources in the sea for its livelihood’. The focus of concern was the 
state of the marine environment; the marine ecobalance is ‘essential 
for life and livelihood in Norwegian coastal regions in the North’ (Stat-
ement of the Norwegian Delegation, 1989, p.11).  
For the Danish, the identity of the country and participation was 
clear:  
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Denmark is one of the eight Arctic nations that borders directly on the 
Polar 
Basin. Geographically Denmark is closer to the North Pole than any 
other country in the world, the distance from northernmost Greenland 
being a mere 460 miles (Statement by the Danish Delegation, 1989, 
p.1). 
 
Icelandic representative considered their Arctic identity in relation 
to its resources; ‘fishing areas around Iceland are of vital importance 
for her economy’ (Gudnason, 1991, p.2). Marine pollution is the main 
cause for concern since ‘Iceland is very sensitive to conditions in the 
Arctic, being situated in a gateway to the North Atlantic’ (Iceland, 
1990, p.1).  
 In particular, a difference in their Arctic identities can be found 
between Finnish and Canadian approaches. The difference is in 
whether the concern is for the well-being of the natural environment or 
for the well-being of the northern habitants. The basis for Finnish 
initiative was the concern for the impact of long-range transboundary 
pollution on the forests in eastern Lapland. For Finland, ‘in the long-
run air pollutants constitute a serious threat to our forests and our 
forest economy’ (Pietikäinen, 1991, p.3).  
For Canadians, the Arctic is seen as the home of indigenous 
peoples; ‘the Arctic is a home to 73,000 native and nonnative 
Canadians. In other words, our Arctic comprises a rich, multicultural 
mosaic’ (Campeau, 1990, p.1). The state and quality of the environ-
ment for these peoples are important; ‘both Indians and Inuit have 
depended on the land as basis of their culture - they have relied on its 
resources for food, clothing and income’ (Siddon, 1991, p. 2).  
There were two countries which did not really indicate how they 
saw themselves as ‘Arctic states:’ Sweden and the United States. Both 
countries emphasized global concerns for the state of the Arctic 
environment. The Swedish representative mentioned the concern for 
global problems in the Arctic, such as the depletion of the ozone layer 
and climate change. For  
the Swedish, cooperation in the Arctic could be an example for the rest  
of the international community; ‘Sharing our experience might serve as 
an inspiring example for other countries and regions’ (Dahl, 1991, p.2). 
For the United States, at least at the beginning of  cooperation, 
the region is mainly interesting for research on global environmental 
problems: 
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The delicate balance of its physical, chemical and ecological com-
ponents, governed by the very low rate of biogenesis and chemical 
turnover in large masses of freshwater and sea ice, makes the Arctic an 
’early warning system’ for global change, where the signatures of climate 
change are expected to occur first (Weinman, 1991, p.3).  
 
For the United States, the Arctic most of all is of global significance as, 
‘an ecologically sensitive region’ that provides ‘livelihood for 
indigenous peoples; majestic scenery; splendid wildlife resources to 
be shared and managed cooperatively by a diversity of political 
jurisdictions; and a wealth of marine species and mineral deposits that 
benefit the rest of the world’ (Weinman, 1991, p.1). 
 
Protecting the Environment 
 
States are important in defining and maintaining property rights. Daniel 
Bromley points out that property is ‘a social relation between the 
benefit stream from the property, the holders of rights to that property 
and those who bear duties’. Property right is a claim to a benefit 
stream. According to this perspective, environmental problems - 
because they are usually a matter of the private interest of A vs. the 
private interest of B - can be regarded as triadic: A, B and the state 
(Bromley 1991, p.19). The state agrees to protect that right. Issues 
such as who will get the rights to land and natural resources, and who 
will have the protection of the state to do as they wish with those 
assets are important in environmental policies and management. From 
this standpoint, the environmental policy problem is ‘nothing but a 
struggle about who shall have control over the stream of future 
environmental services’ (Bromley 1991, p.38; Peluso, 1993; Young, 
1993b). 
The states recognized their role as major actors in Arctic 
environmental cooperation. The preparatory meeting in Rovaniemi 
1989 resulted in affirming the concern for the Arctic environment and 
the need for special measures by the states to protect the 
environment. The Finnish initiative acknowledged the number of 
international, regional and bilateral agreements on the environment 
which apply to the Arctic. Nevertheless, according to the Finnish view, 
it is ‘of utmost importance that a mechanism is created to complete the 
provisions of those disparate agreements so as to ensure their 
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effective application’. The responsibilities of the states was 
emphasized; ‘It is evident and necessary to tighten up national 
measures: political, legal, technical, or others taken so far in nearly all 
environmental sectors’ (Statement by the Finnish Delegation, 1989, 
p.2). 
The Finnish proposal for the continuation of cooperation was to 
develop a process which could lead to a program of action composed 
of concrete and practical measures. This could include: ‘deepening of 
the understanding of the problems’ by a lead country method, and 
‘assessment of the state of the environment and impacts of economic 
and social activities and exchange of information in case of pollution 
incidents’. Cooperation might further include ‘accords on concrete 
measures’ on most urgent problems such as pollution of the sea, 
acidification, accumulation of toxic chemicals and radioactive 
contamination. Finnish representatives stressed the need to develop a 
long term strategy and policy to improve the environment and prevent 
its further contamination. This could lead to either a political or legal 
agreement. The Finns emphasized the need of rapid action; ‘the 
sooner we can research an agreement, political or legal, the better’ 
(Statement by the Finnish Delegation, 1989, p.3). The Finnish initiative 
was open; the point was in starting  cooperation and leaving the 
cooperation to take its form in further negotiations.  
The Russians supported the idea of strong legal measures to 
protect the Arctic environment. The Russians recognized the need ‘for 
blocking measures’ against the deterioration of the environment 
(Address of the Soviet Representative, 1989, p.3). The need of legal 
measures was emphasized; the ‘effective solution of the problem is 
possible only through broad and complex cooperation between the 
Northern countries, based on a solid and permanent legal ground’ 
(Address of the Soviet Representative, 1989, p.7).  
The Russian representative suggested ‘a sort of code of civilized 
and environmentally sound conduct of states’. It would determine and 
provide for an ‘organic interrelation’ between their rights and obliga-
tions vis-à-vis nature and each other. This environmental code would 
cover all the participants and all the regions in the Arctic. It should be 
based on the recognition of ‘the unconditioned rights of every person 
to live in the most favorable environment’ (Statement from the Soviet 
Delegation, 1990, p.3). 
The environmental code suggested by the Russian delegation 
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included several principles. First, the environmental ‘well-being’ of any 
particular state can not be achieved at the expense of other states or 
without due account of their interests. Second, no activity should be 
detrimental to the environment, be it within or outside the framework of 
national jurisdiction. Third, any activities having unpredictable environ-
mental consequences should be inadmissible, that is, putting the 
precautionary principle into practice. Fourth, ‘free and unrestricted’ 
exchange of scientific and technological information’ on the problems 
of the environment and of modern environmentally sound technologies 
is required. Finally,  coordinated measures should be effectively taken 
at different levels of action, including international, regional and 
national levels (Statement from the Soviet Delegation, 1990, p.3).  
No delegation suggested that the existing system of legal 
measures was adequate. There was an agreement ‘that issues are not 
covered by existing conventions, and a number of threats to the 
environment were not adequately dealt with today’ (Statement by the 
Swedish Delegation, 1989, p.1). According to a report prepared in the 
preparatory process, only the agreement on polar bears and some 
individual provisions in other agreements were considered to address 
the Arctic region directly. The report of the consultative meeting 
concluded that there were a number of areas of environmental protec-
tion where the particular Arctic conditions should be more distinctly 
reflected. The existing legal instruments was seen as the basis for 
‘improved Arctic environmental protection through a strengthening and 
broader application’ (Protecting the Arctic Environment, 1990, p.3). 
Most of the participating states supported the idea of special legal 
measures to protect the environment in principle, but wanted to avoid 
overlapping. What was needed, according to the Swedish delegation, 
were ‘clearer guidelines and measures to protect the environment’. 
Rules also had to be followed. The Swedish view was that much can 
be accomplished through existing conventions and agreements; a 
wide range of international treaties applicable  the Arctic region exists 
(Statement by the Swedish Delegation, 1989, p.3-4).  
The Canadians emphasized that the process of elaborating multi-
lateral legal instruments can be ‘arduous and time consuming,’ so if  
‘we agree on the need for one or more such instruments we should 
begin the preparatory process as soon as possible’. The Canadians 
stressed that the negotiation of a treaty or other legal instrument is not 
enough: ‘The treaty must be brought into force and many well founded 
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treaties take years to come into force because of the slow pace of the 
ratification process’. They were concerned about delays in the ‘light of 
the accelerating threats to the Arctic environment’. Moreover, it was 
not enough to ratify treaties. They have to be applied and 
implemented. The Canadians emphasized the need for ‘concrete 
measures to apply and enforce the obligations we accept’ (Statement 
by the Canadian Delegation, 1989, p.4). Despite these reservations 
the Canadians believed that an ‘urgent need exists for comprehensive 
measures to safeguard our northern ecosystems from the adverse 
effects of human activities’ (Statement by the Canadian Delegation, 
1989, p.2).  
Most critical to developing new regional and legal measures to 
protect the Arctic was Norway. The Norwegians stressed that ‘we 
should avoid overlapping and double work with earlier and ongoing 
efforts’. They pointed out the importance of other international efforts; 
‘We shall be well advised to keep in mind also the numerous other 
ongoing initiatives dealing with environmental problems both at 
regional and global levels’ (Statement of the Norwegian Delegation, 
1989, p.15).  
In addition, according to Norway, ‘the legal framework applicable 
in the Arctic would be strengthened considerably if participating states 
would become parties to various legal instruments that are already in 
place’ (Opening Statement by the Head of the Norwegian Delegation, 
1990, p.4). There was no need for new rules:  
 
... unless participating states would also become contracting parties to 
the basic instruments which already exist, chances are less that new 
rules would become really effective (Opening Statement by the Head of 
the Norwegian Delegation, 1990, p.5). 
 
The aim of the Arctic environmental cooperation should, 
according to Norway, be to seek and identify problems which were not 
already covered by existing international agreements. The solution to 
the environmental challenges and problems in the Arctic cannot be 
sought in isolation from broader and regional efforts at protecting and 
improving the natural environment of man. The Norwegian view 
summarizes the approach chosen then; ‘To a large extent, the relevant 
agreements are already in place, only waiting for wider adherence and 
more effective implementation’ (Stoltenberg, 1991, p.2).  
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The AEPS Working Groups  
 
The sense of the need for special measures in the Arctic region had, 
to a large extent, been lost in the preparatory process by 1991. The 
political interpretation of the preparatory process was actually that few 
special measures were needed. The countries aimed at a ‘practical’ 
and ‘pragmatic’ approach; according to the statement by the chair of 
the Yellowknife meeting, ‘it seems clear that the process of Arctic 
environmental cooperation is evolving into a practical and pragmatic 
search for solutions to issues of common interest’ (Statement by the 
Chair, 1990, p.2). 
The concrete measure taken by the states in 1991 was the 
establishment of four different working groups: Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Program (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 
(CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR).  
The object of the AMAP was the measurement of pollution levels 
in the Arctic environment and their effect assessment. The states 
noted that the pollution data available from the region was mostly 
based on national research programs. In order to have better 
documentation on the environmental situation in the Arctic inter-
national cooperation was needed (AEPS, 1991, p.31). AMAP was 
established: to provide ‘integrated assessment reports on status and 
trends in the condition of Arctic ecosystems,’to identify ‘possible 
causes for changing conditions, ‘to detect ‘emerging problems, their 
possible cause, and the potential risk to Arctic ecosystems including 
indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents,’ and to ‘recommend 
actions required to reduce risks to Arctic ecosystems’ (AEPS, 1991, 
p.33).  
CAFF was established to become ‘a distinct forum for scientists, 
indigenous peoples and conservation managers’ in the Arctic to 
exchange data and information and to collaborate for more effective 
research, sustainable utilization and conservation (AEPS, 1991, p.40). 
Jeanne Pagnan from the CAFF secretariat describes the importance 
of the establishment of the working group on conservation; ‘nothing as 
such existed before at all’ (Pagnan, 1996). 
Both PAME and EPPR became forums for state officials and can 
be compared with the other working groups which had larger 
participation. PAME was given the task of reviewing the relevance of 
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international instruments for the protection of the marine environment 
in the Arctic (AEPS, 1991, p.34-35). EPPR was established to review 
existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements in order to evaluate the 
adequacy of the geographical region by cooperative arrangements 
(AEPS, 1991, p.37). 
These working groups have produced reports, guidelines and 
strategies. For example, PAME suggested the development of an 
Arctic regional action programme to address land-based sources of 
marine pollution and guidelines for offshore petroleum activities. The 
rationale for these guidelines, according to the PAME, is that  no 
single instrument completely addresses the problems associated with 
land-based sources of marine pollution in the Arctic (PAME, 1996, 
p.14-16). The work of CAFF is another example of the development 
strategies and applications typical of the work done within the AEPS in 
dealing with regional concerns. The Habitat Conservation Strategy and 
the Circumpolar Protected Area Network are considered by CAFF to 
provide a common framework for the Arctic countries to ensure a 
necessary level of habitat protection. The species-based initiatives of 
CAFF contribute to the achievement of habitat and ecosystems-
oriented goals, to the maintenance of the biodiversity within the Arctic 
regions, and provide the information needed for effective conservation 
and management actions (CAFF, 1995-1996, p.1-4).   
Several guidelines were accepted by  ministers at the AEPS 
meeting in Alta 1997: Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assess-
ment in the Arctic, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, and the 
Arctic Guide for Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(SAAO, 1997). This approach was claimed to save time and money. 
Although the guidelines are not legally binding, they are still expected 
to make a difference to the current situation which does not have any 
direction. The strength of this approach is in avoiding duplication and 
increasing the awareness of the Arctic outside the region (Mähönen, 
1996).  
In a recent study on environmental protection in polar regions and 
international law, Donald Rothwell (1997, p.240) defined the AEPS as 
an example of ‘soft’ international law. Cooperation among Arctic states 
is based on compiling knowledge and developing action programmes, 
guidelines and strategies instead of legally binding international 
treaties. Rothwell (1995, p.281) describes the current Arctic 
environmental protection regime as, a ‘collection of customary 
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international law, fragmented multilateral and bilateral legal 
instruments dealing with some Arctic issues and global international 
instruments that have an impact in the Arctic’.   
Most often regimes are defined as multilateral agreements among 
states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area 
(Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p.495). For Haas (1980, p.358), they 
are ‘norms, rules and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an 
issue-area’. The expected result of a regime is rules for dealing with 
the problem at hand. As Young (1980, p.333) suggests, ‘the core of 
every international regime is a collection of  
rights and rules’. For the mainstream regime theorists, the rules written 
as agreements and conventions are thought of as ‘specific 
prescriptions and proscriptions for action’. Norms, rules and principles 
are, in fact, considered by most students of the subject to be the ‘basic 
defining characteristic of a regime’. This emphasis is seen in the 
definition of regimes developed by Stephen Krasner. For him, regimes 
are ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1982, p.186). 
Sovereignty, legal rules and the state require the other in a tight, 
unbroken circle; it requires that a formally connected set of rules 
operate exclusively in some manifold space and time. For a given time 
and a place there can be only one set of rules operating (Onuf, 1989, 
p.141).  The term ‘sovereignty’ had, for a long time, expressed the 
idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political 
community. Hinsley (1986, p.26) points out that this definition needs 
an addition ‘and no final and absolute power exists elsewhere’. The 
enforcement assumed in the emphasis on the legality of rules is often 
‘an illusion,’ for a constructivist.  The fact that rules are not followed 
does not mean that there are no rules. Nor does the lack of interna-
tional authority to enforce those rules make it impossible to have rules 
of action. According to Nicholas Onuf (1989, p.76), rule does not mean 
legal rule in the narrow sense of formal and enforceable.  
Rules for the constructivist rules are persuasive to the extent that 
provide instrumental guidance and reflect moral considerations. 
Understanding norms as a rule and as embedded in social institutions 
act like structures shaping the  behavior of states. The strength of this 
understanding is that such a norm as a rule must have an ‘aura of 
legitimacy’ despite the origin of the norm or the way it originated. The 
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reason for following such norms is not based on enforcement but on 
their perceived legitimacy (Florini, 1996, p.364-365). This view is 
shared by Audie Klotz; international norms do not, strictly speaking, 
determine behavior since they constitute identities and interests, and 
define a range of legitimate policy options (Klotz, 1995, p.461-462; see 
also Cortell and Davis, 1996). 
The most broad definition of a regime is that ‘a regime exists in 
every  
substantive issue-area in international relations... wherever there is 
regularity in behavior, some kinds of principles, norms or rules must 
exist to account for it’ (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982, p.246). Instead of 
strict rules and norms, according to Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, 
p.764), ‘we know regimes by their principled and shared understan-
dings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior’. Puchala 
and Hopkins (1982, p.246-247) define regimes as intersubjective in 
that they exist primarily as ‘participants understandings, expectations 
or convictions about legitimate, appropriate or moral behavior’.  The 
rule of state sovereignty  
 
... has conquered the world for the people by legitimizing the states, and 
only 
the states which claim to speak in their name, and it has elevated and 
institutionalized the progressive view of human affairs by attempting to 
freeze the political map in a way which has never previously been 
attempted (Mayall, 1990, p.56). 
 
Foucault suggests that the rule of sovereignty collapse into practices 
of power. Starting from practices means concentrating on concrete 
events; practices are instances of people doing or saying or writing 
(Fairclough, 1992, p.57; Lemert and Gillan, 1982, p.34-38). These 
theoretical discussions point to an approach in which the connection of 
law and language is further studied (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). It is a 
‘Durkheimian’ position as suggested by Kratochwil (1984, p.686; see 
also Lynch, 1994, p.590). The practices of governing reconstitute and 
construct the practices of sovereignty in the Arctic.  According to Fou-
cault: ‘the success of history belongs to those who can seize these 
rules,  replace those who had used them, disguise themselves so as 
to pervert them, invert their meaning, redirect them against those who 
had initially imposed them and in controlling this complex mechanism 
they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their 
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own rules’ (Foucault, 1977, p.151).  
 
 
States and Indigenous Peoples 
 
Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic 
 
The countries bordering the Arctic Circle - the United States, Canada, 
Den-mark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia - have indigenous 
peoples living in the Arctic region. The only exception is Iceland. In 
North America, the words ‘aboriginal’ peoples or ‘natives’ are often 
used. In Alaska, the indigen-ous peoples include the Inuit (Eskimos), 
the Aleuts, the Athabascan Indians and the Southeast Coastal Indians. 
The Sámi is the only indigenous group in Norway, Sweden and 
Finland. There is a Sámi population living on the Kola peninsula in 
Russia. Besides the ‘26 small peoples’ recognized by Russian law, 
there are many other indigenous peoples in the Russian north and far 
east  
(see Dahl, 1993, p.105-107).  
The most serious environmental change affecting indigenous 
peoples and their communities in the Arctic is the constriction of 
indigenous controlled land. This continues to the present. The loss of 
land is also a question of losing one’s community, way of life and 
identity: ‘When land is lost the resource base is diminished, but it also 
implies an encroachment upon an essential part of the culture itself’ 
(Dahl, 1993, p.125). This development is not a recent phenomenon; 
the process of losing control over the land has continued for centuries. 
It is a process characterized by acts of  defining and redefining the 
status of indigenous peoples and their lands, and by granting and 
denying rights to land through different legislative measures. 
For the Sámi, establishing national sovereignty over Sámi land 
has been seen as a process which also transferred any Sámi rights 
over land and natural resources to the respective states. The fact that 
the Sámi never made any treaties concerning their tradition and rights 
only confirmed the official notion of the Sámi as a being a people 
without land rights (Brantenberg, 1991; see also Korsmo, 1993; 
Korpijaakko-Labba, 1989; Henriksen, 1996). The Sámi representative 
to the AEPS preparatory process emphasized the importance of 
historical rights and tied  historical developments to indigenous 
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identity: ‘It is due to the history of colonization of Arctic marginal areas 
that the indigenous cultures are regarded as users of resources than 
owners’ (Aikio, 1990, p.4).   
The Sámi claim to self-determination is the basis for their nation 
and separate identity as a people. According to the Sámi Council, the 
Sámi are ‘an indigenous population of Sapmi. Our people have in-
habited Sapmi from time immemorial, tending land and water with 
great respect and care’. The claim to self-determination includes the 
right to decide the use of natural resources. According to the Sámi 
view as the ‘established owners’ of the land and water in Sapmi, ‘this 
makes it not only our right but also our duty to protect natural 
resources for the needs of future generations’ (Sámi Programme of 
the Environment, 1990, p.2). The issue of land rights remains in 
contention. According to a recent opinion of the Sámi Council: ‘The 
question of Sámi land rights is now the main source of conflict 
between the nation states and the Sámi peoples. The states involved 
seem unable to solve this conflict nation-ally’ (Kuokkanen, 1997). 
An exception in Scandinavian politics is Greenland. The colonial 
status of Greenland was abolished in 1953 and, following a 
referendum, home rule for Greenland was established in 1979. Home 
rule was defined in territorial terms, which means that electorate of 
Greenland consists of both resident Inuit and Danes. The home rule 
authorities have assumed control of health, taxation, industry, 
transportation, social services, environment and education. The 
Danish government retains control of defense and foreign affairs. The 
transition to home rule has been a gradual process and difficulties in 
achieving autonomy hinged on Greenland remaining dependent on 
Denmark for  
economic support (Nuttall, 1992; Dahl, 1993; Larsen, 1992).  
The process of collectivization under the Soviet rule in Russia led 
to a disruption of indigenous land use practices and lifestyles in the 
1930's (Vakhtin, 1992; Slezkine, 1994). In 1990, Russian president 
Boris Yeltsin encouraged regional elites to ‘take as much sovereignty 
as you can swallow’ and, as Greg Poelzer notes, ‘they did’. The 
process of devolution - transferring power from the central government 
to local governments - has been accompanied by a policy of economic 
self-sufficiency. In the past, local aboriginal communities received 
large subsidies from the state, however, today self-government means 
also self-financing. There is a crisis of authority. Authority has been 
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transferred to local governments without a corresponding 
institutionalization of political power and the financial means to govern 
(Poelzer, 1995, p. 207-212; see also Fondahl, 1995; Osherenko, 
1995).  
In Alaska, the solution to define the land ownership relationship 
between the state and indigenous peoples was given in the Alaska 
Native Claims Act (ANCSA) in 1971. All  claims of ‘aboriginal title’ by 
the Indians, Aleut and Inuit living in Alaska was extinguished by in 
exchange of monetary payments and rearranging land ownership in 
Alaska.  Once the land was acquired, natives became the third largest 
land owners in Alaska (Arnold, 1976, p.160).  
Two questions were left open by the ANCSA arrangement: the 
issues of subsistence and sovereignty. The problem with the arran-
gement was the hunting and fishing rights, which were considered by 
the indigenous peoples as essential to their subsistence. The State of 
Alaska does not recognize any native right to hunt, fish and gather. 
Congress, however, has enacted special provisions respecting the 
subsistence activities of the Alaska natives (Flanders, 1989).  
ANCSA is a land settlement act and says nothing about  
indigenous politics and self-government. The tribal sovereignty 
movement in Alaska wants to revive the traditional and Indian Reor-
ganization Act Councils that had existed since the 1930's. They want 
to turn their corporation’s land over to the tribal government. The advo-
cates of this strategy hope to extend their powers over all aspects of 
management, including that of fish and game. In contrast, the leaders 
of native corporations sought solutions that did not involve tribal 
governments (Morehouse, 1989; Kasayulie, 1992; Fienup-Riordan, 
1992).The State of Alaska has argued against the special native rights 
based on the tribal model of Indian country and ‘domestic dependent 
sovereignty’ (see, Price 1982).    
The developing relationship between the Inuit and the 
Government of Canada is of interest for the entire indigenous peoples 
community. In an agreement made in 1992, the Inuit of the Nortwest 
Territories:  
Cede, release and surrender to Her Majesty The Queen in Right of 
Canada all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and interests, if any, in and 
to lands and waters anywhere within Canada and adjacent offshore 
areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada (Nunavut Agree-
ment 1992, p.11).  
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The arrangement accepted in 1992 included a land claim settlement 
for a region called Nunavut. The remainder of the land was to become 
Crown land owned by the federal state. The agreement contains 
monetary compensation. In addition, the Nunavut were to have their 
own legislature assembly with powers similar to those existing with the 
Northwestern Territories’ Legislative Assembly. Because of the 
composition of the population in the Nunavut, the model of self-
government is  based on ethnicity (Nunavut Agreement, 1992, p.235). 
The Inuit of Greenland, Alaska and Canada claim to be ‘one 
indivisible people with a common language, culture, environment and 
concerns’. It is ‘only boundaries of certain nations’ that separate the 
Inuit and the ‘oneness of its culture, environment and land and the 
wholeness of the homeland’. The Inuit view is that ‘borderlines 
separating us today were not drawn nor accepted by us. We have 
never given up our sovereignty’ (in Lauritzen, 1980, p.235).  
Despite steps in recognizing the economic and political rights of 
the indigenous peoples of Canada, their rights were not recognized for 
a long time in the Canadian constitution, although there were several 
attempts in the negotiations during the 1980’s (see, for example, 
Schwartz, 1986). The ‘positive’ interpretation of the nature of 
indigenous rights was stressed in the Royal Commission Report on 
Aboriginal Peoples in 1996. It proposed calling for the recognition that 
‘Aboriginal peoples are the original inhabitants and caretakers of this 
land and have distinctive rights and responsibilities flowing from that 
status’. The report raises the need for constitutional amendment in the 
Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, including recognizing ‘the inherent 
right of self-government as an Aboriginal right’ (Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, 1996, p.11). 
These national differences in relations between states and 
indigenous peoples suggest that the issue of sovereignty and self-
determination cannot be excluded from Arctic environmental 
cooperation. The claim to self-determination is the basis for the 
collective identity of the indigenous peoples in the Arctic. The resol-
ution adopted in the Arctic leaders’ meeting in 1973 stated that the 
representatives have recognized their respective identity through 
these discussions: 
 
We are autonomous peoples, that is, we are an integral part of the very 
lands and waters we have traditionally used and occupied. Our identity 
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and culture is firmly rooted in these lands and waters. It is this rela-
tionship which constitutes the very unique features of our cultural identity 
in contrast to the cultures of other peoples within each of the countries 
from which we come (Kleivan, 1992, p.231).  
   
The common Arctic identity of indigenous peoples is based on the 
idea of ‘there is only one Arctic and that we share one future together’. 
Concern for the health, well-being and ultimate survival of their 
peoples was voiced at the 1991 Summit of The Arctic Leaders 
following the first ministerial meeting of the Arctic environmental 
cooperation. The Arctic leaders required that state governments 
recognize and satisfy the rights of indigenous peoples to self-govern-
ment, lands, renewable and non-renewable resources, and to recog-
nize their cultural, social and economic rights (Faegteborg, 1993, 
p.34). 
 
Protecting Indigenous Peoples 
 
For the Greenlandic representative it was clear that most of the 
indigenous peoples living within the Arctic have not obtained the posi-
tion of political or economic self-government. However, having self-
government is not enough: 
 
... Even where we do possess such powers internally - like in Greenland 
- we can only act within our own region and on our sources of possible 
pollution - and not on the sources, which lie outside our own lands and 
region (Olsen, 1991, p.2).  
 
Protection of the indigenous peoples and their rights is seen as the 
responsibility of the Arctic states. The Greenlandic representative 
noted that: 
  
Only the nation states - and only the nation states of the Arctic in  full 
cooperation - hold the means, and the power to actually do something to 
counteract the environmental threats to the Arctic environment, thereby 
helping us to save our very culture (Olsen, 1991, p.2).  
 
The indigenous peoples saw the issue of environmental 
protection as one of including concerns other than those purely related 
to the protection of the environment. The representative for the Finnish 
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Sámi pointed out that ‘When considering the protection of environment 
in connection with indigenous peoples it shall be noticed that the 
issues cannot deal with the natural environment only’. The Sámi 
representative noted that ‘it is important, in this regard, to consider 
whether the agenda for the proposed ministerial conference would 
include the issues regarding Arctic native peoples’ (Aikio, 1990, p.14).  
Protecting the environment is also a question of human rights for 
the Sámi. According to the Sámi, it is possible to regard environmental 
rights in connection with the land rights and human rights. For the 
Sámi, ‘the problem is that the legal regulation also in the 
Fennoscandian north is based on the principles of agriculture and not 
on those of the extensive Arctic culture’. The Sámi view is that Arctic 
cultures do not enjoy sufficient legal protection and they are often 
open to free competition where everyone wishes to use the resources 
of the Arctic nature as effectively as possible. The ultimate conclusion 
by the states is that  
 
... the Arctic nature must be protected from the human influence. This 
leads to the situation where the Arctic cultures become subject to restric-
tions although they originally were not hazardous for the survival of the 
Arctic nature (Aikio, 1990, p. 14). 
 
The Sámi representative emphasized that ‘in the vast Arctic 
circumpolar region a great number of indigenous peoples are living still 
partly according to their ancient traditions’ (Aikio, 1990, p.14). The 
Sámi representatives point it out that national legislation and regula-
tions can be detrimental to sustainability if the traditional knowledge 
and indigenous peoples’ own relationship with nature are unnecessar-
ily violated (Utsi, 1996, p.2). 
The Arctic indigenous peoples have noted that it is not ‘fully 
accurate to imply that countries would fulfil their national and 
international responsibilities in the Arctic if they ensure the future 
health and well-being of Arctic ecosystems’ (ICC, 1990, p.1).  
 For indigenous peoples, the question is of a right to development 
and environment for them. The Inuit consider it a human right to have 
‘a decisive influence on the development of projects which are planned 
at, in, or influencing our territory - be it land or sea’. The Inuit saw  
environmental cooperation in the Arctic from this perspective: ‘environ-
mental and human rights have a clear connection in this context’ 
(Lynge A., 1992, p.9). It is an issue of human rights that Inuit tradi-
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tional knowledge about the environment and living resources is taken 
into consideration. It is a violation of human rights when the natural 
resources on which the existence of the Inuit are based are contami-
nated and by that, threaten their health (see Principles and Elements 
for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy, 1992).  
 Northern indigenous peoples are not looking for independence 
from the states but for the protection of their rights to the environment 
by the states. For example, the Association of Indigenous Minorities of 
the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian Federation is looking 
for ‘a special status’ for indigenous peoples including, primarily, ‘the 
existence of a mechanism that does not permit the ignoring of the 
political and social demands of the Small Peoples’ and second, such a 
mechanism would have ‘a legal foundation’. This special status also 
includes its own structures of self-government for indigenous peoples. 
The association suggests the establishment of parks and reserves and 
other forms of protected territories in which indigenous peoples could 
live ‘undisturbed, practice their traditional professional activities and 
take part in preserving nature’ (Sanghi, 1996, p.69-70).  
 
Environmental Rights 
 
The demand of indigenous peoples is to be considered as ‘peoples’ 
and claim their right to self-determination. Self-determination is 
understood as the right to autonomy and self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs. For example, in the case of 
the Nunavut, the agreement  include rights of economic activities, 
land,  resource management, and the environment. The agreement 
recognizes that the Inuit are ‘traditional and current users’ of wildlife, 
and their right to harvest wildlife stems from their traditional and 
current use. The Inuit are also users of certain marine areas, especia-
lly the land-fast ice zones. The agreement recognizes that there is a 
need for a system of wildlife management that complements Inuit 
harvesting rights and priorities, and recognizes Inuit systems of wildlife 
management that contribute to the conservation of wildlife and the 
protection of wildlife habitats. The government, however, retains 
ultimate responsibility for wildlife management (Nunavut Agreement, 
1992, p.26). 
The agreement provides the Inuit with a role in international 
negotiations:  
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The Government of Canada shall include Inuit representation in 
discussions leading to the formulation of government positions in relation 
to an international agreement relating to Inuit wildlife harvesting rights in 
the Nunavut Settlement Area, which discussions shall extend beyond 
those discussions generally available to non-governmental organizations 
(Nunavut Agreement, 1992, p. 54). 
 
A recent Canadian government report notes that it is ‘important 
that indigenous peoples’ representatives have opportunities exert 
influence at the early stages of policy development, i.e. domestic 
milieu - which may then lead to the international discussion table’ 
(Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, 1997, p.168). The Canadian 
government and northern indigenous peoples have clearly arrived to a 
mutually beneficial arrangement. According to the agreement, the 
sovereignty of Canada over the waters of the Arctic archipelago is 
supported by Inuit use and occupancy (Nunavut Agreement, 1992, 
p.135). 
In the Nuuk Declaration in 1993 the states acknowledged 
Principle 22 of the Rio declaration, which emphasized the role of 
indigenous peoples in advancing sustainable development (The Nuuk 
Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic 1993, p.4). 
According to the article 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development adopted in 1992 in UNCED: 
 
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities, 
have a vital role in environmental management and development 
because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should  
recognize and duly support their identity, culture, and interests and 
enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable 
development. 
 
The evolving international standards on indigenous peoples 
postulate  their right ‘to the conservation, restoration and protection of 
the total environment’ (Tomasevski, 1995, p.258; 260). The 
relationship between indigenous peoples, the environment and self-
government were recognized by the UN meeting of experts in 1991. 
Experts concluded that the ‘self-government of indigenous peoples is 
beneficial to the protection of the natural environment and the 
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maintenance of ecological balance which helps to ensure sustainable 
development’ (The Nuuk Conclusions and Recommendations, 1991). 
The link between the environment and development was 
emphasized by the UNCED. According to Principle 3 accepted by the 
UNCED, ‘the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably 
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations’ (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
1992).  The idea of the right to development has been accepted within 
the context of the United Nations. The UN adopted the idea of the right 
to development in 1986. According to the Declaration on the Right of 
Development (1986), development is an inalienable human right. 
Since 1993, under the Commission on Human Rights, there has been 
a working group on the right to development. A special rapporteur to 
the Commission on Human rights notes that ‘the human right to 
development implies as the Declaration on the Right to Development 
makes clear the full realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination and to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources’ (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/8, p.19).  
The right to development is subjective; development has different 
meanings for different peoples. The emerging right to development 
has a special significance for indigenous peoples, since the history 
and impact of ‘development’ on indigenous peoples, their 
communities, lands, territories, and way of life has been significant 
(Sambo, 1992, p.168).  In the 1989 International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, Article 7 states that indigenous peoples 
 
... shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of 
development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-
being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use and to exercise 
control, to the extent possible, over their own economic,  social and 
cultural development. 
 
The right of self-determination includes concerns related to the 
environment. The ILO Convention states that the rights of ownership 
and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they 
traditionally occupy shall be recognized. Governments are required to 
take the necessary steps to identify the lands which the peoples 
concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection 
of their rights of ownership and possession. The states are also 
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expected to take measures which will ‘safeguard the right of the 
peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but 
to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and 
traditional activities’ (ILO Convention, 1989, article 14). 
The ILO Convention has been ratified by only Norway and 
Denmark from the Arctic states. The main obstacle to ratification in the 
other Scandinavian countries is found in the same section that states 
the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over 
the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized (Beach, 
1994, p.197).  
An earlier human right´s instrument, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1996) can be interpreted in a way that 
emphasizes the need for states to ensure the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their lands and natural resources. Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) states that 
‘in countries where there are ethnic or linguistic minorities, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right to practice 
their own culture and use their own language’. Whether or not Article 
27 of the Covenant also covers territorial rights (the rights to land and 
water) depends on the understanding of the concept of culture 
contained within the provision. The question is whether it also covers 
the material foundation, the economic and physical basis, of the 
culture of an ethnic minority. If so, 
the article may include the right to natural resources (Boyle, 1996). 
One possible interpretation of this is the idea that each ethnic 
minority should have the right to demand a real basis that is decisive 
for just that minority´s enjoyment of its culture. This interpretation is 
based on the view that indigenous peoples are in great need of 
protection for their traditional use of land and water, because the 
relationship between the environment of their culture and the exercise 
of their traditional trades is particularly strong. This view indicates that 
the use of natural resources and other economic circumstances 
should be covered to the extent to which this is decisive for the group’s 
maintenance and development of its own culture (Smith, 1991, p.125). 
The 1989 ILO Convention recognized the right of indigenous 
peoples to take participate in the conduct of public affairs and in decis-
ions which affected them directly, such as  land rights, social security 
and health. Article 15 provides for the rights of the peoples concerned 
to the natural resources on their lands to be specially safeguarded and 
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that these rights shall include the right to participate in the use, 
management and conservation of those resources. This Article has 
been interpreted to mean that under the Convention indigenous 
peoples have a right to control over their lands and they should be 
granted special political group rights. In particular, those rights should 
include representative organs and appropriate mechanisms for having 
‘a real impact’ on decisions taken at the national, regional and local 
levels which effect their identity (see Myntti, 1996, p.24-25).  
Garth Netthein points out that international law ought to be suffi-
cient in principle to meet the claims of indigenous peoples: ‘it is the 
implementation of the law which blocks them’ (Nettheim, 1988, p.120). 
The UN experts affirm this view:  
 
Although there is still a need to develop rules in order to lay a legal 
foundation for this right and improve the machinery for its protection, the 
fact remains that there are enough frameworks for action in existence at 
the present time for it to be effectively implemented (E/CN.4/Sub.2/19-
91/8, p.29).  
 
One reason for this is, according to the UN rapporteur, that non-
participation in decision-making at the international and national level 
has been and remains at the root of imposed development choices or -
strategies that have done grave harm to the environment. However, 
the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the 
political unity of independent states are often preferred at the expense 
of the principle to the self-government of indigenous peoples in 
different national practices (Myntti, 1995, p.137-138). 
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Practices of Power 
 
‘Indigenous’ 
   
Fredrik Barth’s focuses on boundaries used to maintain and construct 
ethnicity. Ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification 
by the actors themselves and thus, have the characteristic of 
organizing interaction between people. Barth stresses the different 
processes in generating and maintaining ethnic groups by constituting 
ethnic boundaries. He focuses on internal maintenance of  boundaries, 
but notes that ethnic groups are connected to each by interdependent 
relations which may be differ from co-residence and competition to 
reciprocity (Barth, 1969, p.16-17).  
Making boundaries and defining identities is an act of power. 
From the Foucaultian standpoint, ‘indigenous’ in political terms is a 
statement of power. The principle of indigenousness may be defined 
essentially in political terms that acknowledge the special status of the 
original occupants of a territory and aims at resorting rights and 
entitlement that flow from recognition of this special unique 
relationship with the state. It provides the ‘theory’ as well as the 
practices for redefining indigenous-state relations; self-determination 
and self-government is the practical expression of this theory (Fleras 
and Elliott, 1992, p.30).  
Jens Dahl makes a difference between the rights of indigenous 
peoples in their relations with the states and the relationship that they 
have with the environment. He stresses that cultural rights should be 
kept separate from rights based on state legal systems or specified 
rights to natural resources. Self-determination, Dahl (1996, p.17) 
claims, is ‘first of all and act of cultural identity and secondly a right to 
be claimed within national and international law’. Dahl makes a clear 
difference between cultural identity and the legislative identity of 
indigenous peoples.  
Foucault’s idea of identity is the opposite of Dahl’s understanding. 
The relationship between states and individuals is defined in terms of 
‘rights’: The focus is on how indigenous identities are defined by 
legislative measures and by granting rights. In Foucault’s terms, ‘what 
enables the identity of a community to be defined is political practices 
of subjection’ (Simons, 1995, p.53).  
The individual to which power has been constituted is its vehicle. 
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As a human subject is put into a position of an object he or she is 
placed in a complex network of power relations. The individual is not 
the vis-a-vis of power; it is one of its prime effects. The state acts on 
the individual but in the process a new, general type of individual is 
produced. Foucault does not deny the negative repressive force of the 
state. He insists that power relations are more complex. The state 
segregates, labels, creates and oppresses (Foucault, 1980a, p.98).  
The techniques of self also include resistance. The individuals 
can be seen as ‘self-determining agents who are capable of 
challenging and resisting the structures of domination in modern 
society’ (McNay, 1992, p.4). However, ‘there are no good subjects of 
resistance,’ therefore nobody is innocent, original or outside the grid of 
power (Foucault, 1980b, p.257). 
This view does not look for origins as an epistemologically 
problematic quest for ahistorical and asocial essences. The search for 
the origin of a particular historical phenomenon implicitly posits some 
form of original identity prior to the flux and movement of history. The 
Foucaultian approach emphasizes a nonessentialist definition of 
identities; identities are made by political decisions and through 
legislative documents (Foucault, 1980a, p.98). 
For governmentality the word indigenousness does not refer to 
‘origins,’ since all human beings are indigenous in some way, but here, 
it is a reference to groups that occupy a determined position in society 
because of specific historical developments. The word ‘indigenous’ 
refers to a set of relations between states and population groups as a 
historical continuity from the occupation of the territories inhabited by 
these groups to the demands for their specific rights because of injus-
tices suffered and for their special quality as being indigenous - 
claiming to be the original occupants of the region (Stavenhagen, 
1994, p. 14; 16-17).  
The word ‘indigenous’ refers to both descendants of the original 
inhabitants of a territory which has been overcome by conquest and to 
peoples who have characteristics of a national minority including a 
common language, re-ligion, culture and other identifying characte-
ristics, and a relationship to a par- ticular territory but are subjugated 
by a dominant culture and society (Assies,  1994, p.49). A minority is 
‘a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a 
nondominant position, whose members - being nationals of the state - 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
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those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense 
of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, 
religion or language’ according to Article 27 of the International  
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).  Although there is an 
overlap in the distinction between indigenous peoples and minorities, 
‘indigenous’ refers to peoples who have been affected by the past 500 
years of colonialism. Most indigenous peoples satisfy definitions of 
‘minority’ but many minorities are not indigenous (Thornberry 1991, 
p.331; see also Sanders, 1993). 
Indigenous peoples claim to have a special relationship to the 
environment and to the land where they have lived for millennia. 
Indigenous peoples are people ‘who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or 
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions’ (see 
ILO Convention, 1989, article 1). 
The perception of indigenous peoples as a ‘problem’ to be solved 
constitutes the central motif in the evolution of statehood in the Arctic. 
Strategies for the solution of the problem at the national level have 
changed from a commitment to assimilation by segregation, wardship 
and protection, through to the era of integration and formal equality in 
the post second world war era and the arrangements for limited 
autonomy in 1970's and 1980's. Developments in the circumpolar 
region have common features, although the phases and modes of 
policies are different. The tradition of how states treat the indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic has been based on using different definitions and 
policies for different groups of indigenous peoples in national legisla-
tion. This tradition is continued in the international practices of 
cooperation within the circumpolar region.  
The contribution of the Foucaultian approach to the study of 
power is to show how relations of ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ have been 
constituted discursively: how agency is denied to some things and not 
to others, and how structures could be said to have determined some 
things and not others. Foucault’s theory is extremely constitutive but 
neither agency nor structure is given primacy (Clegg 1989, p.158).   
This view questions the macro-level analysis of power relations 
suggested by international relations theorists and suggests that power 
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should be studied as an event, in a different space-time form to its 
emergence, at the microlevel. Typical to the traditional formulation of 
power is to reduce it to those who have the power in terms of material 
or intellectual resources or to the institutions of power. Power, in the 
Foucaultian view, is not the possession of a certain amount of material 
capability but is exercised by drawing upon material and authoritative 
resources (Foucault, 1980a, p.95-96). This view challenges the 
traditional view of international relations theory on power according to 
which power was which as seen, shown and manifested. This 
approach sees international politics as social rather than strictly 
material (Wendt, 1987, p.360; Dunne, 1995a, p.371-372).  
Power is a name given to the complex strategic situation in a 
society. Power is an ‘intrinsic element of interdependence’ (Milner, 
1991, p. 83; Rood, 1989, p.73; Keohane and Nye, p. 1977, 11). 
Intersubjectivity and considerations of power are not separate; power 
does not exit independently of human relations. Power does not 
depend on consent; the relationship of power can be the result of a 
prior or permanent consent but it is not by nature the manifestation of 
a consensus. Power has to be understood as a process and  a 
continuous struggle. Power is productive; it is a network of relations 
structuring a phenomenon, defining a space of interaction or a field of 
possibilities. It is not only force that restrains and constrains actors.  
Rather, it is a force that also produces something (Foucault, 1982a, 
p.220-224).  
Power is nonsubjective. The question is not who has power, it is 
how is it that subjects are constituted (Foucault, 1980a, p.97).  Power 
exists ‘between’ people: ‘the ´other´ (the one over whom power is 
exercised) is thoroughly recognized in the end as a person who acts; 
and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of 
responses, reactions, results and possible interventions may open up’. 
Power resides in the inter-world; ‘... it is always a way of acting upon 
an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being 
capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions’ (Foucault, 
1982a, p.220).  
 
Indigenous Peoples’ Participation  
 
At the first consultative meeting in Rovaniemi 1989 the participants 
were officials either from different ministries of the environment or of 
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foreign affairs. Some national delegations included researchers as 
delegates. The issue of the involvement of indigenous peoples was 
discussed in the meeting. There was no one solution to this issue, in 
that: ‘different situations in the Arctic countries may call for different 
ways of achieving this’. However, it was considered that ‘indigenous 
peoples should be involved in future work since they bear the burdens 
of environmental degradation directly’ (Consultative Meeting on the 
Protection of the Arctic Environment, 1989, p.6).  
A further problem has been in defining which groups should be 
included into the process as representatives of indigenous peoples. It 
has not always been clear who the indigenous peoples are in the 
Arctic. As the Danish representative noted: 
 
I think in a way we are all indigenous but in different places. We all want 
to influence our own fate and protect our homelands just as the in-
digenous peoples of the North want. These endeavors are our 
endeavors (Haarder, 1991, p.4).  
 
This idea of doubting (or questioning) the demand of indigenous 
groups, as I interpret the previous statement, has changed 
considerably within the AEPS experience. Recognizing the role of indi-
genous peoples has produced a new word in the AEPS language: 
IPO’s (Indigenous Peoples Organizations). The recognition of IPO’s as 
actors in the process is an acknowledgment of the fact that these 
organizations have played a major role in developing the AEPS 
(Petersen, 1996).  
The Danish contribution to indigenous peoples’ participation was 
important. Denmark stressed that it shared ‘Arctic responsibility’ in 
close cooperation with Greenland. It is therefore ‘impossible to talk 
about Danish Arctic policies without simultaneously looking at what is 
going on in Greenland’. The Danish representative emphasized that: 
‘To a considerable extent Greenlandic Home Rule policies simply are 
Danish policies’ (Statement by the Danish Delegation, 1989, p.2). The 
Sámi Council representative stresses that the efforts and pressure by 
Sweden on other Scandinavian countries to involve indigenous 
peoples as observers was important  (Halonen, 1996a). 
It was the Canadian representative who suggested that ‘sufficient 
attention is given to the interest, roles and involvement of northern 
regional governments indigenous peoples, industry and non-
governmental organizations’ (Statement by the Canadian Delegation, 
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1989, p.3). The idea became real at the Yellowknife preparatory 
meeting where some Inuit and Sámi representatives were present. 
The Inuit representative considered as important the ‘direct 
participation of indigenous peoples at all stages of an Arctic 
sustainable and equitable development strategy, so that indigenous 
perspectives, values and practices can be fully accommodated’ (ICC, 
1990, p.2).  
The Inuit representative suggested, ‘an effective cooperative 
process that would ensure the direct involvement of indigenous 
peoples in the Finnish initiative’. Different steps were suggested to 
involve indigenous peoples in the process: 1) distributing information 
about the  process itself, 2) preparing a detailed proposal on 
indigenous participation, 3) giving financial support for indigenous 
participation, and 4) organizing a preparatory meeting of indigenous 
peoples. The wish of the indigenous peoples’ organizations was for 
indigenous peoples’ relations with state governments to be based on 
‘principles of cooperation and respect, rather than on unilateral state 
action’ (Simon, 1990, p.3).  
Three Arctic indigenous people’s organizations have been 
‘permanent observers’ within the process since 1991. The Inuit 
Cirucmpolar Conference (ICC) represents the Inuit way of life in 
Alaska, Canada and Greenland. It was established in Barrow, Alaska 
1977. The Inuit residing in the Russian republics were accepted as full 
members of the ICC at the 1992 meeting. The ICC concentrates on 
international relations and issues concerning the Inuit, in contrast to 
regional Inuit organizations (Creery, 1994, p.143-144; see also 
Lauritzen, 1983). 
The Association of 26 Small Peoples of the Soviet North was 
founded in Moscow in March 1990 (later known as the Association of 
Indigenous Minorities of  the North, Siberia and Far of the Russian 
Federation). The association brings together the representatives of the 
different regional organizations established at the end of 1980's 
(Dallman, 1994, p.58; see also Alia, 1991). The association was not 
present at the Yellowknife meeting. However, the Soviet repre-
sentative mentioned the association at the meeting. The role of the 
association was described as ‘to take care of the interests of the 
indigenous population at all levels of government’ (Statement from the 
Soviet Delegation, 1990, p.4). There was readiness by the Soviets to 
accept the participation of the association in the process since, 
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according to the representative, ‘appropriate policies cannot be 
worked out without the participation of indigenous peoples of the 
North’ (Statement from the Soviet Delegation, 1990, p.9).  
The Sámi Council represents the Sámi way of life in the 
Scandinavian countries of Finland, Sweden, Russia and Norway. The 
Nordic Sámi Council was established in 1956. The Sámi on the Kola 
peninsula were organized in 1989, when it became possible for them 
to organize politically (Sergejeva, 1995). The participation of the Sámi 
on the Kola Peninsula since 1992 has led to the renaming of the 
organization as The Sámi Council. The Council is responsible for 
promoting commonly held Sámi views for general knowledge and 
public discussion (Minde, 1995; Seurujärvi-Kari, 1994; Sillanpää, 
1994).  
The indigenous peoples considered the Rovaniemi ministerial 
conference in 1991 ‘historical,’ since it was the first time that 
indigenous peoples of the area participated in the preparatory process 
of making of a joint international declaration on  Arctic environmental 
conservation (Alkuperäiskansojen yhteistyö tiivistynyt arktisessa 
ympäristönsuojelussa, 1991). According to Aggaluk Lynge, the head of 
ICC delegation, ‘this was a great step for us’ (Alkuperäiskansat 
mukana arktisten alueiden ympäristökonferenssissa, 1991). The AEPS 
was characterized as ‘a long-awaited step in a mutually beneficial 
direction’ by the representative of the ICC. Lynge (1991, p.2) 
considered the participation of indigenous peoples as important since 
‘where the indigenous peoples have been displaced or otherwise lost 
control of their lands, we see that environmental destruction quickly 
follows’.  
The Sámi Council representative described the contribution of 
indigenous peoples thus ‘We the Sámi are able to agree and 
cooperate with the Arctic governments in order to combat pollution’. -
States are, however,  asked to recognize that ‘the restrictions which 
may be put through in future legislation would give us the opportunity 
to live in the Circumpolar Arctic utilizing the natural resources, our 
land, water and territories with our traditional technology’ (Halonen, 
1991, p.2).   
The representative of the Greenlandic Home Rule from the 
Danish delegation noted that the involvement of the indigenous 
peoples in the process has shown ‘an absolute positive attitude 
towards the Arctic indigenous peoples’. This positive attitude was also 
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shown ‘by incorporating our organizations in the preparatory work and 
by securing our continuing participation in the future work’ (Olsen, 
1991, p.2).  
 
Indigenous Peoples as Permanent Participants  
 
During the negotiations to establish the Council from June 1995 to 
August 1996, the theme of participation by indigenous peoples’ was 
one of the major items on the agenda. The source of the ‘problem’ in 
the negotiations was the United States who, in the meeting in 
Washington, D.C., opened the discussion by bringing a suggestion to 
add two new groups from Alaska (the Athabascans and Aleuts) to the 
category of ‘permanent participants’ in the Arctic Council. The 
discussion evolved around the issue of defining the access 
requirements for the status of a permanent participant, their number 
and involvement in the work of the Council. The progress made in 
previous negotiations was lost and the ‘Washington meeting was a 
disappointment’ according to a Finnish representative (Puurunen, 
1996).  
For the U.S. it seemed most important that ‘they [indigenous 
peoples] are there’ to participate. According to the U.S. SAAO (Senior 
Arctic Affairs’ Official), the ‘U.S. encourages indigenous participation 
into working groups’. Senseney described the negotiations on the 
issue as ‘a long and difficult discussion [on] which groups are represe-
nted’. The issue was difficult, particularly concerning representation 
from Alaska.  The term ‘Alaska Natives’ includes the Yupik, Inupiat, 
Aleut, Athabascan, Tlingit, Haida and Tsimshian peoples. They speak 
several different languages. Over half of them live in nonurban areas. 
Alaska Natives can be found in a variety of occupations and ways of 
life, from subsistence hunting and fishing to state and corporate 
offices. There are over 200  tribes, twelve regional native corporations 
and 200 village corporations in Alaska. Some Natives, though, feel 
that they are not truly represented by any of these organizations 
(Senseney, 1996). 
The aim of the Aleuts and Athabascans was ‘a representation on 
a par with three major indigenous groups’. The problem mainly 
concerned the way the organization of indigenous communities was 
instituted on the North American side of the Arctic. The ICC does not 
represent all the indigenous peoples and their local organizations in 
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North America, and only represents part of the indigenous population 
of Alaska. As a result, the Inuits do not have a mechanism in place for 
consultation with, or the provision of, constituent services with the 
other groups. Only the Inuits and the Athabascan reside within the 
geographic Arctic in Alaska but the U.S. changed its definition of the 
Arctic for the AEPS, by enlarging it to include the Aleutian chain in 
1995. This resulted in the Aleuts living on the 120 islands of the chain 
becoming ‘Arctic’ residents for AEPS purposes (Senseney, 1996).  
   The indigenous groups were looking for ‘closer involvement with 
the  
activities of the Arctic Council’. Flore Lekanof from the Aleutian/Pribilof 
Islands Association in Alaska stated the U.S. position that the Aleuts 
and Athabascans should be recognized by allowing each of their 
organizations to have ‘Permanent Participant’ status in their own right. 
 Lekanof expressed concerns over the language used in the proposal 
especially the meaning of ‘non-governmental’. In his view it would dis-
qualify all tribal governments from applying for permanent participant 
status. In February 1996, the Aleutian/Pribilof Island Association 
described the present situation as ‘hardly representative’ since they 
‘don´t have a voice’. The idea of having joint representation with other 
groups (the Dene and Athabascans, for example) did not get them 
very excited: The ‘Aleuts is not a land-based culture as the 
Athabascans are, therefore, the interests of the groups are different 
and joint representation could be difficult’ (Lekanof, 1996).  
For Randy Mayo, who represented the Council of Athabascan 
Tribal Governments, it was clear that ‘ICC does not want any other 
indigenous peoples’ organizations’. He stated that the role of new 
indigenous peoples´ organizations were relevant to the AEPS and the 
Arctic Council: ‘We wanted to get included because of this 
unsustainable resource use that is having an impact to us’. The repre-
sentative of the Athabascans was not happy to be a member of the 
U.S. delegation since ‘they do not agree with the U.S. agenda’. The 
Athabascans want to ‘stand on their own’ (Mayo, 1996). 
The Canadian Arctic Ambassador saw that be ‘the permanent 
participant category is meant exclusively for indigenous organizations’. 
A provision was kept open for ‘additional membership’. The problem is 
that ‘national groups do not have members representing indigenous 
peoples in their delegations’.  A solution had to be found to the 
question ‘how to bring in other groups’ into the negotiations. In-
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digenous involvement was a delicate issue but it was ‘indigenous 
peoples that  have to find a mechanism of their own to deal with the 
issue’ (Simon, 1996).  
From the indigenous point of view, ‘to allow everybody there 
would result in a disaster’ (Huntington, 1995). The fear was that by 
allowing other participants, the ‘voices of indigenous peoples are 
diluted’. Chester Reimer from the ICC stated that the ‘U.S. position 
has been unclear as well as other states have been also unclear’. 
There was some frustration among the ICC members since, as Reimer 
described, ‘things were agreed but they were not’ (Reimer, 1995). 
Several people who represented other countries saw the U.S. initiative 
as obstructive to the entire process of establishing the Arctic Council.  
For Margie Gibson from the Arctic Network, an organization that 
brings together both indigenous groups and environmentalists, 
expanding indigenous participation is ‘democratizing the process,’ and 
not a move by the U.S. negotiators to obstruct the process itself 
(Gibson, 1995). The explanation for this is in the internal situation in 
Alaska and the United States; there are ‘internal reasons in the U.S. 
for taking up the participation issue’. Gibson referred to the ‘trust 
relationship’ between indigenous peoples and the federal government 
in the U.S. This relationship obligates the U.S. State Department to 
ensure that indigenous peoples have an adequate representation on 
the council (Gibson, 1996).   
On the Canadian side, it was noted that the ‘Dene and Athab-
ascans do not have as good access to the initiative as the Inuit’ 
(Fenge, 1995).  Canada´s other indigenous groups were asked by 
Canada to postpone any request for ‘permanent participant’ status 
until  a later date. The Canadian position was that a political decision 
concerning indigenous representation was made in Rovaniemi in 1991 
(Mills, 1995). The official Canadian view was that the current three 
groups represent the major part of the indigenous population in the 
Arctic. Canada believed that  other indigenous peoples’ groups should 
make their input as members of national delegations (Whitby, 1996).  
Russian negotiators echoed the concern of Canada in the Arctic 
Council negotiations, stating that opening the category of permanent 
participants would mean that 40 groups could apply for accreditation. -
Several indigenous northern groups in Russia were not currently 
represented: the Chukchi, the Chuvan, and Yukaghir, the Yakut, the 
Evenk and the Nenets are not then in the AEPS. It was also unclear 
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for the Russian representatives on just how many additional groups 
from the Russian North might apply for permanent participant status 
(Senseney, 1996).  
Finally, the issue was left for the indigenous peoples to be solved. 
The main points in the ICC proposal for a solution were: 1) there were 
a finite number of indigenous organizations that could be 
accommodated, 2) there were a potentially large number of interested 
Arctic peoples’ organizations, and 3) certain Arctic indigenous 
peoples’ organizations should have standing as permanent par-
ticipants  (Simon, 1996; Meeting of the Working Group on Permanent 
Participants, 1995).  
In practice, permanent participation: 
 
is equally open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples with a 
majority of Arctic indigenous constituency representing a) a single 
indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state; or b) more 
than one Arctic indigenous peoples resident in a single Arctic state 
(Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996).  
 
The number of ‘Permanent Participants’ should, at any time, be 
less that the number of member states. The number of indigenous 
peoples organizations cannot be more than the number of states 
whether there are joint seats or separate representation (Declaration 
on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996).  
Among the indigenous peoples, the arrangement of permanent 
participants was met with satisfaction. According to the Sámi 
representative: 
 
The status that indigenous peoples and Sámi Council has been given is 
the highest than ever before for any indigenous peoples’ organization in 
the world ... We can sit at the same table as the ministers with the 
highest officials when decisions are discussed and made. We have the 
right to make a statement and we can make whatever suggestions we 
want to. We only miss the right to make decisions, that is we are not part 
of the consensus (Halonen, 1996b, p.4-5).  
 
For Arctic governmentality, defining power relations in a traditional 
way through focusing on the states’ relations would have given a 
rather simplified and narrow understanding of the relations among the 
actors. Seeing power as microsocial, strategic, productive and as a 
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restrictive phenomenon gives a more diverse picture of the relations 
among the Arctic actors in the cooperation. Overall, governing is the 
effective use of power; the states asserted their power and influence 
through the measures chosen. The reservations of individual countries 
towards the issue of state sovereignty were respected. For Foucault, 
governing is the right manner of arranging things so as to lead not to 
some form of the common good, as suggested by the governance 
theorists, but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each thing that is to 
be governed (Foucault, 1991b, p.95).   
Governing of the environmental issues followed the logic of 
convenience; there were many reasons for the states for not taking 
regional actions and for emphasizing national measures and joint 
action in international fora. Not much could be done, at least according 
to the states, to the concrete problems. Convenience is seen in the 
commitments made in the cooperation. States had ‘good’ reasons for 
that: no real gaps in the existing legal framework, avoiding overlapping 
work, and the need to act actively in other international relevant fora in 
order to advance the protection of the Arctic environment. Convenient 
governing of the Arctic consists of the guidelines, strategies and 
applications for the moment. They at the minimum created a sense of 
actions by the state to deal with the issues. 
 The ‘things’ to be governed  are not only the territory, but ‘a 
complex composed of men and things, men in their relations, their 
links, their actions with other things which are wealth, resources, 
territory etc’ (Foucault, 1991b, p.93). This complex includes the 
relations between the state and indigenous peoples in Arctic 
environmental cooperation. Interpreting these claims and international 
practices in the Foucaultian sense focuses the essential function of 
the discourse and techniques of rights’ in defining the relationship 
between states and indigenous peoples is to ‘efface  domination’ 
intrinsic to power as the legitimate right of sovereignty, and as the 
legal obligation to obey it (Foucault, 1980a, p.95).   
Defining these rights is the process of reconstituting the 
relationship between states and indigenous peoples. The practices of 
power can be also detected in the efforts to redefine the state-
indigenous peoples’ relationships in the Arctic.  The relations between 
states and indigenous peoples are things to be ‘governed’. More 
important than finding solutions to the problems at hand was to secure 
existing power relations both inside and outside individual Arctic 
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states. Indigenous peoples were defined first ‘observers’ and then 
‘participants’ in the Arctic cooperation while the states were the main 
actors - ‘the members’- of  the cooperation.   
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The Need for Knowledge 
 
The Problem of Uncertainty 
 
Information about the state of the Arctic environment was ‘incomplete’ 
and even ‘fragmentary’ in 1989. Iceland noted that the ability 
completely to understand pollution issues in the Arctic was restricted 
by the lack of a comprehensive scientific data base and coordinated 
monitoring program on the state of Arctic ecosystems (Gudnason, 
1991, p.4). Uncertainty about the problem or problems in the Arctic 
was the basis of the concern:  
 
What has been especially worrying is the fact, that most of  the 
environmental 
threats to the Arctic seem to be coming from the outside world - and that 
there has been no clear picture of the sources and transport patters of 
the pollutants accumulating in the Arctic (Olsen, 1991,  p.1). 
 
States agreed to prepare individual reports on the different concerns of 
pollution.  
The report on organochlorines, which are a large class of 
manmade chemicals, stated that ‘virtually all organochlorines detected 
at southern latitudes have also been found in the Arctic’. These 
contaminants were considered ‘hazardous’ due to their high 
persistence in the environment, their potential for bioaccumulation and 
biomagnification, their relatively high toxicity. The amounts released 
into the environment were considered large. These contaminants 
reach the Arctic via long-range transport from the more industrialized 
centers. It was evaluated that concentrations of organochlorines are 
generally lower in the Arctic than in heavily polluted areas. There were 
some exceptions; some of these pollutants were often detected in the 
Arctic at concentrations similar to those in the ‘source regions’. 
Despite the lack of information, however, the report concluded that 
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‘species at the top of the food chain are considered most at risk’. Due 
to the slow turnover process in the Arctic the rate of a contaminant 
breakdown may be considerably slower than in temperate 
ecosystems. Therefore, pollutants may present ‘a prolonged threat’ to 
the Arctic environment. Local consumers of wildlife foods are 
threatened (Jensen, 1991, p.337; 369; 374).  
Pollution resulting from heavy metals was considered ‘not critical 
at the present time’. The main input of heavy metals is by their 
transport with air flows from the industrial and densely populated areas 
of Eurasia and North America. Heavy metal levels decrease from 
south to north, but smaller values are found in the Greenland-Scan-
dinavian area. The development of an economic infrastructure and 
industrialization in the Arctic has resulted in ‘an increased anthropo-
genic load’ of pollutants on the ecosystems of the region. An input of 
heavy metals from local to freshwater sources and an accumulation of 
heavy metals in tundra soils, snow cover and glaciers has been 
observed. The threat to human beings was noted; the use  of local 
species of fish, marine mammals, terrestrial mammals and migratory 
birds with enhanced levels of heavy metals in their tissues presented 
‘a direct threat to the health of the population’ and required more 
detailed and extensive studies on the harmful effects of heavy metals 
(Melnikov, 1991, p.112-113).  
The reports on acidification and noise were more directly 
concerned with their impact on the environment. The main anxiety is 
over acidification caused by transboundary pollution. The available 
information available was ‘incomplete’. It was estimated that 
anthropogenic influence is restricted but may cause considerable, and 
possibly irreparable, ‘local and regional damage’. Global impact, 
however, had not been studied. Available information indicated the 
rate of acidification was be divided into three main categories. First 
there was large scale acidification, which  mainly involved the north-
boreal zone. The Taymur Peninsula near Norilsk in Russia is ‘an 
extensively polluted and acidified region in the tundra zone’. Second,  
acidification is evolving into ‘a prominent environmental problem’ in 
Fennoscandia, especially in Finnish Lapland and Norwegian 
Finnmark, the eastern part of Canada and in the northwestern parts of 
Russia. Third, there is a south-north or a west-east direction in 
acidifying influences, reaching sparsely populated and 
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nonindustrialised regions, but those regions also have the lowest 
depositions. The role of constantly increased emissions produced 
north of the Arctic Circle is ‘unknown’ (Nenonen, 1991, p.63-64).  
The report on noise noted that the waters of the Arctic region 
make a unique noise environment, due mainly to the presence of ice. 
During the periods when ice cracking and wind noise are absent, the 
areas covered by shore-fast ice are among ‘the quietest underwater 
environments’. Manmade noise is created by ship traffic, offshore ac-
tivities, airplanes, and small boats. Most important is the traffic north of 
Russia, where most of the polar icebreakers operate. Other shipping 
activities include fishing and military activities. The exploration for oil 
and gas creates underwater noise. These activities create noise levels 
which may disturb marine mammals, or mask the natural sounds that 
are important to those mammals. Noise from human activities may 
sometimes cause short-term behavioral reactions and temporary dis-
placement of various marine mammals. The report indicates that there 
is much evidence to show that most types of disturbance do not cause 
mortality. Marine mammals seem able to habituate, or at least tolerate, 
increased noise levels. The scarcity of direct evidence of serious 
consequences from noise and disturbance, however, does not 
necessarily mean that marine mammals are not stressed or affected in 
another way (Davis et al., 1991, p.157; 246-247). 
Future-related threats to the Arctic were oil pollution and radio-
active contamination. According to a study on oil pollution, there is ‘a 
lack of good data’ on the trends in oil inputs into the Arctic Ocean. The 
report concludes that ‘acute oil spills show large variations from one 
year to another, while the data available on long-range transport pollu-
tants indicate fairly stable annual inputs’. Oil pollution is caused by 
discharges of oil-based drill cuttings, ballast water from storage tanks, 
drainage, and minor spill or leaks of oil during normal operation. Most 
oil spills, small and large, are statistically linked to the transport of oil 
by ship (Futsaeter et al., 1991, p.274-276).  
The problem of radioactivity was, according to the report, 
considered ‘well studied’ in the northern regions. These studies have 
included direct measurements of radiation and the collection of air, 
precipitation, water, soil, sediment, fauna and flora samples. They 
have shown that ‘some plants and animals accumulate appreciable 
amounts of radionuclides as a result of the nutrient poor environment’ 
in the Arctic. Populations that use caribou or reindeer as their main 
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sources of meat also accumulate high amounts of radionuclides, 
particularly caesium 137.  The current levels of radionuclides in the 
Arctic and its seas do not pose ‘a widespread’ threat to human health 
or the environment. The present concentration level in the Arctic 
reflects contribution from at least four different sources: global fallout, 
transport from European reprocessing plants, transport by rivers and 
fallout from Chernobyl. The dominant source of anthropogenically 
produced radionuclides observed in the Arctic is the fallout from 
previous atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. Available information 
also reveals that nuclear material has been disposed of into the Arctic 
seas (Paakkola, 1991, p.387; 396-398).  
 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program  
 
The states decided to establish a separate program. The idea of 
monitoring and the assessment of inputs, outputs and their effects in a 
‘comprehensive and coordinated manner’ was proposed during the 
preparatory process. It was suggested that this might lead to a follow-
up program to monitor the state of the Arctic sea, its coasts and fauna 
and flora, according to the Finnish proposal (Statement by the Finnish 
Delegation, 1989, p.1). The participants recognized that ‘there was a 
need for coordinated monitoring of important environmental 
characteristics and pollutants throughout the Arctic’ (Protecting the 
Arctic Environment, 1990, p.8). 
The mandate of the AMAP is based on ‘an urgent need to 
improve cooperation among local and regional efforts and global 
programs in order to better and more complete the understanding of 
the environmental situation in the Arctic’ (AEPS, 1991, p.31). The 
program was modeled on the UN Economic Commission of Europe 
(ECE) program on transboundary air pollutants: ‘A coordinated moni-
toring program for air pollutants... would be of interest not only to the 
Arctic region’ but also to ECE’s activities  to monitor long-range 
transboundary pollution, ‘because of its links with transatlantic 
transport of air pollution’ (Statement of ECE, 1989, p.1-2). 
The image of the Arctic and the threats to the environment did not 
noticeably change as a result of the AMAP publication of ‘Arctic 
Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report’ in 1997 
(AMAP 1997), just before the AEPS ministerial meeting in Alta, 
56 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Norway. The Arctic is characterized by ‘a harsh climate with extreme 
variation in light and temperature, short summers, extensive snow and 
ice cover in winter and large areas of permafrost’. The plants and 
animals of the region are adapted to these extreme conditions but 
adaptation is  sometimes making them more sensitive to human 
activities (AMAP, 1997, p.vii). 
 The AMAP report is a ‘consensus report’. It is a compilation of 
the work of hundreds of scientists (Stone, 1997). The AMAP report is 
described as, ‘both a process and a product’. That is, the chapters of 
the report are  intended to summarize and analyze the contemporary 
state of knowledge on the sources, levels, distributions, trends, fate 
and effects of contaminants and other anthropogenic influences on the 
environment and human health. In addition, the AMAP was asked to 
assess the relative magnitude of damage and threats to the 
environment and human health based on existing information. The 
assessment also included the recommendation of the AMAP for future 
actions to reduce damages and threats and identify deficiencies and 
gaps in information and data. The AMAP assessment aims to provide 
a ‘baseline for understanding the status of contaminants in the Arctic’. 
It is not intended to be an assessment of the environmental impact of 
contaminants nor a risk assessment for developing risk management 
policies (AMAP, 1997, p.3). 
The AMAP report stresses the global threats to the Arctic envi-
ronment and the interdependent relations between the Arctic and rest 
of the world. Contaminants enter the Arctic from ‘outside’. Here, 
‘outside’ refers to sources in Europe and North America. Outside the 
Arctic, there are a number of sources for persistent organic 
contaminants and heavy metals. Industrial activities, energy produc-
tion and transport in areas far from the region produces contaminants 
with low but widespread levels which arrive in the Arctic. The Arctic is 
described as a region where many pathways - atmospheric, riverine 
and marine - transport contaminants into, and within, the Arctic. The 
Arctic is, therefore, ‘a potential contaminant storage reservoir’. Strong 
south-to-north air-flows, particularly over west Eurasia in winter, 
transport contaminants from lower latitudes. Arctic rivers are also 
significant pathways for  
contaminant transport to the Arctic. Finally, ocean waters are ‘a major 
storage reservoir’ and transport medium for, for example, water 
soluble persistent organic contaminants. The report considers that sea 
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ice may be important in transporting contaminants. The sea ‘is the final 
resting place for most contaminants’ (AMAP, 1997, p.vii-viii).  
With regard to the ‘global’ threats of climate change and ozone 
depletion, the report emphasizes climate change as being of 
‘immediate interest to the Arctic’. Climate change is ‘likely to be more 
pronounced in the Arctic than in other areas of the world’ (AMAP, 
1997, p. 161). In addition, feedback mechanisms that can enhance the 
warming caused by greenhouse gases make the Arctic important for 
understanding global climate change. In adidition, ozone depletion has 
been ‘more severe in the polar regions than elsewhere in the world’. 
Reflective snow-cover in the Arctic makes the effects of changed 
radiation especially pronounced in the Arctic. The effects of the 
depletion of the ozone layer on humans are well known.(AMAP, 1997, 
p.180). 
According to the report, observations from snow cover and 
permafrost cores suggest that some warming is already taking place in 
the Arctic. Temperature records show warming in some areas but 
cooling in others. The effects of global climate change on Arctic 
temperatures and precipitation patterns are, according to the AMAP 
report, ‘very difficult to predict’ but most studies suggest that the Arctic 
as a whole will warm more than the global mean. Warming in the 
troposphere is expected to be followed by a decrease in temperatures 
in the stratosphere. Temperature records for the lower stratosphere in 
the Arctic reveal ‘dramatic changes’. They are described as  the 
‘steepest decline on the entire planet’ (AMAP, 1997, p.161). 
The Arctic Ocean has also warmed slightly over the past decade. 
There is, however, a cooling trend in the Nordic seas. The ice sheets 
of Greenland hold great amounts of water. Measuring their volumes is 
very difficult but ‘so far they do not seem to be shrinking and might 
even be growing slightly’. This does not necessarily, according to the 
report, contradict indications of a warmer climate, since increased 
snowfall adding more mass to the top of a glacier may compensate for 
any extra melting and calving of icebergs. Finally, as one aspect of 
climate change, it is noted that precipitation has increased in high 
latitudes over the past 40 years (AMAP,  1997, p.160-161).  
Some problems are ‘regional’ in character, according to the 
AMAP. Some known sources of persistent organic pollutants and  two-
thirds of the heavy metals in air in the high Arctic originates from 
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industrial activities on the Kola peninsula, the Norilsk industrial 
complex, the Urals and the Pechora basin. Industrial activities in 
northwestern Russia, including the Kola peninsula, and at Norilsk are 
‘the dominant sources of sulfur’ north of 60 degrees latitude. The 
‘major anthropocentric source of hydrocarbon contamination’ in the 
Arctic is oil and gas development. Excepting catastrophic releases of 
oil, concentrations of hydrocarbons associated with anthropogenic 
inputs have been relatively slow. Contaminants are ‘widely but not 
uniformly distributed’ around the Arctic. Geographical variations in 
levels result from point sources of contamination, which in turn result 
in ‘high local pollution concentrations,’ and from environmental 
convergence mechanisms (AMAP, 1997, p.viii-ix). 
Some problems, by their nature, are ‘local’. For example, the 
environmental threats to the Arctic associated with oil and gas 
development, production, and transport are primarily local and/or 
regional and on a circumpolar scale. Local sources of radionuclides, 
such as dumped nuclear waste, nuclear storage sites, accidents and 
past explosions have led to local radioactive contamination. Several 
radioactive sources exist in north western Russia. They are ‘a potential 
threat’ for the release of considerable quantities of radionuclides 
(AMAP,  1997, p.viii).  
For the standard regime theorists, this information gives actors a 
sufficient consensus to serve as a guide to public policy designed to 
achieve some social goals (Haas, 1980, p.367-368). Regimes are 
assumed to include essentially objective information or standards for 
behavior which the parties have to live up to (Haas, Williams and 
Babai, 1977, p.12). The information has an instrumental function in 
international environmental politics since, for example, Haas (1975, 
p.858-859) argues that ‘scientific knowledge will create a consensual 
basis for the recognition of new cause-effect links which had not been 
recognized before’. These beliefs are accepted irrespective of their 
absolute or final truth. Shared perceptions, beliefs and understandings 
of causal mechanisms of problems among the relevant parties are 
important in the regime formation (Osherenko and Young, 1993, p.20).
  
The mainstream approach to knowledge in international relations 
theory is in viewing it as ‘consensual’. Consensual knowledge is 
understood as a body of beliefs that are widely accepted by the 
relevant actors. Consensual knowledge is ‘generally accepted 
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understanding about cause and effect linkages about any set of 
phenomena considered important by society, provided only that the 
finality of the accepted chain of causation is subject to continuous 
testing and examination through adversary procedures’ (Haas, 1990, 
p.21).  
 
Creating the Consensus 
 
The pollution data available to the AMAP from the Arctic region is 
mainly based on national programs carried out within limited areas. 
The AMAP Project Directory includes approximately five-hundred 
monitoring and research projects and programs of relevance in the 
Arctic area, of which approximately three-hundred comprise the AMAP 
national implementation plans. The information in the AMAP reports is 
also based on existing literature, since some AMAP projects have only 
recently been started  and have yet to produce adequate information 
for assessment. The initiation of new programs was restricted 
(Reiersen, 1996).  
The monitoring program was designed to be a media specific, 
rather than a pollutant specific, approach. Individual countries took 
responsibility for developing individual sections: atmosphere (Canada), 
terrestrial (Sweden), freshwater (Finland), marine (Norway), human 
health (Denmark), remote sensing and modeling (the United States) 
and emissions and discharges (the secretariat). In the preparatory 
process, the AEPS participants recognized that two of the most 
significant threats to the present Arctic environment may come from 
climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion. However, programs 
to study these problems have been developed in other international 
fora, therefore they were not included in the Rovaniemi Process in 
1991. These global problems were included on the list of AMAP ac-
tivities at the 1993  Nuuk Meeting (The Arctic Environment, 1993). 
Organizing the collection of the information was complicated. The 
1993 AMAP update noted that ‘a combination of lack of data and 
restrictions on access to data’ imposed by various commercial and 
military authorities, has made the work of AMAP difficult. Thus, the 
AMAP has been unable to provide the AEPS meetings with 
comprehensive emissions and discharge data. According to the 
update, ‘this situation makes it impossible to compare the contributions 
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and significance of Arctic versus non-Arctic sources and thus recom-
mend comprehensive, optimal response strategies for the entire Arctic 
at this time’ (AMAP, 1993a, p. 8). The progress made within the AMAP 
has been slow because of several hindrances: 1) the financial base of 
the program has not been strong, 2) the differences in monitoring data 
and the practices of collecting and handling it vary according to 
regions and scientific traditions, and 3) some information has not been 
made available although it had been promised. Interestingly, cultural 
differences in monitoring and research practices between different 
regions and institutions, rather than the financial basis of cooperation, 
seemed the main reason for the slow process of collecting the 
monitoring data (Nenonen, 1996). 
The problems were known early. For example the International 
Arctic Science Committee ( IASC), with the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), was asked by the AMAP to 
perform an audit on the monitoring program of the first AMAP period 
(1992-1996). Independent experts performed the audit. The auditors 
reported many problems in the work of the AMAP. The main 
conclusions were, according to the IASC audit of 1993, that relying on 
the existing programs will not suffice to achieve AMAP objectives. The 
relationships among the five sub-programs were not sufficiently 
coordinated or harmonized. The report criticized the plan because it 
was difficult to derive a holistic picture of Arctic contaminant transport, 
dissemination and deposition. The decision by the AMAP task force to 
monitor along media-specific boundaries instead of pollution-specific 
lines was considered to give reason for concern. The relationship 
between national programs and the overall implementation plan of 
AMAP was considered weak. No member country has attempted to 
describe the assessment of the AMAP. The auditors evaluated that the 
time frame of AMAP report was unrealistic (AMAP, 1993b). 
This puts pressure on the assessment work of AMAP; 
assessment means interpreting existing information for the SAAO’s 
and ministers and making suggestions for further measures by the 
states nationally, regionally and internationally (see also AMAP, 1995). 
The assessment task of the AMAP, resulting in the  1997 report, has 
been viewed ‘a considerable burden’ on the AMAP in negotiating 
meaningful policy recommendations within an organization by 
personnel with a scientific rather than a policy portfolio (Ringold, 1994, 
p.103). The assessment report on the status of the Arctic environment 
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was delayed. The assessment was not really based on the latest 
information originating from the AMAP activities; a major part of the 
AMAP assessment was based on information and results published in 
scientific literature and was available in scientific reports. The AMAP 
stressed that an assessment utilizes accumulated data and informa-
tion and does not necessarily require any new data to be collected 
during the assessment process (Reiersen, 1996).  
The 1997 report by AMAP suggests existing legal regulations are 
followed and reviewed to ensure full accounting for the extreme Arctic 
conditions. These measures, however, are not enough since levels of 
many contaminants in the Arctic are, according to the report, likely to 
remain at or close to existing levels for decades because of their 
resistance to degradation, the slow rate of degeneration and the 
recycling of existing accumulations. Thus, ameliorative action to 
reduce exposure to humans and to protect wildlife is ‘essential’ 
(AMAP, 1997, p.vii).   
Despite these problems, the AMAP report constitutes the Arctic 
as a region for a moderate environmental concern. Compared to most 
other areas of the world ‘the Arctic remains a clean environment’. 
Some pollutants, and the combinations of different factors, however, 
‘cause concern in certain ecosystems and for some human popu-
lations’ (AMAP, 1997, p.vii). The constitutive nature of knowledge 
emerges when knowledge is understood as more than scientific knowl-
edge on emission sources, levels and their ecological, economic and 
social implications. For environmental cooperation, knowledge of 
pollutants and anthropogenic emissions is an important part of the 
management of the problems but there is more to it than this 
instrumental knowledge. Foucault (1972, p.185) combines ‘savoir’ with 
knowledge instead of ‘connaissance’ as knowledge; the difference 
between connaissance and savoir is the difference between 
instrumental and constitutive knowledge. The example is easy to find; 
scientific knowledge (connaissance) of mental diseases plays a role in 
the knowledge (savoir) of madness (a question of decision-making 
authority). By concentrating on this constitutive aspect of knowledge 
the subject and the object, and the knowledge about them, is mutually 
constitutive. 
It seems that the knowledge acquired by the AMAP legitimizes 
the existing situation and the lack of special measures to protect the 
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Arctic environment. One of the close observers to the process, the 
AMAP was not established because the concern for  nature. The 
proposal for the AMAP was made knowing the rich natural resources 
that the area has. Then, however, the ‘general opinion’ was 
‘environmentally active’. Establishing AMAP was a sign of ‘finding’ the 
Arctic but there were parties in the negotiations, in particular Norway, 
that did not like the purely environmental protection initiative. The 
rationale for establishing AMAP, in which Norway took a leading role, 
was that ‘if there would not be problems ahead in the future, why 
would you need a monitoring program?’. The AMAP was established 
because the region and its resources would be used and therefore the 
states needed a mechanism of surveillance to make sure that any 
crucial limits were not trespassed (Nenonen, 1996). According to the 
AMAP, the region is now monitored so that should some adversary 
developments suddenly should take place information about it could 
be collected throughout the circumpolar region (AMAP, 1997, p.2). 
 
Other Reports 
 
Besides the AMAP report, other reports by different institutions have 
been published in the last two years.  In a report by the European 
Environment Agency the Arctic environmental threats are ‘regional’. 
This report, partly based on information produced within the AEPS, 
defines eleven main current threats to the European Arctic 
environment. They are: 
 
Habitat fragmentation, degradation, or destruction; over harvesting of 
biological resources; the potential or radioactive contamination; 
persistent organic pollutants; oil pollution; tourism in vulnerable areas; 
introduction of alien species and diseases; cumulative impacts; long-
range pollution transport; climate change; ozone depletion and UV 
radiation (Hansen et al., 1996, p.113). 
 
The report stresses that one of the ‘most valuable and unique 
features’ of the European Arctic is its large area of wilderness and 
natural wildlife habitats. Agriculture, forestry, and other natural 
resource exploitation, road, construction, urbanization and other 
infrastructure development are all human activities that cause habitat 
destruction and fragmentation. Such activities continuously and inc-
reasingly affect wildlife habitats in the European Arctic. Several mam-
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mal and bird species have previously been over harvested in the 
European Arctic and both fish stocks and forest areas are being 
harvested today (Hansen et al., 1996, p.113).  
A third report on the state of the Arctic environment was produced 
by the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1996. It deals with Lapland in 
Finland, Norrbotten and Västerbotten in Sweden, northern Norway, 
Iceland, Greenland and Svalbard. The report is interesting since it 
aims to rank environmental concerns. The writers have attempted to 
analyze the environmental impact of both the use of natural resources 
in the region and the threat caused by pollution (Bernes, 1996). 
The report deals with biodiversity and concludes that, rather than 
pollution, the  resources and recreational values of nature in the 
Nordic Arctic region dominate concern. The impact of natural 
resources’ exploitation is a threat to the biodiversity of the region. The 
report states that the greatest threats to biodiversity are: hunting, 
climate change, overgrazing, forest fires, hydroelectric power, the 
introduction of new species, erosion and earlier deforestation. The 
threats to the use of natural resources are: the use of minerals and 
fossil reserves, overfishing, deforestation, hunting and overgrazing. 
The greatest threats to the recreational value of the environment are, 
however, lower than in the previous cases: climate change, 
overgrazing, erosion, water energy, noise and tree felling in the fjells 
(Bernes, 1996, p.233). 
The report discusses the issue of pollution to some length. It says 
that local pollution has had severe impacts on these values and some 
pollutants are spread over the Arctic. None of these pollution effects 
have, however, been both large scale and severe on the Arctic 
ecosystems; at least at the moment no such observations can be 
made on this point. The health risks are, however, connected to the 
pollution problem in the region but no indications have been found to 
indicate that these pollution effects would be lethal (Bernes, 1996, 
233). 
The hunting families of Greenland are singled out as being 
threatened by pollution because of their diet. The report considers the 
dominance of the pollution problem in the public sphere and shows 
that such problems are easy to blame for the degradation of the 
environment. The problem is outside the hands of local people and 
has to be solved somewhere else. The issues related to the use of 
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natural resources, and threats to them, direct discussion to ways of 
living and consumption and the need to change them locally. Such 
discussions are not easy (Bernes, 1996, p.233).   
In addition, results of two national research projects have become 
available. The basis for the Finnish Forest Decline Project was the 
awareness of extremely high emissions of sulphur dioxide and heavy 
metal and severe environmental degradation in the Kola peninsula. A 
connection between these emissions and the needle-loss outbreak 
that occurred in Salla, eastern Lapland, was suspected. Between 1990 
and 1994 fifty researchers from Norway, Finland and Russia studied 
the problem. The studies were concentrated on a series of joint samp-
ling and monitoring plots located along lines running through Finnish 
Lapland to the northwest, west and southwest, from both Nikel and 
Monchegorsk in the Kola peninsula (Tikkanen, 1995; see also 
Väliverronen, 1996). 
The report concludes that there were considerable emissions 
from the Kola peninsula arriving in eastern Lapland on easterly and 
north easterly winds. The duration of these high pollution episodes, 
however, is short and the annual mean sulphur dioxide concentration 
in Lapland is relatively low. The project was not able to demonstrate 
any direct connection between the cases of tree damage reported at 
the end of 1980's in Finnish Lapland and emissions from the Kola 
Peninsula. However, sensitive ‘bioindicators,’ such as lichens and the 
sulphur and acid rain damage symptoms in pine needles, indicated 
that the emissions are having an effect in Finnish Lapland (Tikkanen, 
1995; p.211-216). 
 
A Canadian review team considered nine organochlorine 
compounds 
and three metals in their Northern Contaminants Report. This stated 
that ‘contamination of traditional foods does not pose any immediate 
short-term health threat’. In the Canadian north, people who eat a lot 
of marine mammals tend to have higher contaminant levels than at 
‘zero risk’ level, but more research needs to be undertaken to u-
nderstand the long-term health issues. The report concludes that ‘the 
nutritional advantages of traditional foods still outweigh any potential 
risk which may be associate with them’. The report stresses that 
hunting and consumption of wildlife, fish and plants are essential to the 
health, culture, spirituality and economy of the people of the north. If 
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people stop eating traditional foods, which may have many overriding 
benefits, adverse effects may occur (Northern Contaminants Program, 
1997, p.7-8). Both reports conclude that the current levels of exposure 
to contaminants in the Arctic are clearly of concern but it is still not 
clear what public health measures should be taken (see also AMAP, 
1997, p.186). 
The relation between these  reports is worth examining more 
closely. The point of having these reports on the state of the Arctic 
environment is that they ‘balance the information about the Arctic’ 
(Liljelund, 1996). They do so by increasing information about the 
knowledge of threats other than those related to the long-range 
transportation of pollutants to the Arctic. Both the report of the 
European Environment Agency and the Nordic report emphasize the 
threats to the biodiversity of these northern regions, compared with the 
AMAP emphasis on global, regional and local pollution issues. The 
Finnish and Canadian reports downplay the threat of pollution in the 
Arctic. In conclusion, there is no consensus on the state of the Arctic 
environment and threats to it outside the AMAP. 
 
 
Arctic Science and Indigenous Peoples 
 
Scientists and the Arctic Cooperation  
 
Sweden stressed the need to improved scientific cooperation during 
the preparatory process of the AEPS: 
  
Science will help us identify the threats to the environment. Science will 
also 
aid in designing appropriate counter measures. We have to make sure 
that the scientists have the opportunity to carry out their important 
activities (Statement of Swedish Delegation, 1989, p.5).  
 
The role of science in Arctic environmental cooperation was 
emphasized by Fred Roots, representative of  IASC at the Rovaniemi 
ministerial meeting in 1991: 
 
Wise actions and policies to protect or maintain life quality and produc-
tivity of the environment... can only be achieved if there is adequate 
66 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
knowledge on the natural characteristics and processes of the Arctic 
regions (Roots, 1991, p.1).  
 
To Roots, science is ‘the organized and systematic pursuit, 
accumulation, and testing of observations, data, experience and 
insight, and turning that information into knowledge that can be 
disseminated for all to use’ (Roots, 1991, p.2).  The IASC 
offered its services to the Arctic states at the meeting in Rovaniemi. 
The IASC is a nongovernmental multisubject scientific organization 
whose purpose is to facilitate international cooperation and the 
exchange of information for all kinds of scientific activity in the Arctic 
regions. The committee does not conduct research; it has the respon-
sibility of developing policies and guidelines for cooperative scientific 
research concerned with the Arctic (IASC Founding Articles, 1990, p.1; 
see Roots, 1992, 1993 for a  history of the IASC).  
Over the years the IASC has developed ‘an informal relationship’ 
with the AMAP (IASC Council Meeting, 1992, p.3).  As the only 
accredited scientific observer to the AEPS, there were discussions of 
the role of the IASC in the framework of the Arctic Council. In principle 
the scientific community views the establishment of the Arctic Council 
in positive light and looks forward to the development of the 
relationship between them: ‘The Arctic Council promises to provide the 
political framework within which to establish science politics and priori-
ties, and thus provide a rational basis for science resource allocation 
in the Arctic nations’. At the IASC Conference in 1995 the match 
between the Arctic Council and IASC activities was described as 
‘excellent’ by one of the key note speakers. In 1996 IASC Council 
meeting it was decided that IASC would seek an advisory role in the 
Arctic Council (IASC Meeting, 1996, p.38). 
However, the questions that need answers are: Who speaks for 
Arctic science? How do governments obtain and use international 
science policy advice? How can science systematically identify and 
solve circumpolar problems? What is the role of government research 
agencies in Arctic science? And, To whom are Arctic scientists 
responsible? (Lock, 1995, p.12).  
The role of the IASC in relation to the Arctic Council is defined as 
either a facilitator or an advisor, according to Lock. However, ‘the 
responsibility for science policy lies, ultimately with the political com-
munity’ (Lock, 1995, p.15). The Arctic Council could articulate or imply 
Arctic science policies rooted in national policies. These discussions 
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are ‘political, not scientific’. In Lock's view, science is incorporated only 
at the early stage, during international discussions. Under these condi-
tions, advice from an international body such as the IASC would be 
‘superfluous at best; at worst, it may prove wasteful and vexatious, 
especially where the science politics or priorities of the Arctic nations 
are not in accord’ (Lock, 1995, p.16-17). 
Alternatively, the Arctic Council could choose to seek scientific 
advice from an independent circumpolar body set up especially for that 
purpose. Such a body ‘could do much to smooth the development of 
circumpolar policies’. This would not optimize the chances of 
reconciling the policies of individual Arctic nations but would, or could, 
facilitate appropriate contributions from non-Arctic nations. The 
functioning of such an advisory body would, however, require it to be 
independent of any organization that has interest in its advice. Any 
scientific bodies concerned with the funding and execution of Arctic 
science would have to remain separate from this advisory body. ‘In 
short, those that do the science, or have it done, should not be those 
who recommend it,’ concludes Lock  (1995, p.17).  
Lock suggested the establishment of a science and technology 
advisor to the Arctic Council named Arctic Science Advisory Board. 
Oran Young representing the IASC voiced the concerns of the 
scientific community about such a body in the AEPS meeting in Alta, 
Norway:   
 
Our experience with scientific and technical committees built into interna-
tional agreements is not encouraging. The danger of politization is ever 
present when the connection between science and policy becomes too 
close (Young, 1997,  p.1). 
 
According to this view, the policy community must be free to seek 
relevant scientific information and advice from a variety of sources 
including, but not limited to, the IASC. On the other hand, the IASC 
must be free to develop a science program that addresses ‘the cutting 
edge questions of concern’ to scientists working in this field. In this 
sense Young thinks that the AEPS got it right in 1991 in saying ‘the 
eight Arctic countries will consult, as deemed appropriate, with the 
International Arctic Science Committee and other bodies on any 
matter that falls within the scope of this Strategy’. Young  (1997, p.4) 
hopes for ‘an easygoing relationship between the two communities in 
which each is able to assist the other and neither compromises the 
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integrity’.The U.S. SAO (Senior Arctic Official) saw the role of IASC 
and the science community as important in the Arctic cooperation: 
science may be an ‘initiator’, but often also ‘a marker’, or milestone by 
which policies can be evaluated. In the Arctic context, the range of 
science issues ‘go far beyond those traditionally imagined as being 
arctic science’ (Senseney, 1997, p.4). 
However, in a recent evaluation of the AEPS, it was noted that 
‘scientific information is not always delivered to the SAO’s in an easily 
grasped from, thus making the policy formulation process hard to 
manage’. Also, the capacity to handle all the information made 
available seems to have reached ‘its maximum limit’. All of the 
available information is not used nor did any party or a person seems 
to have a holistic view of the whole information base (Nilson, 1997, 
p.5).  
As a solution to these problems, the report suggests the 
establishment of an advisory board or a screening function. An 
advisory body could be either scientific or technical in its nature. A 
purely scientific advisory board probably would take  holistic approach 
to matters compared with a more technically oriented advisory board 
staffed by government agency experts.  A screening body could be 
staffed with knowledgeable people who can advise the SAO’s in their 
decision-making. It could help in communication between the SAO’s 
and the working groups. Either a screening body or a technical 
advisory group probably could function as a translator and a filter 
between the SAO’s and the working groups (Nilson, 1997, p.29).  
The role of scientists in such a situation, however, creates 
different views. How far can scientists go in interpreting research 
results? Scientists have power in that they are in control of problem 
framing. Epistemic communities are networks of knowledge-based 
experts which  articulate ‘the cause and effect relationships of complex 
problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for 
collective debate, proposing scientific policies and identifying salient 
points for negotiation’ (Haas, 1992a, p.2; see also, Haas 1992b). 
The mainstream regime approach assumes that knowledge arises 
as an issue in the absence of power relations. The epistemic 
community theorists, for example, focus on uncertainty because they 
assume that in such a situation the power aspect may be absent and 
institutions work poorly. It is assumed, however, that epistemic 
communities do have the power to create reality but ‘not as they wish,’ 
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since political factors and related considerations affect the construc-
tion of the reality just as much as the contribution of scientific experts 
(Adler and Haas, 1992, p.381).   
The members of epistemic communities do not have an equal 
access in political decision-making.  Steinar Andresen et al. (1994, 
p.117) emphasize the role of ‘those scientists who are most involved in 
the dialogue with decision-makers and serve as coordinators of 
research and as mediating agents between those who do the actual 
research and the decision-makers’.  
Karen Litfin has created a concept ‘knowledge brokers’ to capture 
the elements missed by the epistemic communities’ theorists. By 
knowledge brokers she refers to those intermediaries between the 
original researches, or the producers of knowledge, and the policy 
makers who consume that knowledge but lack the time and training 
necessary to absorb the original information. The ability of knowledge 
brokers, who operate at low or middle levels of governments of 
international organizations, to frame and interpret scientific knowledge 
is a substantial source of political power, according to Litfin (1994, 
p.4).   
The approach by Litfin focuses more on individuals and their role 
in the interface between science and politics than groups such as 
epistemic communities. According to this view, ‘interpreting and 
framing knowledge become crucial political problems as information is 
mustered to achieve policy objectives’ (Litfin, 1994, p.8). Individuals 
and groups function as creators of risk and carriers of knowledge. This 
means that knowledge is  embodied, that is concrete individuals and 
groups of individuals who serve as definers of reality. To understand 
the role of the knowledge brokers is to situate them in a discourse, 
which also means that subjects are at least partially constituted by the 
discursive practices and contexts in which they are embedded. The 
knowledge-broker who interprets and frames knowledge for policy-
makers has power in respect to ‘how knowledge is framed, by whom 
and on behalf of what interests’ (Litfin, 1994, p.198). 
 
Controversial Relationship 
 
The relationships between science, knowledge and indigenous 
peoples in the AEPS were, from the indigenous peoples’ point of view, 
one of the main concerns. The relationship between indigenous 
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peoples and science is ‘complex and often controversial’. It is cont-
roversial because indigenous peoples are concerned about who 
actually controls research. They also question whether scientific 
studies are beneficial to their own society, economy and environment. 
Science has the power to validate the opinions of outside interests in 
circumpolar issues (Brooke, 1993, p.17).   
The problem is based on misunderstandings between indigenous 
peoples and the scientific, administrative and political interests of the 
member countries. These misunderstandings are based on: 1) resis-
tance by member countries to share the responsibility for planning and 
decision-making, 2) there is resistance by scientists and administrators 
concerning the role, content and utility of indigenous knowledge, and 
3) there is resistance by many indigenous peoples to the value and 
accuracy of scientific information and scepticism about the motives 
that underlie international processes such as the AEPS. Indigenous 
peoples stress that research activities and the findings and opinions of 
scientists are import aspects of decision-making in the southern 
centers (Brooke, 1993, p.12; see Brelsford, 1995; Brelsford, 1996b; 
Cochran, 1996).  
   Indigenous peoples consider that the Arctic scientific community, 
for  
example the IASC, has not been very receptive to the idea of including 
the knowledge of the indigenous peoples. The IASC saw itself as ‘a 
science organization’: it did not want to become ‘a tool for social or 
policy action’. Relating this to the inclusion of human and social 
sciences has been problematic in the IASC. In 1991, it was recognized 
that the IASC itself should have an important future role in binding 
links between natural and social sciences but such a role would have 
to be developed carefully and with ‘considerable sophistication and 
sensibility’ (IASC Council Meeting, 1991, p.11).  
There was a proposal that a standing working group could be 
established to represent the interests of social, human and medical 
sciences. It was not, however, adopted. The problem, from the IASC 
standpoint, seemed to be one of no well developed criteria for what is 
excellent, or leading, in the social or human sciences (IASC Council 
Meeting, 1991, p.11). The IASC Council decided an advisory group 
that would include representatives from IASC Council, International 
Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA, established just before 
IASC) and indigenous peoples of the north should be established. The 
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advisory group would include three representatives of IASSA, three 
representatives from the major indigenous organizations and two 
members of IASC member organizations (IASC Council Meeting, 
1993, p.9). The IASSA response to this proposal was negative and the 
organization proposed  becoming an advisory group to the IASC on 
social sciences, as had been done with the International Union on Cir-
cumpolar Health (IUCH) in 1993. The IASSA was invited to become an 
advisory group to IASC in 1994 and the contact persons were no-
minated (IASC Council Meeting, 1994, p.13).  
However, this solution left open the issue of participation by 
indigenous peoples. Franklyn Griffiths, during his speech at the IASC 
Council Meeting in 1995, questioned some approaches adopted by 
IASC; the way, for example, the  IASC had been involved in ‘mega-
science’ and ‘under performing’ the residents of the area. He raised 
the question of whether indigenous peoples or users of Arctic science 
should be directly represented on the regional board of the IASC. As 
to making Arctic science relevant, he saw no other alternative than 
making IASC programmes as socially responsive as possible  (IASC 
Council Meeting, 1995, p.15).  
The problem of participation by indigenous peoples in IASC activ-
ities was seen also at the IASC Arctic Research Planning Conference 
in Hanover, in the United States, in December 1995. Addressing the 
IASC conference, Canadian Arctic Ambassador Mary Simon stressed 
that the Arctic national governments have agreed upon the importance 
of indigenous peoples’ knowledge and their contribution. This, she 
said, was also expected to happen  among the larger scientific 
community (Simon, 1995). Tove Petersen from the Indigenous 
Peoples Secretariat (IPS) pointed out at the Tromsø Conference on 
Environmental Pollution in the Arctic in June, where the AMAP assess-
ment report was published: ‘a new form of colonialism is created if 
there is no communication between scientists and indigenous 
peoples’. Unless there is communication between different groups, the 
production of knowledge in the Arctic is an ‘affirmation of existing 
power structure’ (Petersen, 1997). 
Communication in such a situation needs to be analyzed. Those 
who emphasize the idea of a communicative rationality focus on an 
ideal speech situation where there are no hindrances to com-
munication.  Although actual speech situations hardly ever resemble 
the ideal situation, these basic assumptions make it possible to define 
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the truth as ‘a rational consensus’. The basis of a situation is 
characterized as pure intersubjectivity by the absence of any barrier 
which would hinder communication (McNay, 1992, p.183). Interna-
tional environmental politics have been studied with the help of the 
idea of communicative rationality (Dryzek, 1990; Hjorth, 1992).  
Ernst B. Haas (1990, p.11; 20-21) emphasizes that consensual 
knowledge is always socially constructed and therefore ‘inseparable 
from the vagaries of human communication’. Haas claims that ‘change 
in human aspirations and human institutions over long periods is 
caused mostly by the way knowledge about nature and about society 
is married to political interests and objectives’. Knowledge is ‘a social 
product’ which denotes that it is easily politicized by becoming a field 
of struggle in itself. Neither the processes of making knowledge more 
extensive nor the reflection on knowledge itself are passive. They are 
‘intensively political’ (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, p.773).  The idea of 
communicative rationality is utopian, according to Foucault,  because 
of the relations of power in society: ‘the problem is not trying to dissol-
ve them (relations of power) in the utopia of a perfectly transparent 
communication, but to give one’s self the rules of law ...  which would  
allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of 
domination’ (In, McNay, 1992, p.184).  
The Foucaultian view on knowledge considers it as discourse. 
Knowl- 
edge, is a system for the formation of statements. Knowledge is ‘that 
of which one can speak in a discursive practice and which is specified 
by that fact’ (Foucault, 1972, p.182). According to Foucault, ‘we should 
abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge 
can only exist where the power relations are suspended and that 
knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and 
its interests’ (In, Simons 1995, p.44). Foucault questions the idea that 
knowledge is power or vice versa; the relationships between power 
and knowledge are complex and not to be taken for granted. The 
relationships are overlapping, reciprocally supporting each other, using 
and contradicting each other (Foucault, 1982a, p.217-218). It follows 
that discourse is ’...by nature, the object of a struggle, a political 
struggle’ (Foucault, 1972, p.120).    
Foucault points out that studying the interactions between knowl-
edge and power cannot be studied at the discourse level by analyzing 
concepts, subjects, objects, enunciative modalities and strategies. The 
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institutions of power/knowledge have to be used as the basis for 
analysis. Foucault takes the language-politics connection to a higher 
level of abstraction from linguistically reflected power exchanges 
between persons and groups, to an analysis of the structures within 
which they are deployed. He argues that the deep-seated discursive 
formations which determine the production of knowledge in a given 
period are intimately bound up with nondiscursive factors defined as 
‘an institutional field, a set of events, practices and political decisions’ 
(Foucault, 1972, p.157).  
 
Indigenous Knowledge in the AEPS  
 
In 1989, the Danish had already suggested the use of indigenous 
knowledge as a part of Arctic environmental cooperation in the AEPS: 
‘their traditional knowledge is taken into account on par with otherwise 
accepted knowledge’ (Statement by the Danish Delegation, 1989, p.3). 
In the declaration signed in 1991, the states emphasized recognizing 
‘the special relationship of the indigenous peoples and local popu-
lations to the Arctic and their unique contribution to the protection of 
the Arctic environment’ (Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic 
Environment, 1991). It was recognized that ‘this strategy must 
incorporate the knowledge and cultures of indigenous peoples’ (AEPS 
1991, p.2). In practical terms, the ‘consideration of the health, social, 
economic and cultural needs of indigenous peoples shall be 
incorporated into management, planning and development activities’ 
(AEPS 1991, p.6).  
Two decisions were made in Nuuk 1993 to enhance the 
participation and contribution of indigenous peoples. First, the 
government of Iceland offered to host a seminar on indigenous 
knowledge. A seminar was held in 1994 to clarify how indigenous 
knowledge was applicable to the AEPS and its programs. It aimed to 
identify strategies and pragmatic proposals for the integration of 
indigenous knowledge into the AEPS and its programs and to identify 
the contribution that indigenous knowledge could make to sustainable 
development. Second, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) was 
established with the financial help of Denmark to assist and coordinate 
cooperation between indigenous peoples’ organizations (The Arctic 
Environment, 1993). 
The idea in the AEPS is that ‘knowledge is in people’ (Huntington, 
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1996). From the indigenous point of view, indigenous knowledge is ‘a 
body of knowledge on its own right and a means of communication 
and decision-making that reflects who indigenous peoples are and the 
world view that they hold’ (Brooke, 1993, p.75). Indigenous knowledge 
is, according to the AEPS seminar report, considered a ‘legitimate, 
appropriate and valuable basis for co-management and self-
determination’. It is dynamic and evolves in response to changing 
situations and conditions. Moreover, there is ‘an inseparable 
relationship’ between the utilization of living resources, conservation 
and the continuing vitality and utility of indigenous knowledge. The 
AEPS seminar saw the role of indigenous knowledge as ‘relevant’. It 
could help identify important research areas,  expand understanding of 
the natural world, and bring useful insights into natural processes - 
including the  role of humans in the environment. At the opening of the 
AEPS seminar on indigenous knowledge many participants stressed 
that the issue was not ‘integration but partnership’ (Hansen, 1994, 
p.16-17). 
The knowledge of local and indigenous peoples is not usually  
evaluated as ‘knowledge’; in some instances, it has been part of the 
fieldwork of a western educated scientist. It is rarely authorized as 
knowledge, there is no formal external science for acquiring that 
knowledge and the status that come with it. It is not transnational, nor 
is it a network. It is local and piecemeal information about the human-
nature relationship in certain cultures and by certain persons. This 
knowledge includes empirical or practical knowledge. It also includes 
paradigmatic knowledge, for example about the way to interpret 
practical knowledge and construct mostly coherent cosmologies. 
Finally, it is institutional, since it refers to participation to decision-
making (Kalland, 1994, p.157-160).  
The knowledge of indigenous peoples is often defined as ‘traditio-
nal knowledge’. Traditional knowledge is not based on the formal 
methods of scientific knowledge. It is passed through socialization 
from one generation to another and by the involvement of children in 
everyday life activities. It includes the names of places and creatures 
in nature, and they do not necessarily follow western logic nor western 
ways of mapping. It is not formal, in that there are no courses nor 
diplomas to be taken in traditional knowledge. Traditional knowledge is 
considered endangered because the people who have that knowledge 
and their lifestyles are changing (Freeman and Carbyn, 1988; 
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Freeman, 1992; Inglis, 1993; Borgos, 1993). 
It is sometimes stressed that this knowledge is connected to the 
environment. Claiming that it is ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ 
(TEK) refers to the paradigmatic nature of information, the way of 
interpreting practical knowledge.  It constructs its own cosmologies. 
This encompasses spiritual relationships, relationships with the natural 
environment and the use of natural resources, and the relationships 
between people.  It is reflected in language, social organization, 
values, and the institutions and laws of indigenous peoples (In, Bell, 
1994, p.190). This knowledge is seen as an alternative to western 
scientific knowledge because of the differences in their world view. 
Henry Huntington defines traditional ecological knowledge as a 
‘coherent world view with internal and external relationships that may 
not have direct parallels in western science’. TEK typically embodies ‘a 
holistic view of ecology rather than an atomized one and some under-
standing of the local taxonomy is necessary to understand TEK fully’ 
(Huntington, 1994, p.89).  
Indigenous peoples themselves have argued against the term 
‘traditional’ since it does not consider that this form of knowledge is 
evolving and dynamic which adapts to changing conditions and 
situations. Some would leave the environment out, and concentrate on 
‘traditional knowledge systems’ as suggested by Elina Helander. To 
her this knowledge is, ‘patterned ways in which peoples from a non-
literate tradition learn about their reality and communicate such 
information amongst themselves and from generation to generation’ 
(Helander, 1993, p.71; see also Eidheim, 1995; Helander, 1996).  
Sometimes, particularly in relation to the environment, this 
knowledge is identified as ‘local’.  It is connected to a certain 
population and place: Indigenous knowledge is considered dependent 
on the existence of indigenous peoples’ and their way of life. 
Indigenous knowledge is the foundation of a culture in its own right. 
The expertise cannot be separated from the practices and experiences 
of particular local, cultural groups (Hansen, 1994, p.17). Some critics 
claim that  this knowledge is not valuable because it is held by a 
certain group of people such as indigenous peoples. Its value is in 
what it has to say about the ecosystem and place of people within it. 
The practical value of this knowledge is most important: ‘local knowl-
edge is too important to be tamed into myths for the environmentalist 
consumption’ (Kalland, 1994, p.152, 157). 
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In this work, ‘indigenous knowledge’ is understood, following the 
ICC report on indigenous knowledge, to comprise:  
 
... information and concepts about the environment and ecology that are 
known but usually not formally recorded by individuals who belong to a 
particular cultural group that has occupied an identifiable territory over a 
long period of time (Brooke, 1993, p.36). 
It includes ‘facts, concepts and theories about the characteristics 
which describe the objects, events, behaviors and interconnections 
that comprise both the animate and inanimate environments of 
indigenous peoples’. This knowledge is local since it has been 
developed ‘through the person's observations of, experience with, and 
explanations about the physical environment and living resources that 
characterized the territory in which they live’. This knowledge is 
traditional because it is ‘commonly shared between individuals’ and it 
is transferred from one generation to the next through the oral 
tradition. The content and extent of knowledge ‘vary from individual to 
individual and there can be a specialization in expertise’.  It is also 
paradigmatic: All of this information is organized around concepts and 
perceptions that are ‘constantly being shaped and reshaped by the 
intellectual culture of indigenous peoples and its content and meaning 
is best expressed within the context of indigenous language systems’. 
It also has the capacity to provide ‘explanations about causality and 
give validity to the world of natural phenomena’ in a way that is 
consistent with systems of belief and which characterized the world 
view of  each indigenous society (Brooke, 1993, p.36-37). 
 
 
Indigenous Peoples and Knowledge 
 
Knowledge in Regimes 
 
The question of indigenous knowledge is about power; demanding the 
use of indigenous knowledge is a demand that ‘the power base must 
be shared’ (Brooke, 1993, p.18). Therefore, this knowledge is also 
institutional, since it refers to local participation in decision-making. 
The growing awareness of different types of knowledge can be seen 
both as a response to the need of acknowledging the role of local 
informants in producing knowledge about the northern regions and the 
demands by the local communities for researchers to acknowledge 
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their contribution to western science. The aim is to use different kinds 
of knowledge ‘to present different sides of problems and advance 
creative thinking’. The aim is not to find ‘an average for different views’ 
(Hilden, 1996).  
The institutional dimension means that members of indigenous 
peoples 
organizations are experts whose knowledge and expertise can and will 
be used in the AEPS. By claiming the knowledge is ‘indigenous’ the 
basis of using this knowledge becomes political. This means that the 
important point in this knowledge is not necessary the information 
content but the participation of indigenous peoples as experts in 
cooperation. Stressing ‘indigenous’ knowledge as opposed to tradi-
tional, ecological or local, makes the issue into an institutional 
problem, a problem of participation in decision-making. It refers to the 
direct participation of indigenous peoples' groups in decision-making. 
According to the indigenous peoples, the use of their knowledge is an 
issue of self-determination (Hansen, 1994, p.16). 
These processes of inclusion and exclusion raise the questions of 
who has the right to speak, from which institutional places speeches 
can be made and the kind of positions the objects of the discourse can 
have. Initially, this means that one has to describe the institutional 
sites from which the speakers make their discourses and the 
legitimate source and point of its application (Foucault, 1972, p.51-52). 
The question Foucault asks is of the relationship between knowledge 
and political practice. The various status, the various sites, the various 
positions that he can occupy or be given when making a discourse is 
interesting. The definitions of positions include institutionalized 
justification: 
 
The method of justification and refutation confers on these speech acts 
their claim to be knowledge (savoir), and makes of them objects to be 
studied, repeated and passed on to others  (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 
p.48). 
 
According to Foucault, a rival knowledge to that of scientific 
knowledge 
may exist; the hegemonic discourse and its disciplines may be unable 
to absorb or obliterate these fully and may even have to reach an 
understanding with some of them. Alternative knowledge combined 
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with local power may defy the dominant discourse and its apparatus 
(Keeley, 1990, p.94). This alternative knowledge is a range of formula-
tions that either have never gained formal recognition as regimes of 
truth or lost that status; they are ‘subjugated knowledge’. Subjugated 
knowledge is historical content that has ‘been buried and disguised in 
a functionalist coherence of formal systemisation’. Subjugated 
knowledge is thus ‘blocks of historical knowledge’. On the other hand, 
subjugated knowledge is ‘a whole set of knowledge that have been 
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated’. 
Foucault calls these blocs popular knowledge, though it is far from 
being general common sense knowledge, but is a particular, local, 
regional knowledge (Foucault, 1980a, p.81-82).  
 
Indigenous Expertise 
 
Many of the projects that aim to include indigenous knowledge are still 
in progress and writing any final evaluation of their significance and 
results is therefore difficult. It is clear that the role of indigenous 
knowledge has been recognized although this recognition varies 
between different working groups. 
The goal of the fourth program under CAFF, the integration of 
indigenous peoples and their knowledge, is to ‘fully integrate 
indigenous peoples and their knowledge into the functions, processes, 
and implementation of CAFF’. This program includes four 
subprograms: the Indigenous Knowledge Mapping Project on the 
Beluga Whale, Ethical Principles for Arctic Research, the Indigenous 
Knowledge Data Directory and the Review of Co-management 
Systems (CAFF, 1995-1996, p.9). The open policy of CAFF  to 
indigenous peoples organizations and their participation in different 
meetings caused some confusion in the Moscow CAFF meeting in the 
fall of 1995 (Hild, 1996).  
There is a project within the CAFF that reflects the concerns of 
the indigenous peoples towards scientific research in the northern 
regions. The United States has completed a compilation of ethical 
principles from various sources for Arctic research. The SAAO’s 
forwarded the review to IASC which  coordinates with the IASSA in 
their preparation of pan-Arctic ethical principles. The projects, under 
the fourth item of the CAFF Work plan, involve Inuits from Alaska and 
Canada and the Alaskan-based Arctic Network. Under Canadian 
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leadership the ICC is preparing a data directory for locating sources of 
indigenous knowledge for the Arctic (CAFF, 1995).  
Another project focuses on the traditional ecological knowledge of 
the Beluga Whales and aims at demonstrating an appropriate 
methodology for documenting indigenous ecological knowledge. It is to 
recommend appropriate steps for integrating this knowledge into the 
work and policies of the AEPS. Beluga whales were selected as the 
target species for the pilot project because they migrate across 
national boundaries and are of scientific interest (see Huntington, 
1994). 
The ‘Ice-Edge Ecosystem Project’ of the Arctic Network aims to 
identify and map areas in the ice edge environment which are 
important for high biological diversity, biological activity, large seasonal 
concentrations of species, and for cultural and subsistence purposes. 
These maps are to be based on traditional knowledge and existing 
scientific data. The project also aims to identify and set priorities for 
the ecological health of the ice edge environment, the future of 
traditional harvesting and subsistence life and to encourage a 
cooperative effort among native and environmental groups to protect 
habitat and species’ diversity for continued subsistence purposes 
(Gibson, 1996). 
The CAFF program suggested that co-management as a model 
for the effective participation of indigenous peoples in resource 
management needed to be explored. Both Canada and the United 
States are jointly leading a review of co-management systems to 
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the mechanisms for 
involving indigenous peoples in Arctic resource management. The 
AEPS seminar report point outs that if the co-management of 
renewable resources was to be effective, formal agreements between 
indigenous peoples and governments were required. To address their 
need for hunting rights, indigenous peoples require territorial rights 
and participation in the management of land and living resources 
(Hansen, 1994, p.19; see also CAFF, 1995, p.3).  
Indigenous peoples’ organizations have been represented at 
EPPR official meetings (Pahkala, 1996). The ICC has expressed its 
satisfaction over the establishment of cooperation between itself and 
the EPPR but has pointed out existing communication problems.The 
need of communication was stressed; The ICC indicated that 
indigenous peoples should be involved in identifying areas that are 
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biologically and culturally sensitive and areas for hunting and traveling. 
Indigenous peoples should receive information about emergencies in 
terms and languages understandable to them (see ICC, 1995a) 
(EPPR, 1996, p.15).  
With PAME the role of indigenous peoples and their knowledge 
has been very modest. Indigenous peoples’ organizations have been 
present at the meetings of PAME. The ‘ICC and Sámi Council have 
been more visible than the Russian association’. However, ‘the nature 
of cooperation within PAME does not require the use of indigenous 
peoples’ knowledge’. Though, it is ‘important is that they are present in 
the meetings’ (Lassig, 1996).  
The evaluation made by the IPS in 1996, during the earliest 
phase of cooperation in 1991-1993, stated: ‘many working group 
meetings were unattended or the indigenous peoples’ representatives 
were ill-prepared’. The organizations often did not receive notices of 
meetings and not much information on AEPS activities was distributed 
to the indigenous peoples organizations. The funding to support the 
participation of the indigenous peoples was ‘minimal:’ the government 
of Canada, and to a lesser degree Denmark, provided the majority of 
funds during this period and this explained in part why the Inuit were 
more often represented than other indigenous peoples. The report 
stresses that most of the funds allocated during the 1991-1993 period 
were primarily for meeting participation. Very little financing was made 
available for meeting preparation or for communicating the work of the 
AEP’s to the organizations’ own people, whom they represented 
(Reimer, 1996, p.3). 
Since 1993, the ministers have given the three indigenous 
peoples organizations a formal standing invitation to all future 
meetings of the AEPS, making it ‘a milestone’. Between 1993 and 
1996 there was a noticeable increase in the participation of the three 
indigenous peoples’ organizations. The SAAO meetings were gen-
erally ‘well-attended’ by representatives of the three organizations. 
Additionally, AEPS working group meetings were also better attended 
than during the earlier period. However, excepting ICC, the working 
group meetings were often attended by volunteers or others who were 
not well prepared. The degree to which meaningful input was made 
directly related to the funding available for preparing the issues 
beforehand and to discussing the issues ‘back at home’ with the 
organizations’ own people.  Chester Reimer, the executive director of 
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the IPS, described the form of participation in the later period as 
‘project participation’. Within each of the working groups several tasks 
and projects were undertaken. Sometimes, projects were led by an 
indigenous peoples’ organization, such as with the sealing industry 
project by the ICC. In other cases, parts of reports were contracted out 
to indigenous peoples’ organizations, such as sections of the AMAP 
Assessment Report. In still other cases, indigenous groups were 
partners in co-leading a specific project (Reimer, 1996, p.3). 
There is a rather large consensus among the participants that 
indigenous  
involvement in the AEPS has made the process ‘a different product,’ 
compared with their lack of participation (Whitby, 1996). It provides 
‘real life examples’. The ‘indigenous peoples’ role is both important 
and positive in the Arctic,’ according to the head of the U.S. 
delegation, Robert Senseney (1996). For the environmental 
coordinator of the ICC, the current situation is best described as, ‘a 
means to an end... to get more influence and control’. The benefits of 
indigenous knowledge are many: 1) ‘to make a real contribution,’ 2) ‘a 
nice, interesting new thing to attract funding,’ and 3) ‘a feel good pro-
ject’. The problem is, ‘How do we get the most of this?’ The ultimate 
problem is ‘who can speak for somebody else?’ (Huntington, 1996).  
 
The Bio-Politics of Knowledge 
 
Among the indigenous peoples there are some concerns over where 
the use of indigenous peoples’ knowledge is leading. Ritva Torikka 
from the Sámi Council mentions ‘the concern that indigenous peoples’ 
knowledge is used as a political weapon, because there are not 
enough possibilities to cooperate’. However, she does admit that there 
could be a good opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the 
problems related to overgrazing reindeer in northern Finland with the 
help of indigenous peoples’ knowledge (Torikka, 1996). Mary Simon 
warns that indigenous peoples’ knowledge gets ‘a lot of lip service’ 
(Simon, 1996). 
Governmentality ties subjects to someone else by control and 
dependence by one’s own identity and self-knowledge. Both meanings 
suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to 
(Foucault, 1984a, p.21). In becoming and being experts there is a 
price to pay; it means subjecting oneself to the network of power 
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relations. Strategies of challenging colonial structures also include  
claims to knowledge. It is possible not to escape power per se but to 
escape the particular strategy of power relations that directs one’s 
conduct. Each adverse relation is potentially reversible (Simons, 1995, 
p.85).   
This aspect of knowledge emerged in the discussions on the work 
of the AMAP; how are the indigenous peoples seen as part of the 
environmental problems and their management in the Arctic. Human 
health research is a sensitive issue for indigenous peoples. The 
dilemma is especially difficult in communities where traditional foods 
are vital to spiritual, cultural and physical well-being. An Inuit view on 
the problem is: ‘We are what we eat. Inuit eat Inuit foods. When I eat 
Inuit foods, I feel like myself again’ (quoted in Huntington, 1997).This 
is a problem difficult to govern. 
The suggestions made at the AEPS seminar in 1994 were that 
first of all, indigenous peoples should be involved in the scientific 
monitoring of pollutants and contribute their observations on pollution 
effects. The practical suggestions included that the AMAP data 
management program’s meta-database-system could be used for 
collecting information about indigenous knowledge sources and as a 
registry of experts. Then, the workshop speakers focused on the need 
for enhancing the possibility for indigenous peoples to contribute their 
knowledge to the work of the AMAP through a research partnership. 
Finally, to improve the chances of participation in this kind of work, 
indigenous peoples needed training and educational opportunities. 
The seminar report stated that indigenous peoples needed to have 
better access to monitoring data. Indigenous peoples’ organizations 
have pointed out that it is not enough to only receive information about 
the results generated by AMAP programs but that they are also given 
the opportunity to contribute to the design of research undertaken by 
the AMAP and to point out areas for research based on information 
from their communities. Representatives from indigenous peoples’ 
organizations have expressed the need for improving the flow of 
information from the work of the AMAP. They have also emphasized 
that such information must be presented in a way that is readily 
understandable for the indigenous communities (Hansen, 1994, p.8-9).  
Indigenous peoples’ organizations are observers and they have 
attended the meetings of the AMAP Working Group. The idea was that 
they would be involved in the planning of the AMAP assessment 
            Discourse on Knowledge 
83 
 
 
process, in drafting sections of the assessment and in compiling the 
information required for the human health and radioactivity 
assessment work. Representatives of the indigenous groups also 
participated in the expert groups responsible for both parts of the 
assessment (AMAP, 1996). In the assessment work of AMAP,  the 
role of the indigenous peoples’ community was restricted to presenting 
two chapters about indigenous peoples and the health issues raised in 
the AMAP report. In addition, a workshop was held to present papers 
on indigenous peoples’ health issues. Only a handful of the 
conference participants followed this workshop.  The indigenous 
groups themselves seem to be happy with their role in the AMAP 
assessment; the ‘AMAP had done the Inuit community a great service, 
and would like to see CAFF incorporate more traditional knowledge in 
its work and decision-making’ (Lynge, 1997).   
In practice, the idea of using indigenous peoples’ knowledge has 
been limited. The reason for this, according to Lars-Otto Reiersen, is 
‘that there was no indigenous peoples’ knowledge available to be 
used’. The ICC suggested a research program to identify such 
knowledge. In the Reiersen view, this proposal exemplifies the 
problem: ‘there is no such knowledge available since it has to be 
collected’ (Reiersen, 1996). 
The politics of governmentality is one of bio-politics; the life of 
populations is an object of political and scientific concern.  State 
administrators express their concepts of human welfare and state 
intervention in terms of biological issues. From AMAP’s point of view, 
‘the indigenous peoples are the primary human population at risk from 
persistent contaminants and other forms of pollution in the Arctic’ 
(AMAP 1993a, p.55-57). The AMAP report says, ‘indigenous peoples 
who rely on traditional diets are likely to be more exposed to several 
toxic substances than the majority of people elsewhere in the world’. 
There are no illnesses yet reported in Arctic for which contaminants 
are known to be a direct cause (AMAP, 1997, p.172).   
These practices of surveillance enhance the power of states; the 
question is how individuals and groups are subjected and categorized 
by age, ethnic group, sex, disease, and welfare regimes (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982, p.140). 
The AMAP dietary assessment is based on toxicological data and 
biological monitoring. The data is collected by: sampling blood from 
mothers, from the umbilical cords of the newly born, from placental 
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tissue and by collecting breast milk samples. Questionnaires and the 
collection of food items can also gather data for monitoring. This kind 
of research also includes ethical concerns, such as all the participants 
in human biomonitoring programs being fully informed of the 
objectives and scope of the programs and having provided written and 
informed consent prior to their participation (see AMAP,  1995; see 
also AMAP 1993a, p.55-56). The practice of governmentality  is also 
followed in the Arctic; these political practices include a population 
surveyed and listed, observed, and examined. 
The problem of assessing tolerable risks, according to AMAP, is a 
challenge: there is ‘an urgent need for an in-depth assessment of the 
toxic effects of all persistent organic contaminants, including the 
combined effects of these substances’. For example, almost all of the 
organic pollutants in the study can be detected in breast milk. 
Sometimes they are found at levels at which the child’s short-term 
exposure is higher than tolerable daily intakes calculated for lifetime 
adult exposure. Nevertheless, at this time, studies have evaluated the 
potential effects of persistent organic pollutants in breast milk to ‘be 
limited and not conclusive’. The benefits of breast feeding outweigh 
the known risks from persistent organic contaminants and breast 
feeding should continue (AMAP, 1997, p.186).   
From the point of view of governmentality, the administrative 
apparatuses of the states pose welfare in terms of people’s needs and 
their happiness. The concern for AMAP is ‘balancing the information’. 
It means informing the population about the problem with its negative 
implications without causing too much panic. This is the responsibility 
of governments according to AMAP. Giving ‘balanced’ information 
about the situation is considered a challenge.  First, many factors 
contribute to health and illness: socioeconomic conditions, health 
services, societal and cultural factors, individual lifestyles and 
behavior, and genetics: ‘Contaminants enter this already complex 
scene’. The variation in human exposure depends on varying 
environmental concentrations of contaminants, local physical and 
biological pathways, and the local dietary habits of people. Exposure 
to persistent organic pollutants is the primary concern. Some 
indigenous groups are exposed to levels that exceed established 
tolerable intake levels (AMAP, 1997, p.172-173).   
Second, fear of contaminants and changes in traditional ways of 
life can 
            Discourse on Knowledge 
85 
 
 
affect both community social structure and individual well-being. The 
potential negative effects of contaminants to the human health have to 
be balanced with the positive effects that consuming traditional foods 
have. The traditional diets are high in animal foods and are rich 
sources of protein and vitamins. Overall, traditional diets provide ‘a 
strong nutritional base’ for the health of Arctic peoples. Market foods 
from outside the Arctic often have less protein and iron but more fat 
and carbohydrates. Moreover, changes in food habits follow changes 
in the way of life leading to a more sedentary life style. Therefore, a 
move away from traditional foods could contribute to poor health, and 
increase the risk of diabetes and cardiovascular diseases (AMAP, 
1997, p.174).  
Governmentality makes the population the focus of 
administering.In governmentality, human needs are now seen 
instrumentally (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.140). The AMAP report 
aims at developing some scientifically based criteria for the human 
intake of pollutants. The main criterion for the AMAP report is human 
tolerance to toxic effects of contaminants. Analyzing tolerance is not, 
however, a simple task. People are exposed to a mixture of many 
different compounds simultaneously, often at low levels and over their 
entire lives. The AMAP report talks about a ‘tolerable daily intake’ 
which includes ‘safety factors’ for humans. The safety factor is an 
attempt to account for the unknown: ‘The greater the uncertainty in the 
toxicology, the larger the safety factor’. When the intake of con-
taminants in food exceeds tolerable daily intakes, it is a warning that 
health effects cannot be ruled out and that the situation has to be 
examined more closely (AMAP, 1997, p.173-174).  
For Foucault, this kind of medical discourse is part of the system 
of administrative and political control of the population. The medical 
discourse and political practice are connected - not through concepts, 
methods and utterances of medicine but by political practices that 
make a possible object for medical discourse (Foucault, 1991c, p.68). 
The Arctic case is a good example of this. Pollution becomes a 
problem of population for national governments. The indigenous 
peoples in the region are recognized as victims of pollution and their 
contribution is important to the understanding of the problems of the 
region from  a position of victims. In the work of AMAP no signs of 
accepting this rival knowledge can be found. There are few signs of 
recognizing their contribution as experts in the local conditions or 
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recognizing the value of different forms of knowledge. 
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The Need for a Comprehensive Approach 
 
Pollution as a Common Enemy 
 
The Arctic was mainly perceived as a military theater until the end of 
the Cold War. This was characterized by the political, economic and 
strategic division of superpower relations. The Russians were first to 
see a new identity for the  Arctic:  
 
The Arctic is a region which just a few years ago was seen mainly in the 
light of military and political interests, a region where many requirements 
for cooperation in civilian projects were put aside, left of the curb of the 
’highway’ of international cooperation (Address of the Soviet Repre-
sentative, 1989, p.1). 
   
According to the Russian representative, ‘one cannot say that military 
and political problems in the Arctic have been resolved, they are very 
palpable’. However, the situation  made  new political thinking possible 
- even in the Arctic. It is ‘perestroika that gave the chance to achieve a 
qualitative change in politics, public attitude in the very atmosphere 
surrounding environmental protection problems’ (Address of the Soviet 
Representative, 1989, p.1-2). 
Transforming the identity of the region dominated by military 
concerns to one of environmental concerns has not been easy. Some 
countries, such as Norway and the United States, clung to their old 
identities. For a long time, the U.S. representatives stressed the 
strategic importance of the Arctic: ‘It [the Arctic] has also been a region 
of vital security interest to most of our countries’ (Weinman, 1991, p.1). 
It took till 1994, before the United States redefined it Arctic Policy. 
Then they emphasized cooperation in the region instead of U.S. 
security interests. The importance of protecting the Arctic environment 
and conserving its biological resources was initially stressed in the 
new policy. The need for assuring that natural resource management 
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and economic development in the region were environmentally 
sustainable was next considered important. Finally, the idea of 
strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic 
nations was accepted (United States Announces New Policy for the 
Arctic Region, 1995).  
Studying this discourse shows that the end of the 1980's was a 
change in the collective identity of the Arctic and the future of the 
region. Existing identity commitments broke down. This breakdown 
made an examination of old ideas about self and others possible. It 
was followed by new structures of interaction.The experience with the 
AEPS shows that the process so far has been one of continual identi-
ty-building for the actors and the region itself as a community. Actors 
acquire identities - relatively stable, role-specific under-standing about 
self - by participating in the production of collective meanings. Iden-
tities are inherently relational. The commitment to, and the salience of, 
particular identities vary but each identity is an inherently social 
definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively 
hold about themselves and one another. These constitute the structure 
of the social world. Rethinking those identities paved the way for new 
identities and  practices of interaction. It is not enough to rethink ideas 
about self and others, since old identities have been sustained by 
interaction with other actors, the practices of which remain a social fact 
for the transformative agent. To change oneself it is often necessary to 
change the identities of those that help sustain the frameworks  of 
interaction. However, interaction may also further change those 
identities; interaction is a process of defining and redefining identities 
(see Wendt, 1996). The important point for regime study is, as 
Stephen Krasner once noted, international regimes ‘once estab-
lished...  take on a life of their own and develop their own inner 
dynamics’ (Krasner, 1985, p.77-78). 
The Arctic was reframed for the process of rebuilding the 
identities of the 
actors. The Arctic had to be given a new identity. Circumpolar 
countries set themselves a challenge to combat the common enemy - 
the threats to the fragile environment in the north. The Polar Basin was 
defined as ‘the final depository of a number of air and seaborne 
pollutants’ (Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic 
Environment, 1989, p.2). The circumpolar countries developed ‘a 
common understanding of the serious threats to the fragile Arctic 
                                                                                 Discourse on 
Development 89 
 
 
environment’ (Haarder, 1991, p.2). The main aim of the strategy for 
Arctic cooperation was to ‘identify, reduce and, as a final goal, eli-
minate pollution’ (AEPS, 1991, p.4). 
The main concern within the AEPS is pollution control for the sake 
of human health within the region. Concern for the environment united 
the actors and made the AEPS possible for a short period. Concern for 
the environment, in particular the concern over pollution, was the 
lowest common denominator for cooperation in the Arctic (Prokosch, 
1996). Politically, the issue of pollution lost its importance within the 
framework of the AEPS. At the 1996 Inuvik meeting, the issue of 
pollution is not among the first concerns mentioned; it was considered 
a problem for the ‘long-term health of Arctic ecosystems’ (Inuvik 
Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Develop-
ment in the Arctic, 1996). Politically, the ministers at Alta in 1997 
concluded, after receiving the AMAP report that:  
 
The Arctic, in comparison with most other areas of the world, remains a 
clean environment with large areas of unspoiled nature (Alta Declaration 
on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1997). 
  
The ministers noted that ‘in some parts of the Arctic severe pollution 
from local sources requires both national and international remedial 
action’ (Alta Declaration on the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy, 1997). However, the sense of urgency in dealing with Arctic 
environmental concerns and the sense of the fragility and vulnerability 
of the Arctic environment was lost. 
 
A Rich Resource Region 
 
The Arctic was seen more in terms of its rich natural resources and 
their potential for further regional use and development, instead of the 
fragility and vulnerability of its ecosystems and populations. The 
Canadian representative stressed the identity of the Canadian Arctic 
as ‘...a land surprising rich with flora and fauna and it offers enormous 
resource potential’ (Campeau, 1990, p.1). According to the Russian 
representative:  
 
For us the Russian Arctic is not only a vast territory, where about 2 
million Russians live, not only a considerable part of our economical 
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potential and not only a unique component of our nature. The Arctic for 
us, especially now is something much more (Danilov-Danilian, 1993, 
p.1). 
 
The Arctic provides the Russians with: ‘... the ores of Murmansk 
district, nickel and copper of Monchegorsk and Pechenga region, 
bauxites of Archangel District, coal of the Pechora Basin, oil and gas 
of the Timan-Pechora gas province’. Major mineral extraction and 
refining complexes at the country’s largest metal processing plant are 
located at Norilsk in Arctic Russia. The ‘next step will be the develop-
ment of oil and gas fields on the Arctic seashelf,’ according to the 
Russian representative (Address of the Soviet Representative, 1989, 
p.3).  
Fisheries and hunting are of special importance for Greenland. In 
terms of non-renewable resources: 
 
... granted mineral and hydro-carbon wealth should be exploited. Nobody 
can expect us to have this kind of development potential just lying 
around untouched (Statement of the Danish Delegation, 1989, p.2). 
 
For the Danish, ‘natural resources in the long run can only benefit 
the people if they are utilized in a sustainable way’. Denmark is ‘no 
friend of  
the ‘boom and bust’ mineral exploitation that has caused so much 
havoc in the Arctic’. The Danish also noted that the ‘exploitation of 
mineral resources must take place within the framework of a general 
development policy that takes into account a number of other 
important requirements of a social cultural and especially 
environmental characters’ (Statement by the Danish Delegation, 1989, 
p.2).   
The Norwegian representative described the resources the high 
Arctic gave Norway: fisheries, petroleum related activities, industrial 
activities and efforts to use the resources allowing for environmental 
considerations.  Arctic natural resources are expected to receive more 
attention in the future because ‘not only has the exploration of 
potential resources in the Arctic acquired new importance’ but new 
technologies allow for their  utilization (Statement of the Norwegian 
Delegation, 1989, p.1).  
The issue of development and development opportunities became 
the focus of attention. As Finland said: ‘the direct and indirect effects 
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of modern, developed models of production and life in the northern 
hemisphere call for immediate attention’ (Bärlund, 1989, p.1). 
 
Equitable Development 
 
In 1990, the basis for the involvement of the indigenous peoples was 
that ‘indigenous peoples have a great deal at stake’; the culturally-
distinct societies of indigenous peoples are ‘vulnerable to the effects of 
environmentally-unsound or other inappropriate development ac-
tivities’ (Simon, 1990, p.2-3). The representatives of ICC challenged 
the 1990 draft for the AEPS. According to the ICC the strategy should 
have several diverse objectives instead of one, which  concentrated on 
the need of protecting the Arctic environment. These objectives relate 
to the ‘northern peoples, as well as Arctic ecosystems’. The strategy 
also had to be sustainable and equitable in ecological, social, cultural 
and economic terms. The Inuits required that the strategy and its 
objectives were put into the larger perspective of ‘development, peace 
and human rights’ (ICC, 1990, p.1). 
The Inuit particularly focused on the issue of ‘equitable 
development,’ by demanding that this should enhance the 
development of indigenous peoples and respect their rights. From an 
indigenous perspective, development projects within the Arctic have 
neither been sustainable nor equitable. The adverse impacts from 
these activities, both within and outside of the Arctic, are directly borne 
by indigenous peoples and by the living resources upon which they 
depend. In particular, if the injustices and imbalances of current 
development practices are not effectively addressed, their health and 
traditional ways of life may be irreversibly affected (Simon, 1990, p.2). 
The issue is also one of the right to use living resources in the Arctic: 
‘within the limits of sustainability, all indigenous peoples of the Arctic 
must be able to exercise their right to utilize living resources’ (Hansen, 
1994, p.16).  
The Inuit emphasize the right of participation in the management 
and development of the Arctic and its resources. From the indigenous 
perspective, development including or affecting indigenous territories 
must not undermine, but rather enhance the economic, social, cultural 
and political development of indigenous societies. Development in or 
affecting indigenous territories must fully respect the rights of 
indigenous peoples and accommodate indigenous values and 
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concerns. Development must not be imposed on indigenous peoples 
without their free and informed consent. Development initiatives by 
indigenous peoples should be encouraged, by ensuring significant and 
accessible opportunities that include government assistance and 
support. Development should only take place at a rate and pace 
compatible with the local communities affected. Indigenous peoples 
must participate equitably in the benefits of development, in a manner 
acceptable to them. Finally, development policies and objectives must 
appropriately recognize the importance of the environment and its 
resources in the survival and growth of distinct indigenous societies. 
These concerns should be taken into account by the ICC in planning 
Arctic environmental cooperation (Simon, 1990, p.2-3). 
The Sámi understanding of sustainable development was based 
‘nature’s own premisses’. Utilization must represent ‘a balance 
between what nature can give and what we take from it,’ so that nature 
will not be depleted.  Economic considerations should not govern 
utilization solely. The aim should be to minimize the production and 
use of products which deplete natural resources (Sámi Programme on 
the Environment, 1990, p.5). In the Sámi view, they are part of the 
ecosystem. Their ‘cultural manifestations are adapted to an ecological 
balance between what nature can give and what we can utilize in 
relations to the nature’s productive capacity’ Also, Sámi cultural tradi-
tion teaches the Sámi ‘how nature is to be used without being 
consumed’.The Sámi representative noted that the Arctic cultures 
(based on e.g., fishing, hunting and reindeer herding) have suc-
cessfully applied the principles of the sustainable development 
strategies for centuries and so they can serve as ‘very valuable 
models’ for these strategies in the modern technological world (Aikio, 
1990, p.6). Their culture is a living culture which enables them ‘to 
adapt to various natural conditions, acquiring new knowledge which 
will enable us to survive’ (Sámi Programme on the Environment, 1990, 
p.3). 
For the Sámi, however, the emphasis is on the right of develop-
ment. According to this view, the Sámi have:  
 
... inalienable right to preserve and develop our economic activities and 
our communities in keeping with our common conditions and together we 
wish to preserve our lands, natural assets, and national heritage for 
future generations (Halonen, 1991, p.1).  
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According to the Sámi, when land and water resources are exploited 
by people other than the Sámi and for purposes other than those of 
the Sámi, the Sámi must be given a share in the profits of exploitation. 
The Sámi demand that primary occupation must be protected and 
promoted on their terms and reindeer herding must be reserved for 
them by law, providing strong rights of access to grazing resources 
(Sámi Programme on the Environment, 1990, p.6).   
The Sámi see the problem as being ‘subjected to constant influ-
ences which is transforming our pattern of life and our relationship with 
nature’ (Sámi Programme on the Environment, 1990, p.2). According 
to the Sámi view, ‘the Finnish initiative for the protection of the Arctic 
has resulted in further cooperation among the Arctic governments. 
This we believe is of great significance of the existence of the 
indigenous cultures. It is important, in this regard, to consider whether 
the agenda for the next ministerial conference would include the 
issues regarding Arctic indigenous peoples’ (Halonen, 1991, p.3). 
The Russian indigenous peoples consider it essential for 
indigenous peoples to be guaranteed the possibility of continuing their 
traditional ways of life. As the chairperson of the Association of 
Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian 
Federation, V. Sanghi states the ‘fundamental’ requirement for saving 
the indigenous peoples in the Russian North is to respect the lifestyle 
of the peoples: ‘The lifestyle is what makes them who they are’  (In, 
Alia, 1991, p.28). One of the main prerequisites for the successful 
development of the peoples of the north is that they are granted the 
opportunity to plan their own present and future. The aim of the 
Association is to involve its members in activities related to monitoring 
the ecological situation and the preservation of flora and fauna in the 
territories of indigenous peoples (Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet 
North, 1991, p.54-55).  
Together the indigenous peoples stress that they ‘desire not only 
to survive but to thrive  as Indigenous Peoples into the 21st Century’. 
They require ‘sustainable and equitable development’ in their 
homelands. This kind of development includes subsistence hunting 
and renewable resource harvesting. For them, the exclusive and 
collective right to lands and resources for subsistence, and 
involvement in all decision-making processes concerning the 
management, research, and allocation of resources, is important. 
Indigenous peoples do not want to be left on the  ‘outside’ of 
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development, as has often been pointed out by both the 
representatives of the ICC and the Sámi Council in their statements. 
They do not want  their regions to be developed ‘over them’; they want 
to have an input in those developments. 
In particular, according to the Arctic Leaders’ Summit, there ‘is a 
need to find an appropriate balance’ between the ongoing subsistence 
activities of the indigenous peoples and the development of renewable 
and non-renewable resources by applying the principles of 
‘sustainable and equitable development’. The Arctic Leaders’ Summit 
declaration criticizes ‘the antiharvesting lobby movement’ which, 
according to the declaration, ‘misrepresent to the public and 
governments their objective which is the complete prohibition in killing 
wild animals’. The antiharvesting movement causes ‘great harm to 
indigenous peoples and indeed, places in jeopardy their very right to 
exist as distinct peoples’ (Faegteborg, 1993, p.39).  
  
Redirecting the AEPS  
  
In 1991, the Arctic states agreed that the AEPS should ‘allow for 
sustainable economic development in the North so that such develo-
pments does not have unacceptable ecological or cultural impacts’ 
(AEPS, 1991, p.2). It was, however, noted in the preparatory process 
leading to the Nuuk ministerial meeting that ‘the AEPS presently 
projects a very protectionist posture concerning the Arctic despite the 
many references within the Strategy to sustainable development’ 
(Protecting the Arctic Environment, 1992, p.5). 
The protectionist image of the AEPS was eroded in the Nuuk and 
Inuvik Declarations. The name of the 1991 declaration, the 
‘Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment’ was changed 
in 1993 to ‘The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in 
the Arctic’. The countries decided at the Nuuk conference in 
Greenland (1993), to conserve and protect the Arctic environment for 
the benefit of ‘present and future generations’ and for the global en-
vironment. The understanding at the Nuuk meeting was for 
sustainable development, which  meant that environmental protection 
constituted, ‘an integral part of the development process and cannot 
be considered in isolation from it’ (The Nuuk Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development in the Arctic, 1993).  
Arctic environmental cooperation became a part of the Rio 
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rhetoric in 1993. In the Declaration of the Second Ministerial Meeting 
on Arctic Environment in Nuuk, ministers stated, ‘we support the 
achievements of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, and state our belief that the principles of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development have particular 
relevance with respect to sustainable development in the Arctic’ 
(TFSDU, 1994, p.2). By 1993, there was a shift in defining the source 
and the nature of the threat to the Arctic environment; the issue of the 
use of local natural resources captured attention - at the expense of 
the pollution problem. This concern included the utilization of natural 
resources by indigenous peoples. 
As a sign of this commitment the Arctic states established a task 
force on sustainable development (Task Force on Sustainable 
Development and Utilization, TFSDU). Terry Fenge from the Canadian 
Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) described the establishment of 
the task force as, ‘an interesting departure’ broadening the AEPS 
(Fenge, 1995). The status of the task force was upgraded to that of a 
working group, reflecting the commitment of the states to the 
continuation of work on sustainable development. 
The report on the work by the TFSDU in 1995, concludes that the 
competing approaches to sustainable development include some 
common conclusions. First, they suggest that ‘long-term social well-
being, economic development and environmental health are 
interdependent’. Second, what is needed is ‘the full integration of 
environmental costs and benefits into accounting and policy assess-
ment procedures in order to inform economic decision-makers more 
completely about the trade-offs required’. Finally, ‘it is crucial that 
those affected by economic development should be involved in 
decision-making around new plans and initiatives, in order to ensure 
that he values inherent in their culture are reflected’. The human-
centered and culturally-oriented approach to the human-environment 
relationship in these formulations is clear; the cultural factor is ‘a factor 
of critical importance in the Arctic’ (TFSDU, 1996, p.16). 
However, the concept of sustainable development seemed to be 
left more or less open. The main message of the AEPS task force on 
sustainable development and utilization seems ‘to avoid superficial, 
theoretical work’ (Hurst, 1994, p. 125). It almost seems that despite 
the lack of interest in the ‘theoretical’ discussion on sustainable 
development, the AEPS participants are reinventing the whole idea 
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and are swallowed up by procedural discussions. Even should the 
participants try to avoid theoretical thinking about sustainable 
development there is some thought about it in the future practices of 
cooperation developed by the working group. 
The TFSDU was established in 1993 to:  
 
... propose steps governments should take to meet their commitment to 
sustainable development in the Arctic, including the sustainable use of 
renewable resources by indigenous peoples, taking into account that 
management, planning and development activities shall provide for the 
conservation, sustainable use and protection of Arctic flora and fauna for 
the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations, including 
local populations and indigenous peoples (Hurst, 1994, p.123). 
 
The task force was expected from preparing reports and making 
recommendations to the ministers on the following: 1) identification of 
the goals and principles of sustainable development in an Arctic 
environmental contexts and finding opportunities and mechanisms for 
the application of these principles; 2) opportunities to enhance 
indigenous peoples’ economies, and to improve the environmental, 
economic and social conditions of Arctic communities through the sus-
tainable utilization of natural resources, while protecting the cultures of 
indigenous peoples; 3) specific issues and problems presented to the 
conservation, sustainable use and protection of Arctic flora and fauna 
by management, planning and development activities, and proposals 
for measures to mitigate or resolve such issues and problems; and 4) 
the needs for new knowledge, ways of facilitating communication and 
the sharing of information concerning the application of new or proven 
technologies and management practices (TFSDU, 1994, p.4; Hurst, 
1996; Snider, 1996).  
Under the TFSDU,  the idea of  an Arctic Agenda 21 was 
developed. Six themes were examined more closely in the regional 
Agenda 21: circumpolar cooperation, poverty, decision-making, the 
conservation of biological diversity, the protection of the oceans and 
environmental threats. The theme of circumpolar cooperation focuses 
on the economic development of the Arctic region and the problems 
caused to it by restrictions on the import of wildlife products. 
Circumpolar cooperation aims at the development of international 
trade and environmental policies to support the local economies. 
Combating poverty aims to provide all persons in the Arctic with: the 
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opportunity to earn a sustainable livelihood and to develop integrated 
strategies; programs of sound and sustainable management of the 
environment, resource mobilization, poverty eradication, and 
alleviation; employment and income generation and education and 
training. The chapter on integrating environment and development in 
decision-making aims at including environmental and developmental 
considerations into policy, planning and decision-making at all 
management levels in all sectors of circumpolar society (TFSDU, 
1995b, p.7-13). 
The three other topics; the protection of the oceans, the protection 
of biological diversity and environmental threats overlap with the 
activities of other working groups. It reflected the aim of developing the 
task force to a higher level compared with others, so that the task 
force would have a comprehensive role in advancing sustainable 
development in the Arctic. The division of duties between the working 
groups and their relations to each other became an issue when the 
establishment of the Arctic Council was negotiated. This made the 
work of the TFSDU difficult in the end.  
 
 
The Human-Environment Relationship 
 
Ethics and Environmental Discourse 
 
Regimes institutionalize a particular ethical stand on the human-
environment relationship. In the anthropocentric (or human-centered) 
approach, environmental problems are a destructive factor in human 
life; they limit the possibilities to enjoy healthy, safe and comfortable 
surroundings. Human-centered ethics emphasize future generations 
and their possibility to use resources for their own development. 
Human needs and interests form the basis of the entire ethical system 
of standards and rules governing the relationship between humans 
and nature (Passmore, 1974, p.73-81; Eckersley, 1992, p.33-47). 
In the biocentric (or life-centered) view, the question relates to 
factors threatening life on earth. This view is that expansionist human 
action threatens life-supporting systems. Life-centered approaches do 
not consider the duties towards nature to be derived from people’s 
duties towards each other. In the life-centered approach, obligations 
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and responsibilities are seen as arising from certain moral relations 
between human beings and nature. The natural world, in this 
approach, is not seen simply as an object to be exploited; animals, 
plants etc., are regarded as more than resources for human use. 
Living things are considered to have a worth of their own, irrespective 
of their actual or possible usefulness to human beings (Rolston, 1988, 
p.216-220; Taylor, 1986, p.12-13).   
The concept of sustainable development reflects a particular way 
 of  
understanding the human relationships between how economic activity 
and natural resources are arranged. These could be called ‘world 
views’ including the aspects of an ethical stance on the relations 
between man, the environment and the world.  According to the World 
Commission Report on Environment and Development, sustainable 
development is ‘development which meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’ (World Commission on Development and Environment, 
1987, p.8).  
The idea of sustainable development represents the tradition of 
resource management in defining the human-environment 
relationship. Resource management is anthropocentric at its core; 
hurting nature is beginning to hurt economic man. Thus, the 
instrumental economic paradigm prevails, although it is enlarged to 
encompass some basic ecological principles in an attempt to maintain 
ecosystem stability for the support of sustainable development; in 
short ecology is being economized (see Colby, 1992).  
The World Commission demonstrated how economic growth 
depended heavily on the increasing use of environmental resources 
and also documented the impact of policies. Many of its conclusions, 
however, reaffirmed the fundamental premises of conventional 
development thinking, in particular the stress on economic growth 
above all else. The main benefit of the concept of sustainable 
development is that although it still considers economic growth as the 
main aim, it also includes the ecologic constraint, or ‘ecological 
imperative,’ that there are limits that should not be broken.  The 
question of what the limits are and how they should be defined is 
essentially left open (Turner, 1988, p.5). 
Defining the limits of development means defining the basis for 
the criteria of sustainability. The alternatives are to either use 
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ecological or social criteria. The idea of social development requires 
that state governments recognize and accommodate the rights of 
indigenous peoples to self-government, lands and renewable and non-
renewable resources. This issue is fundamentally one of recognition of 
their cultural, social and economic needs. The ecological aspect of 
sustainable development refers to a management policy which is 
based on sound ecological principles. These are based on the idea 
that man is a part of nature and say that renewable resources must be 
managed. They must be protected in a manner that maintains 
essential ecological systems and processes and ensures sustainable 
use of species and ecosystem both now and in the future (Oreskov 
and Seijersen, 1993, p.12). 
Interpretations of sustainability were many in the Arctic 
cooperation. The Swedish delegation noted that ‘today’s system of 
environmental protection in the Arctic region was fragmented’. ‘An 
overarching ecological perspective could provide a more comprehen-
sive assessment of the existing situation’ (Statement by the Swedish 
Delegation, 1989, p.1). According to the Swedes, this approach  
 
... must include provisions for the conservation and management of living 
as well as non-living natural resources. With regard to living resources, a 
system that guarantees the long-term sustainable utilization of these 
resources and prevents the over-exploitation of species and populations 
is urgently needed. Such a system must also contain regulations that 
ensure the recovery of species and populations which have been over-
exploited in the past (Dahl, 1991, p.6). 
 
In their view sustainable development is ‘a matter of mutual 
dependence rather than control and exploitation’. This means that 
nature as an element has to enter into all different aspects of the 
decision-making process. Sustainability means  more efficient and en-
vironmentally sound uses of natural resources and the introduction of 
ecologically sound technologies. It requires that environmental stress 
and environmental emergencies are prevented in beforehand. The 
Swedish saw the cooperation as including an ‘Arctic Sustainable 
Development Strategy’ which could express objectives and principles 
on how to protect and sustainably utilize the Arctic environment 
(Introductory Statement by Assistant Under-Secretary, Desiree Edmar, 
1990, p.2-3). 
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The critical question for the Norwegians is to find ‘the right balan-
ce’ between resource conservation and resource utilization. Not least 
is the question of securing the long term basis of livelihoods for the 
local people (Statement of the Norwegian Delegation, 1989, p.11). 
Several principles were suggested for dealing with the challenge of 
balancing the use and protection of natural resources. In the 
Norwegian view: 
  
Only through careful stewardship and with due regard to the precau-
tionary principle will we be able to prevent further environmental damage 
and degradation and thus ensure rational use of the regions resources, 
to the benefit of its peoples and mankind as whole (Stoltenberg, 1991, 
p.5).  
 
They proposed a broad ecological context to deal with the challenges. 
This broad approach would cover interrelations between different 
species and the environment as a whole, which must be protected 
from pollution and degradation. They stated: ‘to secure sustainable 
development in the Arctic is a challenge which is part of the broader 
global challenge to safeguard our common future’ (Statement of the 
Norwegian Delegation, 1989, p.16). 
The problem of sustainability, for the Russians, was a problem of 
including the environment within economic considerations. The major 
problem was: ‘imperfection of the economic mechanisms that do not 
account for ecological factors’. The production dominated, sectoral 
approach to the utilization of Arctic natural resources with an imperfect 
management system for the utilization of the natural environmental 
added to the problem. The solution in the Russian view was equip-
ment and technology for use in the Arctic environment, and knowledge 
about the environment. Finally, what was needed was an ‘environ-
mental utilization strategy’ including a ‘clear concept of economic 
development in the Arctic for the benefit of both economic and 
ecological interests’ (Address of the Soviet Representative, 1989, p.5).  
The ecosystem approach, according to the Canadians, linked to 
the concept of sustainable development and based on sound scientific 
evidence, is the most suitable for studying and managing the Arctic 
environment. Their view on the ecosystem approach was that it 
enabled everybody to ‘ensure the future health and well-being of Arctic 
ecosystems, thereby enabling countries to fulfil their natural and 
international responsibilities’ (Proposal by the Government of Canada, 
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1990, p.2). 
In the ecosystem approach ‘nature and human development are 
dynamic by definition’. It focuses on essential ecological components, 
systems and biodiversity and minimizes climatic change; contaminants 
are seen as a complex problem in the ecosystem. The ecosystem 
model divides sources as local and distant; transport is atmospheric, 
fluvial, in ocean currents and fresh water. Impact is divided into four 
categories: terrestrial, marine, exposure/diet and human health.The 
basic principles of the approach are: each segment of the ecosystem 
model links to all of the others, policy choices can be drawn from an 
understanding of how relevant components of the ecosystem interact 
with each other within the context of the dynamics of contaminants 
transfer, and the focus of resources and science on only one sector at 
cost of another will not provide the basis for policies (Final Draft WG1 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991, p. 4-5). 
Man is an ‘inherent part of this ecosystem’. The human dimension 
has particular emphasis in the ecosystem approach, and  the effects of 
environmental degradation to health and the northern way of life 
(these are heavily reliant on Arctic ecosystems) are highlighted (Stat-
ement by the Canadian Delegation, 1989, p.3-4). The human dimen-
sion is, ‘the incorporation of the social, economic and cultural needs 
and values of Arctic peoples through the development and 
implementation of the strategy’ (Proposal by the Government of 
Canada, 1990, p.2). It was not until 1995 that the Canadians an-
nounced they had dropped the idea of developing an international 
application of their ecosystem approach due to financial limitations 
(see TFSDU, 1995a).  
Sustainable development is not only a theoretical concept, it is 
connected  
with practices. Thought, such as the concept of sustainable 
development,  is not something superfluous for Foucault, a 
superstructural reflection of social reality. Thought is an integral part of 
action. When we think, speak and behave we do so in relation to 
thought. Thought is not independent of, but is related to, economic, 
social and political determinations (Foucault, 1984b, p.334-335).  
Practices rest on ‘modes of thought’ where ‘thought is... often hidden, 
but... always animates everyday behavior. There is always a little 
thought’ (Even in the most stupid institutions, Foucault adds). There is 
thought in ‘silent habits’ (Foucault, 1988a, p.155).  
102 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Foucault directs attention to political practices: to those practices 
that make the objects of discourse, and to the practices that make the 
discourse possible - the political practices that define what is ‘sayable’ 
and ‘doable’.Thought is materialized in the discourse. Discourse also 
has material effects on practice. Therefore, the dependence of thought 
on practice must be also recognized. 
 
Conservation and Biodiversity 
 
Few ideas of conserving nature for its own the sake  were presented. 
In 1989, the background paper considered the conservation needs of 
the Arctic:  
 
... the unique character of the Arctic region as one of the few remaining 
wilderness areas on the earth [and] it would be important to proceed 
much further than traditional fora, fauna and habitat protection and 
management (Jaakkola, 1989, p. 5). 
 
The more conservationist view was that it would have been of greater 
value if the Arctic countries could have agreed on a ‘conservation poli-
cy’ for the Arctic region and prepared a strategy for its implementation. 
The background paper suggested that, rather than start a completely 
new process, it would be more feasible to utilize the already ongoing 
elaboration of the existing international arrangements (Jaakkola, 1989, 
p.5).  
For the more conservation oriented AEPS parties the Arctic is a 
region where the environment needs to be protected, not only used for 
resources. After the proposed areas for protection listed by the CAFF 
are established about 16% of the Arctic land area was protected. 
These areas are not fully representative, since some ‘key habitats’ - 
such as isolated islands, fjords, coastal areas, marine areas and 
wetlands - are under represented. Even with the new proposals being 
implemented the situation will not change. The network will not 
represent ‘the variety of the Arctic ecosystems’ nor will it ‘contribute to 
the maintenance of viable populations of all Arctic species’.  The need 
for planning coastal and marine protected areas is stressed in the 
CAFF report. Some 100 of the present 285 protected areas have a 
marine component. At the present there are five transfrontier 
conservation areas in the Arctic (CAFF, 1997a).  
CAFF notes that maintaining the biological diversity of species 
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and populations is considered ‘fundamental’ to the health of Arctic 
ecosystems, to the global biosphere, and to the continued welfare of 
indigenous peoples of the region. Biodiversity refers to: 
 
... the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter 
alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems. 
 
This is the definition of the Convention on Biological Diversity signed 
at the UNCED in 1992 (CAFF, 1996, p.5). 
The Arctic ecosystems are considered ‘comparatively simple in a 
global context,’ however, ‘they are unique in terms of their biological 
diversity and because anthropogenic impacts are still at a relatively 
low level compared to other parts of the earth’. The characteristics of 
Arctic ecosystems and their biodiversity also make them more vulner-
able to human impacts and susceptible to threats. Arctic species have 
adapted to the harsh environment which may make many of them 
unique in genetic variation (CAFF, 1995-1996, p.7).  
According to CAFF’s list of threats to the Arctic, ‘the ecosystems 
and the biodiversity of the Arctic can be threatened by many human 
activities and the Arctic countries have identified several of particular 
concern in their respective countries of the region as a whole’. Major 
threats to Arctic habitats are primarily related to activities associated 
with the exploitation of natural resources, the development of an 
infrastructure, the increased public uses of natural resources, and 
pollution (CAFF, 1994, p.87).  
The report considers at length the threats related to mining, 
hydroelectric power development and oil and gas exploration. Badly 
managed offshore mining, for example, may affect seabird feeding 
grounds or cause pollution from metals found in  sediment, such as 
mercury, arsenic, cadmium and lead. Building oil fields may result in 
direct habitat loss due to road building pads, and indirect loss due to 
alteration in drainage patterns, dust deposition and contaminants. The 
landscape is continuously altered by a network of roads, pipelines and 
facilities. The presence of these facilities can influence movement of 
animals, such as caribou and waterfowl (CAFF, 1994, p.88).  
The continuing exploration, production and transportation of oil 
pose the threat of a major oil spill in an area of very high biological 
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productivity. A spill of any size could have ‘a significant negative im-
pact’. Spills of crude oil, refined fuels from ships and from onshore and 
offshore oil facilities are ‘significant threats’ to marine wildlife. The 
development of northern industries and communities will affect the 
natural environment (CAFF, 1994, p.88).  
The expansion of modern forestry in the Arctic has drastically 
increased the threat to forest species of plants and animals. The 
fragmentation of habitats can lead to ‘species loss and endangerment 
of and reduction of genetic diversity’. Overgrazing by reindeer is an 
increasing problem both in all Scandinavian countries and in Russia. 
Overfishing threatens marine food chains and populations of sea-
birds. The cumulative impact of the tourism industry, including a formal 
and informal transportation infrastructure, waste and noise and 
increased population, could be ‘substantial’ (CAFF, 1994, p.89-90).  
The CAFF report concludes that ‘there are many categories of 
threats to terrestrial, limnological and marine habitats in the Arctic, 
some actual and some potential’.These threats are directly and in-
directly related to the consequences of human activities. Most of them 
arise from local and regional activities. ‘All these threats constitute a 
great challenge to the management of Arctic nature and its resources’ 
(CAFF, 1994, p.93). In 1995, CAFF defined the ‘priority threats’ to 
Arctic biodiversity as:  
 
Group 1: mineral and petroleum exploration and development,  road 
infra- 
structure, habitat fragmentation, motorized vehicles; 
Group 2: rapid expansion of tourism; 
Group 3: fisheries practices and bycatch, overexploitation of 
species/hunting 
pressures, oil spills; and all pervasive: climate change (CAFF, 1997b).  
 
In emphasizing the need for protection another concept, 
biodiversity, could have become a principal for cooperation instead of 
sustainable development. The idea of biodiversity does not necessarily 
exclude indigenous peoples and their concerns. From CAFF’s per-
spective, indigenous peoples are:  
 
... people who have lived in the northernmost regions of the Arctic for 
about 100 000 years. Over time, they have developed ways to survive in 
the harsh climate of the Arctic and to use biological resources in a 
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sustainable manner thus creating a long-lasting and close connection 
between the people and the ecosystem (CAFF, 1996, p.22). 
 
The draft emphasizes the value of traditional and local communities in 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity: the ‘preservation 
and use of traditional knowledge that has resulted from this long-term 
interaction (indigenous peoples’) with nature has been extremely 
valuable in the conservation and sustainable use of Arctic biodiversity’ 
(CAFF, 1996, p.22). 
‘Conservation issues do not enjoy the same level of recognition 
and acceptance within the AEPS’ (Report of the CAFF Chair and 
Secretariat, 1996, p.1). Experience so far shows that the dominant 
priorities for the AEPS are sustainable economic development and 
pollution control. The idea of advancing biodiversity in the Arctic was 
included in the final AEPS declaration in Alta in 1997.  Here the states 
recognized ‘the importance of biological diversity in the Arctic region’ 
(Alta Declaration on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 
1997). However, this idea will mainly be used mainly as a framework 
for future CAFF activities. Having a biodiversity strategy in the Arctic is 
not an uncontroversial matter; the U.S. government has had some 
reservations about it both in the Arctic and in the global context 
(Kankaanpää, 1996). 
 
Environmental Security  
 
During Arctic Council negotiations a strong resistance from the U.S. 
and most other governments led Ottawa not to push military security 
onto the agenda (Scrivener, 1996, p.22). In the end, all military 
security issues were excluded from the work of the Arctic Council 
(Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). The 
connection, however, between environmental concern and security 
thinking was made in the negotiations.  The aim of the Arctic Council is 
to ‘enhance the collective environmental security of Arctic states and 
peoples, inter alia, through protection, preservation and restoration of 
environmental quality’ (Arctic Council Declaration Draft, August 16, 
1995). 
It has been outside the negotiations that a greater enthusiasm 
around the concept has been found. According to the Arctic 
Committee of Parliamentarians collective environmental security 
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means to ‘protect and defend the Arctic against environmental threats 
arising from outside the region and from unsustainable activities within 
the Arctic’ (Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region Conference Statement, 1996). According to Guy Lindström, 
the concept reflects the notion that all activities include environmental 
risks (Lindström, 1996). For the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
collective environmental security can be achieved ‘through coope-
ration to conserve, protect, enhance and restore environmental quality’ 
(WWF, 1995, p.1).  
The main argument against using the concept of collective 
environmental security in the Arctic is that it would direct  cooperation 
onto wrong track (Griffiths, 1992; see also Deudney, 1990; Brock, 
1991; Dalby, 1992). The critical points on environmental security 
include the word ‘security’ as having a strong nationalistic and 
militaristic burden that cannot be changed just by adding 
‘environmental’ or ‘collective’ at its beginning. It has been pointed out 
that defining environmental concerns as security risks is a security risk 
itself.  Developing ideas and practices that interpret environmental 
issues as security risks and threats are destructive to the  
development made so far in the Arctic. Adopting the concept and 
building the circumpolar region according to the idea of collective 
environmental security would undermine the development of the 
cooperation of the region so far; it defies the idea that the Arctic could 
be seen as something other than  a military theater.  Modernity 
invaded the Arctic in a special way, having originally arrived primarily 
and almost exclusively, in a military mode. The predominance of 
military concerns has suppressed other forms of modernity (Osheren-
ko and Young, 1989, p.122). 
Cooperation on military issues takes place outside the AEPS and 
the Arctic Council at the moment; it is now restricted  to the Arctic 
Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) Forum between the U.S., 
Norway and Russia. According to  information, other countries have 
expressed interest in AMEC but there are no formal plans or 
agreements to expand the cooperation at this time. Other countries 
may take part in the individual AMEC projects after agreement among 
the three partners. The AMEC vision is the ‘preservation and sus-
tainable military use of the Arctic environment’ (AMEC Information, 
1997; see also Kirk, 1997).  
Governmentality focuses on the study of ethics, power and 
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politics. The  
importance of ethical arguments in states’ discourse is not always 
understood: ‘it is remarkable how moralistic governments often are in 
discussing their obligations and those of others’ (Keohane, 1984, 
p.126). For environmental matters, such interest in ethical arguments 
is anything but strange. The human-environment relationship is based 
on values.  Acknowledging the political nature of these arguments is, 
however, sometimes difficult for political scientists. However, ‘ethos is 
fundamentally a political question’ (Dillon, 1995, p.349). In E.H. Carr’s 
view:  
 
It is impossible to build up effective institutions, national or international, 
unless they rest on the function of an accepted common morality: without 
that foundation no institution can work (Carr, 1949, p.69).  
 
The approach to the environment by mainstream regime theorists 
follows the tradition of western science. This tradition requires the 
separation of values and facts and the separation of the subject of 
knowledge and the object of knowledge. Being rational and objective 
has required these practices However, facts and values cannot be 
separated; the human-environment relationship is based on values. 
Descriptions of the environment and environmental problems include 
normative evaluations. Those often ‘hidden’ or ‘silent’ norms may 
include assumptions of the human-environment relationships (see 
Merchant, 1980, p.4). 
Understanding cognitive dimensions of regime building are 
important 
since regimes are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist 
independently of the actors’ ideas on how the world works (see 
Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, p.764). In regime theory, the so called 
‘cognitivist’ approaches on individual representations and perceptions 
oppose the constructivists’ idea of the social construction of problems 
based on collective significations (Jönsson, 1982; Bonham et al., 
1987; Shapiro et al., 1988; Jönsson, 1993).  As Emile Durkheim 
suggests these collective significations: 
 
... could not be confused with biological phenomena, since they consist 
of representations and actions; nor with psychological phenomena, 
which exist only in the individual consciousness and through it. They 
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constitute, thus a new variety of phenomena; and it is to them that the 
term ’social’ ought to be applied (quoted in Järvikoski, 1996, p.79). 
 
The human being  appears in a dense web of language and meanings; 
everything surrounding the human being has meaning and  everything 
he arranges around him constitutes a coherent whole and a system of 
signs. Because of language, a whole symbolic universe can be 
created within which man ‘has a relation to his past, to things, to other 
men and from which he can build something like a body of knowledge, 
in particular knowledge of himself’ (Foucault, 1970, p.351; 357). In this 
universe, nature does not speak but human beings speak for it. In that 
speech, not only is the environment  constructed but the human being 
himself is constructed, too (Foucault, 1970, p.160).  
Intersubjectivity should be understood as a web of socially 
constructed meanings. Emile Durkheim’s social is not ‘collective’ 
consciousness but intersubjectivity - a living relationship and tension 
among individuals (Harris, 1988, p.12). From a constructivist point of 
view, the relationship between  man, the environment and institutions 
is reformulated and reconstituted (Berger and Luckmann, 1966,  
p.168). 
Through this move an effort is made to understand the subjective 
dynamics of interdependence. Interdependence is, above all, a matter 
of how the world is understood (Rosenau, 1990, p.424, Hettne 1994; 
see also Sprout and Sprout 1971, 192; Wilde 1991, p.216). The 
question of interdependence transforms from a question of the rela-
tionship between two systems - human and environment - to one of 
understanding of meanings attached to different interdependencies 
and the ways people interpret human-environment relationships (see 
Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983, p.4-5).  
In the arctic cooperation, this understanding of interdependence 
was based on the idea of sustainable development. The Russian 
representative stated,  
 
We speak here about the interdependence, which by its nature requires 
international efforts, joint action of the Arctic nations for the purpose of 
sustainable development (Danilov-Danilian,1993, p.2). 
The hegemonic silence about military activities and their impact 
on the Arctic environment is breaking. There is no point in 
endangering the results of initiatives such as AMEC by emphasizing 
the security related concerns of the states in the Arctic in relation to 
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the environment, not at least in the name of environmental security. 
The ultimate mandate of the council is to make the area into ‘a domain 
of enhanced civility’ (Arctic Council Panel, 1991, p.2-3). The success 
of the Arctic cooperation is in turning the region into a ‘domain of 
enhanced civility’ using the frase of the Arctic Council Panel.  
The establishment of the Arctic Council institutionalizes a ‘new’ 
identity as a modern region. What is important in the emerging Arctic 
order of sustainability is that it was not defined in terms of the 
environmental impact of militarization in the region, but in terms of 
economic development and development opportunities. Within a 
regime a hegemonical discourse can be detected.  In the Arctic such a 
hegemonic discourse is one of development. Hegemonical discourses 
are considered ‘natural and taken for granted;’ a hegemonical 
discourse is seen without alternatives. Hegemonical discourse can be 
found in a regime: ‘A regime is the product of a genuinely social pro-
cess, in which human actors establish - or impose - frameworks of 
meaning which identify regime related action as acceptable or 
inacceptable’ (Behnke, 1995, p.182).The concept of sustainable 
development itself and its spread to cover the whole globe as the 
dominant perspective in defining the human-environment relationship 
could be defined hegemonical. The Arctic region was normalized to 
make it one of sustainable development and part of the UN led welfare 
internationalism (see Suganami, 1989, p.109). 
The governmentality in the Arctic is one of normalization of the 
region. The environmental threat was normalized through cooperation. 
Normalization is both individualizing and totalizing; it is about finding 
answers to the question of what it is for an individual, society, or 
population to be governed or be governable. Normalization is a 
discursive morality forming the ethical foundation of cooperation 
(Gordon, 1991, p.36). By normalization Foucault means a system of  
individuals that can be distributed around a norm - a norm which  
organizes and is the result of controlled distribution. Both indigenous 
peoples and states in the Arctic have participated in this process. 
Normalization is a discursive morality forming the ethical foundation of 
cooperation. 
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Sustainable Development in the North 
 
‘Two Pillars’ 
 
In the negotiations to establish the Arctic Council, the issue of 
sustainable development emerged as one of the most important items 
on the agenda. In particular, the question of whether the working 
group on sustainable development should have special status in 
respect to the other working groups has often been discussed.  The 
progress made during the summer 1995 was lost at the negotiations in 
Washington, D.C. in September 1995; one of the most important items 
in the reopening of the negotiations was the issue of the relationship 
between sustainable development and environmental protection in the 
Arctic and the Council’s role in promoting them.  
The problem of balancing the need of Arctic environment 
protecting with the use of local natural resources was an important 
part in the negotiations to establish the Arctic Council. In the original 
concept, one of the most important substantive issues to be handled in 
the Council was considered the protection of the Arctic environment 
(Arctic Council Panel, 1991, p.6). Some commentators have said that 
giving working group status to the task force on sustainable 
development was ‘in some ways a victory for environmentalism,’ 
making the survival of the ‘pure environmental agenda for the Arctic’ 
possible (Scrivener, 1997, p.5). Another critical view saw that ‘the 
AEPS is lost by refocusing the cooperation through the establishment 
of the Arctic Council’ (Brelsford, 1996a). The statement of WWF referr-
ed to the responsibility to protect environmental integrity of the Arctic 
‘for its intrinsic value and for the health, social, economic, and cultural 
well-being of its peoples’ (WWF, 1995). WWF in their comments on 
the drafting process, noted that the declaration establishing the Arctic 
Council called for making ‘clear the integral relationship between 
environmental protection and sustainable development’. Otherwise, 
the Arctic Council could ‘risk going in two directions, one cooperation 
for use of the Arctic, the other towards protection and sustainable use’ 
(WWF, 1995). 
In the fall 1995, the structure of the council consisted of two 
‘pillars’ in  
the negotiations. One was the environmental work of the council, that 
is the AEPS, and the other the work on sustainable development. One 
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of the pillars was called the ‘Arctic Sustainable Development Initiative’ 
(ASDI). Concerns were raised about what this kind of ‘pillar thinking’ 
meant for the future of the AEPS work (Elling, 1996). This was also 
seen in the name of a declaration.  In Inuvik, Canada in 1996, it was 
time to draft a new declaration, this time it was titled the ‘Inuvik 
Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development in the Arctic’ (1996).  
The discourse in the negotiations made the protection and use of 
the Arctic environment and its resources a choice between two 
alternatives. First, the character of the Arctic environment was 
discussed. From the beginning of the AEPS, the Arctic environment 
was considered unique; it was understood that ‘northern ecosystems 
are under greater stress than temperate regions’ (AEPS 1991, p.17). 
The Arctic was considered different from other regions of the world. 
Most important, much of its population and culture is part of, and 
directly dependent on, the region’s ecosystems, in particular its plants 
and wildlife. The uniqueness of the Arctic environment was 
threatened: 
 
Within the last few years we have become increasingly worried by the 
signs of degradation to the Arctic environment, which so far has been 
one of the cleanest and healthiest in the world (Olsen, 1991, p.1).  
 
In early June 20, 1995 a draft on the commitment ‘to protect and 
preserve the uniqueness of the Arctic environment’ was reaffirmed 
(Arctic Council Declaration Draft,  June 20, 1995).  
The United States emphasised the recognition of Arctic 
uniqueness in order to protect 
 
... the integrity of the aquatic, terrestrial, atmospheric and ice 
environments of the Arctic and their interdependent ecosystems as 
whole to the region itself and to the global environmental processes 
(Arctic Council Declaration Draft, October 20,1995).  
 
This idea survived in the draft until the beginning of 1996.  In the Au-
gust 16, 1995 draft this uniqueness is directed towards both the indi-
genous peoples and the Arctic environment (Arctic Council Declaration 
Draft, August 16, 1995). As unique and worth of protection were the 
‘special relationship and unique contribution to the Arctic of the 
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indigenous peoples’ (Arctic Council Declaration Draft, January 15, 
1996). The uniqueness of the indigenous peoples survived better than 
the environment in the end.  There is no commitment to the preserva-
tion of Arctic environmental uniqueness in the final version.  It is 
directed to  the unique aspects of the Arctic and the special rela-
tionship and contribution of indigenous people and their communities 
(Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996).  
Second, the declaration balances between different 
interpretations of  sustainability. In August 1995, the participants were 
ready to commit themselves to ‘the sustainable use of its many 
resources in a manner that safeguards the Arctic environment and the 
well-being and cultures of indigenous peoples and other Arctic 
residents’ and to the establishment of the new initiative known as the 
ASDI. The negotiations dealt with a broad definition of the emerging 
concept and this raised some concerns about the place of environ-
mental issues and cooperation in the future collaboration. What is 
significant is the very broad understanding of sustainable 
development, including issues other than those that consider the role 
of environmental concerns in economic activities as a concept for 
sustainable development.  
It was concern for the local and indigenous residents that held the 
attention: ‘the Arctic requires special consideration in order that its 
indigenous peoples and the resident may obtain equal opportunities 
for social, cultural and economic development and emphasizing the 
responsibility of the Arctic states in this manner’ (Arctic Council 
Declaration Draft, January 15, 1996). The two aims of cooperation 
were clear: ‘safeguard the ecosystems and biodiversity of the Arctic 
region and facilitate sound management, including conservation and 
sustainable and equitable use of its natural resources consistent with 
the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’; and to ‘promote sustainable and equitable development in 
the field of economic relations and trade with a view to raise the 
standards of living, provide an adequate infrastructure, and ensure 
employment and the well-being of the indigenous peoples and other 
residents’ (Arctic Council Declaration Draft, January 15, 1996). 
After renegotiating this aspect in June 1996, the states affirmed 
their commitment to a ‘sustainable development in the Arctic region, 
including economic and social development, improved health 
conditions and cultural well-being’. Then came the commitment to ‘the 
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protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic 
ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and 
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources’ (Arctic Council 
Declaration Draft, June 9, 1996). The states committed themselves to 
‘the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic’ in the June 9, 1996 draft 
and establishing the human well-being as the main criteria for 
sustainability (Arctic Council Declaration Draft, June 9, 1996). 
The final version affirmed the states’ commitment to the well-
being of the inhabitants of the Arctic. The second commitment the 
states made was to affirm their commitment to the ‘sustainable 
development in the Arctic region, including economic and social 
development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being’. As a 
third objective, they affirmed ‘concurrently’ their commitment to, ‘the 
protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic 
ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and 
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources’ (Declaration on 
the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). 
Third, in defining the relationship of the Council with the AEPS, 
the idea in June 1995 was for the Council to oversee and coordinate 
the AEPS (Arctic Council Declaration Draft, June 20, 1995). The 
important steps taken to develop and cooperatively implement the 
AEPS was recognized in the August 16 draft (Arctic Council 
Declaration Draft, August 16, 1995). The basis for a new working 
group or groups was made in the establishment of the Arctic Council. 
The August 1995 draft for the ASDI included ‘working groups dealing 
with economic, social, cultural and other issues which may be identi-
fied’ (Arctic Council Declaration Draft, August 16, 1995). In January 
15, 1996-version, the commitment to the ASDI ‘to deal with health, 
economic, social and cultural cooperation among Arctic states as well 
as with other issues for the well-being of Arctic peoples’ was made 
(Arctic Council Declaration Draft, January 15, 1996).  Commitment to 
the principles and goals of the AEPS was affirmed in the January 1996 
version and ‘the need to ensure that all relevant cooperative activities 
are in accordance with these principles and goals’ (Arctic Council 
Declaration Draft, January 15, 1996). In the April 1996 version, the 
states recognized their commitment to ‘the principles and goals of the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and recognizing the 
need to ensure that all relevant cooperative activities are in 
accordance with these principles and goals’ (Arctic Council 
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Declaration Draft, April 19, 1996). The latter part of the last sentence 
was dropped in the June 9, 1996 draft and it only reflected the recog-
nition of the AEPS and its contributions (Arctic Council Declaration 
Draft, June 9, 1996). Only the contribution of the AEPS to the 
commitments of the Arctic Council was recognized in the final version. 
In this version, the task of the Arctic Council was to oversee and 
coordinate the programs established under the AEPS (AMAP, CAFF, 
PAME and EEPR) and adopt terms of reference for, oversee and 
coordinate a sustainable development program (Declaration on the 
Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). 
Finally, through the idea of sustainable development states and 
indigenous peoples are making a claim on the future of the region. The 
normative order in the Arctic is now established around the concept of 
sustainable development. Sustainable development makes the use of 
the region and its natural resources possible - as opposed to defining 
the region as needing special protective measures. The priorities in 
the Arctic are sustainable economic development and pollution control. 
There are no signs that these priorities will change with the transition 
from AEPS-era to that of the Arctic Council. These tendencies are 
strengthened by the establishment of the Arctic Council. 
 
                                                                                 Discourse on 
Development 115 
 
 
The Arctic Idea of Sustainability 
 
The Arctic Council negotiations have been processes of making the 
understanding of sustainable development richer in terms that 
included the broad issues of cultural, social, economic and health into 
sustainable development. The Arctic Council describes sustainable 
development as ‘including economic and social development, 
improved health conditions and cultural well-being’ (Declaration on the 
Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996).  
The language of governmentality is not only a question of 
meanings but also of different ways in making the world 
understandable and usable, where domains are made interventions for 
administrations, politicians, and experts. What is made doable in the 
Arctic is ‘development’. The Arctic has emerged from the cooperation 
as a locale for cooperation rather than distrust. The militarized identity 
of the region was normalized through cooperation and the idea of 
sustainable development.  
These definitions make the Arctic. They are constitutive 
meanings. Constitutive meanings - those assumptions, definitions and 
conceptions - structure the world in certain definite ways and 
constitute the logical possibility for the existence of a certain social 
practice. Constitutive meanings underlie social practices just as 
practices underlie actions. It is in terms of these meanings that the 
actors speak and act. Sustainable development is a modern 
understanding of the human-environment relationship. The Arctic 
Council establishes a modern mentality in the region. Modernity itself 
is a particular set of beliefs, a mentality (Foucault, 1984c, p.41). 
Simultaneously, however, it was a process of making the concept 
of sustainability poorer.  The Arctic Council was ‘established as thin or 
deep as possible,’ according to a close observer (Liljelund 1996). The 
mandate of Arctic Council considerably shrank during the negotiations. 
The first version of the tasks listed in the draft to establish the Council 
included fourteen items. According to the June 20, 1995 draft, the es-
tablishment of the Council would provide ‘a forum to examine and 
discuss issues of common interest relating to the Arctic and to make 
recommendations pertaining to those issues’. The ideas for the work 
of the Council included ‘to address the aspirations, concerns and 
objectives of the peoples living in the Arctic; to provide the political 
impetus for subsequent appropriate action by the Arctic governments 
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on Arctic issues; to promote interaction among the Arctic governments 
and within the Arctic region in general to advance the programs of the 
Arctic Council: to advance Arctic interests by Arctic governments 
within appropriate international organizations’ (Arctic Council 
Declaration Draft, June 20, 1995).  
By August 1995, the long list was shortened to six objectives: ‘1) 
promote international cooperation and peace throughout the Arctic 
region, 2) provide a forum for addressing a wide range of Arctic 
issues, including the aspirations, goals and concerns of the 
Indigenous Peoples and other Arctic residents, 3) safeguard the 
uniqueness of the Arctic environment and promote the sustainable use 
of the natural resources in the region bearing in mind the principles 
and recommendations set out in the Rio declaration and Agenda 21, 
4) advance the principle of sustainable development including its 
economic, environmental, social and cultural dimensions, 5) provide 
political impetus for appropriate action on Arctic issues by the gover-
nments of the eight Arctic countries, and 6) enhance the collective 
environmental security of Arctic states and peoples’ (Arctic Council 
Draft, August 16, 1995).  
The final version divided the work of the Council into only four 
tasks: to provide a means for promoting coordination and interaction 
among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous 
communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in 
particular issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic; oversee and coordinate the programs under 
the AEPS; adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a 
sustainable development program, and disseminate information, 
encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues 
(Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). 
 
Economic Ethos 
 
Through the idea of sustainable development indigenous peoples are 
redefining their identities as economic actors. Sustainable 
development in the Arctic means that the indigenous peoples are 
increasingly seen as economic actors. The economic concerns of  in-
digenous peoples became evident in the work of the TFSDU. For 
example, in the discussion on trade barriers to Inuit products, the 
problems were defined as legislative barriers such as Marine Mammal 
                                                                                 Discourse on 
Development 117 
 
 
Protection Act of the United States (MMPA) and the European Union (-
EU), psycho-sociological and cultural life study barriers by the 
consumer, socio-economic barriers, international barriers and people’s 
attitudes. The most notable trade barrier, according to a Danish 
discussion paper, is the MMPA of the USA. The Act dates from 1972 
and prohibits the import of all and any marine mammal products into 
the USA. The MMPA prohibits the import of all whale products from 
Arctic countries (Trade Barriers Affecting Products from the Arctic, 
1995; see also ICC, 1995b).     
The market for marine mammal products in Europe has been 
partially closed by the 1983 Seal Skin Directive. This directive prohibits 
the import of products derived from the pups of harp and hooded 
seals. The directive makes an exception for products deriving from the 
Inuit subsistence seal hunting. Individual EU countries have, however, 
 developed their national seal skin legislation. The import of fur 
products into the EU from different Arctic and sub-Arctic species will 
be prohibited, unless the countries exporting these products forbid the 
use of leghold traps, according to the EU plans. The discussion paper 
calls on the ‘world community to respect the legitimate interests of the 
Arctic peoples, and take the necessary measures to protect the 
international trade in sustainably harvested products of nature’ (Trade 
Barriers Affecting Products from the Arctic, 1995).    
In promoting sustainable development in the Arctic the coopera-
tion has resulted in common action aimed at improving the situation of 
the hunters in indigenous peoples communities. Canada, for example, 
made a draft letter of intervention to the EU about the seal skin 
products ban. Canada sent a verbal note to the EU. Denmark said that 
it would support Canadian approach to the EU at the task force 
meeting in March 1995, but support was also required from other 
countries. It was agreed that the U.S. and Russian Governments could 
draft similar letters of intervention using the Canadian letter as a 
model. Task Force countries that are members of the EU would apply 
internal pressure (TFSDU, 1995a, p.10).  
 Economic issues, not only those related to the economic well-
being of the indigenous peoples, in the Arctic may also be of common 
concern for the states in the future. The structure of the Arctic Council 
suggests the possibility of such concerns. The mandate of the Arctic 
Council definitely brings economic issues and the welfare of the Arctic 
populations into discussion. As Foucault suggests, the ultimate goal of 
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governmentality is ‘with how to introduce economy, that is the correct 
manner of managing individuals, goods, and wealth ...  into the 
management of the state’ (Foucault, 1984a, p.15).  
These discourses are all carried out in the name of  sustainability. 
Governmentality includes the  ways in which individuals may redefine 
their existences.The idea of self-subjection opens the possibility of 
identity politics; identities are fashioned by the political technologies of 
individuals that totalize as they individualize. Foucault is interested in 
the process of identity formation; becoming oneself and the practices 
of self. Therefore, it is essential to examine those intentional and 
voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of con-
duct but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves 
(Foucault, 1982b, p. 237-238).  
Identities are made by making ethical claims in relation to the 
concern about the environment.  It is a question of ‘the kind of 
relationship you ought to have with yourself ...  and which determines 
how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject 
of his own actions’ (Foucault, 1982b, p.238). This is called ‘ethos’: it is 
a way of a social unit speaking to itself about itself and constituting 
itself as a result. Ethos does not separate fact from value nor the 
subject from the object of knowledge. An ethos means a feeling, an 
identity and a commitment. It is about values, the root for the word 
being ‘ethical’. It is about both knowledge and feeling. An ethos links 
the claims of truth and  value. It is a social self, a shared self and a 
role. It does not infer anything artificial; it is rooted in the subject at 
issue, and expresses the commitment of the speaker (Myerson and 
Rydin, 1996, p.23). 
   Ethics and subjectivity are inseparable; to be a subject is to have 
ethos.It 
is an ethical practice that defines moral obligations. Ethos and 
subjectivities are formed in discursive moralities. These do not 
have absolute foundations nor they are based on compromises. 
They are concrete, local and contingent. Ethics is historically 
grounded social practice (Hekman, 1995, p.149). Ethos is a 
product of collective self-interpretations and  self-identification of 
human communities. They are different from the notion of a 
consensus or a compromise about values or beliefs. Ethos is 
intersubjective: in the Foucaultian sense intersubjective meanings 
themselves are products of the long-range subjectifying trends in 
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our culture (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.165).   
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The Meaning of Environmental Cooperation 
 
The Practice of Cooperation 
 
It can be argued that the status of cooperation does not really 
correspond to the assumptions of cooperative effectiveness on 
environmental issues expected by the standard regime approach. 
Disappointment, here, is obvious and unavoidable. The AEPS is 
programmatic rather than regulative in character; The impact of the 
AEPS on environmental problem solving has been ‘modest’. Not 
everyone, however, shares this view. According to Håken Nilson, 
‘cooperation on concrete environmental issues has been 
strengthened’ by the AEPS experience. The main success of the 
AEPS is that ‘it  has provided a mechanism for the Arctic states to 
initiate and maintain a constructive dialog, and for a significant 
increase in the knowledge about the Arctic environment’ (Nilson, 1997, 
p.4). 
It is, however, interesting that so much effort has resulted in so 
little, which leads to the question of what is the point of the effort. Oran 
Young notes that ‘it would be a mistake to seize on these limitations to 
dismiss the AEPS out of hand as an ineffective and largely irrelevant 
effort at environmental cooperation’. So far, cooperation has produced 
‘a vibrant social practice that is engaging the interest of a wide range 
of public agencies as well as non-state actors interested in Arctic 
environmental concerns’ (Young, 1995a, p.8). 
Cooperation in the Arctic has produced a practice of a series of 
ministerial meetings and working groups getting together. The AEPS 
participants seem to think that developments in cooperation have been 
successful. The Finnish view was that the cooperation has been 
‘extremely successful’ in terms of awareness of the problems of the 
region (Haavisto, 1997a, p.3). The Canadians, so far, view the AEPS 
as a dynamic cooperation It is in a stage of transition from ‘analysis 
and monitoring, toward a stage where concrete actions will be come 
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more prominent in our work’. In addition, environmental cooperation is 
integrated into a wider framework which, in the future, will gradually 
encompass many other activities. A greater understanding and 
awareness of the challenges that face the region have been gained 
through the AEPS. In the future ‘the circumpolar states will need to 
work hard within the broader global community to achieve effective 
results’ in dealing with pollution issues (Simon, 1997, p.2). 
The Swedish saw the AEPS as, an ‘example of how international 
cooperation founded on common interests, goals and commitments, 
rather than legal instruments, can be successful and constructive’ 
(Kjellen, 1997). The Icelandic representative ‘stressed the need to 
maintain momentum to protect the Arctic environment’. It was hoped 
that ‘the next state for Arctic cooperation will be more characterized by 
concrete actions and less by analysis and monitoring’ (Bjarnason, 
1997). The Russians seemed ready to include as many countries as 
possible in Arctic affairs and not ‘just the parties to the AEPS/Arctic 
Council’ (Solovyanov, 1997).  
According to the Norwegian view, the ‘AEPS has helped 
strengthen the political dialogue among the Arctic states and the 
setting up of the Arctic Council is a significant milestone’. The 
Norwegians emphasized that ‘environmental protection remains an 
essential and integral part of the Arctic Council’s future activities and 
priorities’ (Berntsen, 1997). Also the  statement by Tucker Scully 
called for clear priorities in cooperation (Scully, 1997). The WWF notes 
that the Alta ministerial meeting ‘is not only a historic step forward in 
the process of environmental cooperation’.  
 
Six years have passed since the Arctic countries met in Rovaniemi at the 
initiative of Finland. What they created - an international cooperative 
process which changed the Arctic from a zone of confrontation to one of 
environmental cooperation - is a tremendous achievement in the world 
(WWF, 1997, p.1). 
 
The WWF compliments the Arctic environmental cooperation for 
moving toward, ‘a more action-oriented agenda’ (WWF,  1997, p.2). 
Negotiating at international level itself is a social practice. As 
Friedrich Kratochwil suggests, ‘actors are not only programmed by 
rules and norms, but they reproduce and change by their practice the 
normative structures by which they are able to act, share meanings, 
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communicate intentions, criticize claims, and justify choices’. 
Therefore, Kratochwil continues: ‘one of the most important sources of 
change, neglected in the present regime literature, is the practice of 
the actors themselves’ (Kratochwil, 1989, p.61).  
These practices more resemble habits than legal rules. As Rosen-
au (1986, p.861) claims actions stem, ‘from a combination of past 
experiences, cultural norms, memories, beliefs, personality, role 
expectations and cognitive styles to which they have long been 
accustomed, by which they manage to maintain continuity in their 
affairs’. In Rosenau’s view, it is a world of habit driven individuals, 
collectivities and their organizations. The world is of ‘our making’ 
through  application of practice-based rules (Onuf, 1989, p.73). In an 
analysis of the Arctic environmental cooperation, Carola Björklund 
suggests that even if cooperation had taken a less codified form, in 
practice the legal form is not decisive for the legitimate protection of 
the environment in the polar areas (Björklund, 1995, p.146).  
 
NGOs in the Cooperation 
 
In particular, the field of international environmental politics seems to 
attract non-governmental organisations (NGO) or non-state actors. It is 
often assumed that the growing role of groups in international relations 
is the result of the effect interdependence has on intrasocietal, 
national and global levels. The world is increasingly interconnected, 
thus providing ‘transnational actors’ with the potential for unprece-
dented influence if they mobilize effectively. This is not to suggest that 
transnational actors operate without constraints but rather to empha-
size the ‘fluidity’ of global political relations under conditions of interde-
pendence (Willetts, 1982; McCormick, 1989; Porter and Brown, 1991; 
Weiss and Gordenker, 1996). 
The effort to give a name to the phenomenon of the emerging role 
of actors other than states reflects ‘a more complex international 
society in which states remain important actors, but find themselves 
increasingly sharing influence, if not authority, with several other types 
of actors’ (Young, 1990, p. 344; see also Keohane and Nye, 1977, 
p.24-25). Thomas Princen points out that NGO influence is exerted by 
linking the local to the international levels of politics - that is 
interpreting interdependence. It is influence gained by filling ‘a niche 
that other international actors are ill-equipped to do’ (Princen, 1994, 
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p.41).   
The ‘non-governmental’ and ‘non-state’ is often evaluated as 
problematic: how can something be defined by using the word ‘non’? 
James Rosenau suggests the term NGO unduly places too much 
attention on states and thus maintains state-centrism in international 
relations scholarship. He suggests using the term ‘sovereignty-free 
actors’ making a division between non-state actors and states which 
Rosenau calls ‘sovereignty-bound’ (Rosenau, 1990, p.36). However, 
changing the name as suggested does not deal with the problem. It 
still separates NGO’s, or sovereignty-free actors, from international 
politics and avoids asking the question about their role. Sovereignty is 
an inherently relational notion making the states the main concern for 
the study at the expense of other collectivities and actors that may be 
significant internationally, such as ‘non-governmental’ or  ‘non-state’ 
actors. Questioning this definition means challenging  the neoliberal 
view on interdependence and domestic politics: 
  
... interdependence theorists could not have it both ways; either they 
were right in their talk about blurring, with the inevitable consequence 
that their theories ceased to be theories of international politics, or as 
was more often the case, talk about blurring was mere lip-service 
(Bartelson, 1995, p.20). 
 
This means ‘that which is blurred essentially is distinct; in the end one 
was tacitly reaffirming the same distinction which one so valiantly 
criticized’ (Bartelson, 1995, p.20). Sovereignty as a theory and 
practice establishes the boundary between what is internal and what is 
external; it is a practice of constituting political reality for the agents 
themselves whose identity in turn depend on this division (Bartelson, 
1995, p.41).The name itself - ‘non-governmental’ or ‘non-state’ actor  - 
creates a boundary between states and others and reaffirms the 
assumed boundaries. 
The study of governmentality results in interest in the identities 
and roles defined by regimes including power considerations. 
Foucault’s considerations on power opens discussion on the 
participants of cooperation and regimes in an interdependent situation. 
According Foucaultian understanding, power is always exercised in 
relation to rules which impose the agent as a social actor. The 
individual assuming a role is an effect of power and, while to the extent 
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to which it is in effect, the element of its articulation. For Foucault, 
acquiring roles and positions is an issue of institutionalizing the sites of 
discourse. Foucault speaks of discursive practice. Discursive practice 
is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in a time 
and space that have defined a given period and for a given social, 
economic, geographical or linguistic area and the conditions of 
operation of the enunciative functions. This enunciative field does not 
refer to an individual subject nor to some kind of collective 
consciousness or transcendental subjectivity. It is described as an 
anonymous field whose configuration defined the possible positions of 
speaking subjects (Foucault, 1972, p.118-119). 
 As Foucault concentrates on the relationship between states and 
individuals and the processes by which individuals receive and 
construct identities, the social or collective dimension of identities is 
mostly put aside. The individuals involved in such conflicts may 
become more preoccupied with asserting their own identities than with 
other political goals, such as establishing solidarities with other 
groups. Based on such identities we recognize ourselves as members 
of a social group or state. The struggle for one’s own identity links with 
other more collective struggles against the government of individual-
ization (Foucault, 1982a, p.211-212).  
However, there is freedom in the constitution of subjectivities with 
a capacity for critical independence or self-governance (McNay, 1992, 
p.104).  
The capacity of movements, such as the activities of indigenous 
groups, depends on their ability to construct a powerful identity and 
effective strategies and the given opportunities in society to defend or 
advance the ideology of the movement (see Hjelmar, 1996, p.177-178; 
Touraine, 1981, p.29-30; see also Wendt, 1996, p.51).  
The Inuits wanted to become involved in the AEPS at an early 
stage. Mary Simon who then represented the ICC at the Yellowknife 
meeting said that the ‘ICC made a decision to expand cooperation to 
this level’ and participated in the Yellowknife meeting (Simon, 1996). 
Simon noted that a growing number of issues affecting Inuit rights and 
interests are increasingly being regulated at the international level. 
‘National and regional initiatives alone are not adequate to protect Inuit 
communities’. Simon concluded that ‘there must be a significantly 
expanded role for Inuit at the international level’ at the conference 
organized to formulate the Arctic policy in 1985 (Simon, 1987, p.37-38; 
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see also Clark and Dryzek, 1987, p.227-228).  
The three organizations, especially the ICC, have worked to 
develop an identity as an expert on Arctic issues. Rosemarie Kuptana, 
president of the ICC noted that ‘language surrounding  our 
involvement in the AEPS is often couched in phrases such as the 
governments have finally involved the indigenous peoples in the 
important environmental work’. She stresses an opposite view:  
 
Our participation is based on our interest. It is simply natural that we are 
involved. We have a strong commitment to this work because it is carried 
out in our homelands and because it is within us (Kuptana, 1996, p.1). 
 
The ICC has successfully followed this advice in the AEPS and 
the Arctic Council. The ICC used a strategy composed of: 1) a political 
program stating the aims of the organization, 2) constructing a clear 
environmental identity, 3) having both intellectual and material 
resources to contribute to the process by preparing reports and 
statements on different AEPS activities, and 4) making and maintain-
ing contacts with the Canadian government and other AEPS 
participants. The ICC developed an Arctic policy in the mid-1980’s. 
This is a comprehensive Arctic policy in Inuit circumpolar regions with 
regard to matters of economic, social, cultural and political concern 
(Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy, 1992, 
p.31).  
Next, the conservationist identity of the group was advanced by 
the development of the Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy. The 
environmental commission of the ICC was established in 1985. The 
commission developed the framework document Inuit Regional 
Conservation Strategy (IRCS). This is a common environmental 
strategy for sustainable development covering Alaska, Arctic Canada 
and Greenland (Towards an Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy, 
1986, p.5).  The Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy received a 
Global 500 award from the Secretary General of the United Nations in 
1989  (Lynge A., 1992, p.7). 
Then, within the AEPS, the ICC has been productive in offering 
their reports for use by the working groups. The reports include two 
volumes on traditional knowledge submitted before the Nuuk meeting 
and Regional Agenda 21 from the Inuit Perspective. It also has two 
research projects within CAFF and TFSDU: collecting traditional 
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knowledge on beluga whales in Alaska and a retrospective study on 
the seal market collapse in North America after the EU ban (see 
TFSDU, 1995a). The role of the ICC could not have been possible 
without the support of the Canadian government. At the SAAO 
meeting in Iqaluit in 1995, Canada stated that ‘it wanted to achieve a 
partnership in Arctic environmental management which included 
Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations at a management rather than 
observer level’ (SAAO, 1995, p.9).   The former ICC president 
Mary Simon was appointed an Arctic Ambassador of Canada in 1995. 
As the Arctic Council is a Canadian initiative, her role has been central 
in the negotiations. Rosemarie Kuptana was the co-chair for the Arctic 
Council Panel which wrote the NGO proposal for the Council and later, 
as the President of the ICC, participated in the negotiations to 
establish the Arctic Council. Chester Reimer, former research director 
of the ICC, worked for a while as the executive director of the IPS in 
Copenhagen. Henry Huntington explains the success of the ICC: ‘it 
has a good representation, well respected’ and it is making ‘substant-
ive contribution’ (Huntington, 1996). Mary Simon explains the leader-
ship role of the ICC by its intellectual and material resources. She also 
refers to the input of individuals. The basis of the ‘leadership role of 
the ICC’ is funding (Simon, 1996). The ICC is described as  better 
organized compared with other indigenous groups (Fenge, 1995). The 
distribution of work between national Inuit organization and the ICC, 
which concentrates on international concerns, is important for the suc-
cess of the ICC, too.  
Finally, the success is based on having connections at different 
levels. Jorgen Sondergård, for example, explains that ‘Greenland 
Home Rule takes part in HOD [Head of Delegation] meeting where the 
indigenous peoples’ organizations cannot be’. The cooperation is 
organized informally: ‘We don’t hold formalized meetings [but] on spot 
ad hoc meetings when needed’. The good contact between the ICC 
and the Greenlandic Home Rule Government helps ‘the flow of 
information’ (Sondergård, 1996).  
Sámi efforts at constructing an expert identity are not easy to find 
- not even within the AEPS. Ritva Torikka explained that her activities 
as the representative of Sámi in some AEPS activities had been diffi-
cult since there was a ‘lack of clear political goals set by the Sámi 
Council’. The environmental program of the Sámi Council accepted in 
1986 was not enough (Torikka, 1996). 
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The Sámi representatives also explain that ‘the Sámi do not have 
enough resources for a meaningful participation’. However,  even 
when travel funding has been available there has been no Sámi 
representative participating in meetings. The ICC has personnel for 
the advance preparation for meetings, but such possibilities are not 
open to Sámi representatives. Sámi representatives to negotiations 
participate in the meetings on a volunteer basis, not ex officio.  The 
Sámi did present their projects to advance indigenous knowledge, but 
not as successfully as the ICC. The representative of the Sámi Council 
said that ‘we have to define our projects,’ but he did not doubt that the 
Sámi could contribute: ‘We have people who be can there’. According 
to Halonen the problem is funding for developing projects in collecting 
and using Sámi knowledge (Halonen, 1996a). The lack of funding has 
limited Sámi participation in different AEPS meetings: ‘It is not possible 
to participate even in all the meetings for the lack of resources in the 
Sámi Council,’ according to Torikka (1996). However, it seems that the 
Sámi Council is content with the existing situation; Leif Halonen from 
the Sámi Council explained the situation by stating ‘having 
involvement and to be heard is a goal itself’ (Halonen, 1996a). 
The situation in the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the 
North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian Federation has been 
complicated. Many of the representatives of the Russian association 
have been satisfied with only observing the negotiations with the aid of 
an interpreter. However, not much material has been translated into 
Russian and this has made active participation difficult. Finally, the 
unclear identity of the association  has made things difficult. There is a 
disagreement on whether it is a social or a political organization. 
Lately, the organization has suffered from internal problems. At the 
beginning of the organization there were disagreements between 
indigenous peoples’ representatives over the need for the 
organization; the founder, Sanghi, explained these as being caused by 
‘puppets of the Soviet system’ (Alia, 1991, p.29).The internal 
disagreement seems to reflect Sanghi’s disappointment at not being 
reelected as president of the organization. The former president has 
established a new organization to represent the interests of the 
northern peoples. This has resulted in confusion over representation 
for the Russian indigenous peoples in the AEPS (personal 
communication an.).   
Excluding Environmental NGOs? 
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The Swedish representative noted in 1991 that the cooperation: 
 
... is an open process. We must continue to provide a participatory role, 
as observers, for non-Arctic countries and international bodies which are 
willing and able to make significant contributions to our efforts (Dahl 
1991, p.8). 
  
She continued: ‘environmental NGO’s, with particular interest of 
expertise in Arctic matters, must be also given opportunities to con-
tribute and participate in our work’ (Dahl, 1991, p.8). Environmental 
NGO’s have, however, been rather invisible in the cooperation, 
compared with many other international negotiation processes and the 
role the IPO’s have acquired in the cooperation. According to Dave 
Cline (the NGO delegate of the U.S. delegation at the 1991 meeting) 
from the National Audubon Society, environmental organizations have 
often shown ‘little interest in the Arctic’ (Cline, 1996; see also Hurwich, 
1995; McCloskey, 1995). There are two exceptions: the IUCN and the 
WWF.  
The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN) has had an interest in the Arctic for a long time. 
The IUCN had already been suggested at the World Conservation 
Strategy (1980) that the Arctic environment and its problems should be 
taken into consideration. 
The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) established an Arctic 
coordination bureau in Oslo, Norway in 1992. The WWF, with its 
national organizations in most of the Arctic countries and projects in 
Russia, has been interested in building a pan-Arctic non-governmental 
lobby for Arctic conservation. The tasks of the WWF Arctic program, 
defined by the Arctic coordinator Peter Prokosch, were to ‘create a 
common pan-Arctic thinking,’ as well as acting on and supporting 
conservation steps and developments in the Arctic. To achieve that 
goal, the WWF aims to develop assessments of natural values, 
classified threats and  conservation projects. Solution models for 
environmental problems have to be visualized and mapped. The main 
task of the WWF is, however, to form a circumpolar lobby for the Arctic 
nature as a whole (Prokosch, 1992, p.6).  
The WWF described itself as ‘the only nongovernmental 
organization with a truly circumpolar scope’ (Prokosch, 1997). An 
important contribution of the WWF was the Arctic Bulletin, which for a 
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long time was the only source of information about the AEPS activities. 
The WWF participated as an ad hoc observer at the 1996 Inuvik 
meeting. It has also participated in the activities of the CAFF working 
group. In its application for observer status within the Arctic Council, 
the WWF argued that it had demonstrated ‘a deep commitment to the 
health of the Arctic environment and the Arctic residents who depend 
upon this environment for their livelihood’ (Prokosch, 1997).  
In the current situation these kinds of organizations such as WWF 
do not seem to have a place within the framework of the Arctic 
Council. The participation of the WWF in Arctic Council activities has 
lately been questioned for defining the procedural rules of the Arctic 
Council activities (Arctic Council SAO, 1997, p.29).  
Most environmental NGO participation has taken place through 
national delegations. There has been an NGO representative in the 
U.S., Canadian and Norwegian delegations. Both the National 
Audubon Society (David Cline from the Alaska office) and the U.S. 
Arctic Network (Margie Gibson) have been represented in the U.S. 
delegation. The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) has 
participated in the work of AEPS for the Canadians. CARC is a public 
interest and charitable organization established in 1971. Its task is to 
expand the concept of national interest in the north to include the 
rights and interests of indigenous peoples, to transfer authority to the 
local level and the conservation of natural places. CARC was 
appointed as a member of the Canadian Delegation to the AEPS 
ministerial meeting in Nuuk in 1993.   
CAFF has been the forum most welcoming to environmental 
NGO’s (see AEPS, 1995). Such organizations as Birdlife International 
and the World Conservation Monitoring Center have been present at 
its meetings. Birdlife International was established in 1993 and it is 
built on the work of the International Council for Bird Preservation, 
which was established in 1922. This is a federation of conservation 
organizations and describes itself as ‘non-confrontational, working 
together with governments’ (Heath, 1994, p.95-96). The World 
Conservation Monitoring Center is a joint venture between IUCN, the 
WWF and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). It has 
been involved in the compilation of global environmental data for the 
CAFF program (Kaitala, 1994, p.91-92). The UNEP contribution has 
been through its GRID center in Arendal, Norway. The center has 
produced the maps for AMAP use (see Kullerud, 1994, p.92-93). 
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The International Conservation Union has also participated in 
CAFF meetings. It is a non-governmental organization ‘dedicated to 
the ecological and cultural integrity of the Arctic for present and future 
generations’. The aim of the organization is to link ‘environmental 
interests, indigenous peoples’ interests and sustainable development 
interests with women’s and other networks around the world who are 
interested in building an international Arctic constituency’ (Hurwich, 
1994, p.103).  
It appears that the strategy suggested by the International 
Conservation Union is the only one that provides a way for Arctic 
environmental cooperation. The problem is that the most 
environmental NGO’s lack an ‘Arctic constituency’ and long-lasting 
interest in northern transboundary environmental issues (Cline, 1996). 
Many  environmental NGO’s are at least perceived as representing the 
concerns of environmental activists in the southern centers. These 
organizations have shown very little sympathy to, and understanding 
of, the concerns of indigenous peoples (see Lynge F., 1992; Wenzel, 
1991).  
An interesting organization is the U.S. Arctic Network which  
represents 25 organizations, including native and conservationist 
groups. The objectives of the association are to: promote conservation 
of the circumpolar Arctic ecosystem; protect indigenous cultures and 
ensure the sustainability of local communities; foster understanding 
and cooperation between individuals and organizations that share 
common goals for the protection of the Arctic; to empower indigenous 
and local peoples, whose lives are an integral part of the Arctic 
ecosystem, so that their participation in establishing an Arctic policy is 
meaningful and effective. The steering committee of the Arctic 
Network includes representatives from: the Native Migratory Bird 
Working Group, Greenpeace, the Environmental Defense Fund, the 
Rural Alaska Community Action Program, the Eskimo Walrus 
Commission, the Aleutian/Pribilof Association, The Wilderness Society 
and Tanana Chiefs Conference. The network changed its name to the 
‘Arctic Network’ after establishing an office in Providenya, Kamchatka 
(Chukotka) (Gibson, 1996). 
 The environmental NGO’s have been less successful in their 
effort to create a place for themselves in the Arctic cooperation. Steve 
Breyman defines the relationships between social movements and 
knowledge: ‘Knowledge can be used in the pursuit of movement aims 
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to... monopolize or share claims to meaning’ (Breyman, 1993, p.128). 
The power of the indigenous peoples and in particular their 
organizations are in ‘their persuasive capacity’ (Sondergård, 1996). 
Indigenous knowledge is inseparable from the people themselves; it 
requires the direct participation of indigenous experts. 
The establishment of the Council reaffirmed the positions that the 
different actors had gained in the discourse. In the rather long and 
difficult discussion on the categories of participation and represen-
tation the states have aimed to create practices for participation. 
These practices contain ideas on who has the right to speech, from 
which institutional places the speech can take place and what 
positions the objects of the discourse can have. Through creating 
different categories of participation and limiting the participation by cri-
teria, such as ‘substantial contribution,’ the access of different 
interested actors in the Arctic is restricted. The practices of states 
maintain the boundary between state actors and non-state actors. 
 
 
The Meaning of Establishing the Arctic Council 
 
The Arctic Council as an Organization 
 
The current plans for the Sustainable Development Programme  
include ‘cooperative activities’ meaning ‘a particular activity of any type 
authorized by the Arctic Council to be carried out under a Programme 
of Work, including activities of Working Groups, Task Forces, or other 
bodies established by the Arctic Council’. The Arctic states may esta-
blish working groups, task forces, or other bodies to carry out 
programs and activities under the guidance and direction of SAO’s. 
The rules focus on the administration of such a body; it may select a 
chair and a vice chair or a lead country may volunteer to provide chair 
and secretariat support. The period of which a chair or a vice-chair 
may sit shall be specified. The procedures give advice on the date, 
location and agenda for the meetings of working groups, task forces, 
and other bodies. They shall be decided by ‘a consensus of the 
participating Arctic states, after consultation with the representatives of 
the participating permanent participants’ (see Arctic Council SAO, 
1997).  
The rules for procedure say very little about the actual content of 
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the proposals that can be made. The cooperative efforts are to be 
initiated by an Arctic state or a permanent participant by submitting a 
proposal. A proposal shall include: 
 
... the issues or matters to be addressed, the reasons, for the Arctic 
states to consider for approving the proposal, any recommendations of 
SAOs in relation to proposal, including recommendations as to an appro-
priate body or bodies for carrying out, coordinating, or facilitating an 
activity and any special rules or procedures that should apply to such 
body or bodies (Arctic Council  SAO, 1997). 
   
A proposal has to include information on the costs and methods of 
financing an activity, a working plan with dates for completion, 
information on relationships with other Arctic Council programs and 
activities and to other relevant regional or international fora, and any 
other information relevant to the proposal (see Arctic Council  SAO, 
1997). 
    The future work of the Arctic Council will define the content of 
sustain- 
able development. When the working group was established, the 
Finnish representative noted:  
 
Maybe we have concentrated too much on the formal status of 
sustainable development in the AEPS and in the forthcoming Arctic 
Council. Now we have reached the consensus that the working group 
status is the most functional one. Afterwards much more attention should 
be paid to the process of giving substance to Arctic sustainable 
development (Nurmi, 1996, p.3). 
 
Giving substance to sustainable development will not be an easy 
project;  
According to the Finnish proposal, ‘the Arctic Council would be a 
suitable forum to coordinate the Arctic implementation of both Agenda 
21 and the priority areas set by the UN Special Session of General 
Assembly’ (Nurmi, 1996, p.3). The Finnish wish is for an Arctic Agenda 
21 to be prepared. This is nothing new in itself. The idea of creating an 
Arctic Agenda 21 under the the prgoramme of TFSDU has essentially 
been forgotten in the struggles to decide the structure and content of 
the work of the Arctic Council (Rouhinen, 1996; Matero, 1997). 
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Understood as a bureaucratic structure, the Arctic Council hardly 
exists as an organization.The ‘new institutionalist’ approach focuses 
on specific institutions; it emphasizes international  regimes and formal 
international organizations such as formal intergovernmental or cross-
national nongovernmental organizations, international regimes, and 
conventions (Keohane, 1989, p.3-4).   The idea of establishing the 
Arctic Council was to strengthen  existing cooperation. One of the 
most important substantive issues to be dealt in the Arctic Council 
was, according to the Arctic Council Panel (1991), the protection of the 
Arctic environment. The Arctic Council Panel stated that the weakly 
institutionalized Rovaniemi process would be better subsumed into the 
agenda of an Arctic council. This may, in turn, serve to energize the 
Rovaniemi process on specific issues (Arctic Council Panel, 1991, p.2-
3). 
The establishment of the Arctic Council did not bring new  
bureaucratic structures into existence. It did not bring about a 
permanent secretariat. This would have really made a practical 
difference for secretarial support and provided possibilities to advance 
the cooperation and coordination of the different working groups 
(Skåre, 1996). The states did not appear dedicated to Arctic 
environmental commitment for the development of the organization of 
the work. 
Cooperation had suffered from a lack of funding and that lack 
continues. A chronic shortage of funding has been a reality for the 
AEPS. In a preparatory meeting in Kiruna in 1991, it was noted that 
‘the preparations for future meetings would be the responsibility of the 
host government’ (Protecting the Arctic Environment, 1991, p.4). 
Funding for the AEPS secretariat which coordinates AEPS meetings 
and produces minutes of meetings operates under the host country 
principle. A host country pays the entire cost of the AEPS secretariat 
during its tenure. Four countries, Finland, Greenland, Canada and 
Norway have acted as host countries. Two of the working groups, the 
AMAP and CAFF, work under the host country principle. Their rotation 
among host countries is not regular (Smith, 1997, p.8). 
For the time being the plan is to maintain principle of voluntarism. 
Secretarial services are, however, covered by obligatory fees. In 
particular the Russian participation was discussed. All possibilities of 
cost-sharing and of Russian contributions in kind was considered 
worth examining (see The Arctic Environment, 1993, p.15). The 
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ministers in Nuuk agreed to ‘seeking resources to enable each country 
to fully participate in the program activities under the Arctic Envi-
ronmental Protection Strategy’ (The Nuuk Declaration on Environment 
and Development, 1993).  
The WWF claims that the AEPS practice has been: ‘each country 
has decided how much it will pay and even whether it will pay at all’ 
(Smith, 1997, p.8). No progress was made in Inuvik in 1996; the states 
agreed to ‘ensure implementation of the priorities listed in the present 
declaration and to make every effort to provide and maintain the 
necessary resources to enable each country and indigenous peoples 
to participate fully in the activities of the AEPS’ (Inuvik Declaration on 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development in the Arctic, 
1996).  The states establishing the Arctic Council agreed to ‘regularly 
review the priorities and financing of its programs and associated 
structures’. It was also agreed that the responsibility for hosting the 
meetings of the Arctic Council, including a provision for secretariat 
support functions, should rotate sequentially among the Arctic states 
(Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996).  At the 
Alta meeting in 1997, the issue of financing activities was postponed. 
For indigenous peoples, Arctic cooperation has meant a chance 
to strengthen the organizational setting of their collaboration. The In-
digenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) was established in 1993 on the 
initiative of Denmark and the Greenland Home Rule Government to 
‘address all issues related to the participation of indigenous peoples’. 
The aim was to enhance the participation and contribution of 
indigenous peoples in the conservation and protection of the Arctic 
environment, and to bring their knowledge to bear on these matters 
(IPS Information, 1996).  
The role of the IPS is to facilitate a dialogue between the three 
organizations and the governmental bodies of the AEPS. The 
Governing Board of IPS comprises six members. Three of them 
represent the three IPO’s. The three remaining members of the 
Governing Board are government representatives: Denmark (per-
manent member), the presiding host of AEPS country and a repre-
sentative from the one of the remaining six Arctic states. The eight 
Arctic states appoint this member. One of the three IPO’s chairs the 
Board. The Governing Board meets at least annually (Report of the 
Third Ministerial Meeting, 1996, p.19).  
At the beginning, organizational problems hampered the work of 
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IPS. However, nobody denies its useful role in coordinating the work of 
the IPOS; the ‘indigenous people´s secretariat is a helpful addition’ 
(Huntington, 1995). The problem with the IPS is that its status is 
unclear; it does not have an international and legally binding 
foundation. This would ease some operational difficulties that the 
secretariat has (Petersen, 1996). However, ‘it has potential’, says 
Chester Reimer, the former executive director of the IPS (Reimer, 
1995).  
The wish of the Arctic indigenous peoples  came true with the 
establishment of the IPS. Representatives of the Arctic peoples of 
Canada and Scandinavia met in Copenhagen in 1973. The conference 
discussed the idea of establishing a permanent circumpolar interna-
tional organization. It proposed forming a ‘Circumpolar Body of 
Indigenous Peoples to pursue and advance our shared and collective 
interests’. The working committee established at the Arctic Peoples’ 
Conference did not succeed in organizing a new conference, partly 
due to lack of financial support and partly because the persons 
involved were engaged in other time-consuming activities. The 
participants in the conference represented many indigenous groups in 
the Arctic (Kleivan, 1992, p.233). 
The practice of financing the participation of indigenous peoples’ 
organizations reveals another aspect of the story. According to a 
report by the IPS, during the first three years (1991-1993) the 
involvement of the Arctic indigenous peoples was sporadic and 
funding was ‘extremely limited’. Financing IPO participation in the first 
period was based on ad hoc arrangements. In the latter period (1993-
1996) certain countries (Canada, Denmark, the United States and 
Norway) provided funds to indigenous peoples living in their own 
countries. Iceland and other governments provided some funding and 
services-in-kind for the AEPS indigenous knowledge seminar held in 
Reykjavik 1995. Denmark and Canada also created funds to assist 
indigenous peoples in Russia (Reimer, 1996, p.7). The special 
responsibility of the federal government does not obligate the U.S. 
State Department to handle the practicalities of participation, such as 
financial support for the indigenous groups (Hild, 1996).  
The IPS report stated that for the Canadian Inuit most funding had 
been received from the Government of Canada. The total amount was 
175,000 dollars per annum. Other project funding related to AEPS 
activities had also been provided. The ICC Head Office had, from 
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1995 till March 1997, received 25,000 dollars for preliminary Arctic 
Council work. For the Greenlandic Inuit most funding was given by the 
Danish Government. Since 1993, the average annual funding has 
been 70,000 dollars. The Alaskan Inuit have received 25,000 dollars 
per annum since 1994 (Reimer, 1996, p.5). 
Russian Inuit have attended some meetings of the Arctic Council. 
These costs were covered by the ICC Canada and the Government of 
Canada. Both Canada and Denmark established funds to assist the 
Russian indigenous peoples’ organization to have representatives at 
some AEPS meetings. Canadian government financing for Russian 
indigenous participation, administered by the ICC Canada, is 30,000 
dollars per annum. The Danish Fund provides travel expenses for 
AEPS activities. These funds have been ‘underutilized’ (Reimer, 1996, 
p.6-7). 
Only Norway has provided funding to the Sámi Council for parti-
cipation in the AEPS. Norway has granted  4,000 dollars per year. 
Finland, Sweden and Russia have not contributed directly to the Sámi 
Council for AEPS work. Some funding for an AMAP project has been 
forwarded to the Sámi Council. This lack of financial support has 
resulted in AEPS meetings not being officially attended, being 
attended by volunteers when available and in a lack of overall 
coordination of Sámi activities in the AEPS. It has also resulted in a 
major deficit for the Sámi Council which has contributed from its core 
budget to AEPS activities (Reimer, 1996, p.6). 
In this respect the existing Arctic Council is far from the original 
concept presented by the Arctic Council Panel. This suggested that 
‘adequate financial support will be provided by the Arctic states to 
permit aboriginal organizations and communities to take part in the 
word of Council and Working Groups’ (Arctic Council Panel, 1991, 
p.28).    
 
Northern Cooperation on Sustainable Development 
 
Sustainable Development  is strengthened by other cooperative 
arrangements in the region. The Northern Forum has served as a 
mechanism for regular international interaction between northern 
leaders since 1990. The purpose of the forum is to ‘improve the quality 
of local, national and international decision-making regarding northern 
issues by providing a means through which northern voices can be 
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heard at all stages of the process’. The board of directors consists of 
governors and high political officials representing the northern regions. 
Associate membership is available to businesses, universities and 
special interest groups  (Statement of Intent, 1990, p.2). According to 
the Northern Forum Secretariat, indigenous peoples in the north are 
represented through governors in the Northern Forum (Clark,  1996).  
The Northern Forum also has environmental projects such as on 
environmental monitoring and wildlife management (Clark, 1996;Wohl, 
1996). The Northern Forum, an organ describing itself as ‘Northern 
voice’ also applied for special status within the Arctic Council structure. 
The basis of special status for the Northern Forum is that ‘unlike other 
organizations with an interest in observing the work of the Arctic 
Council, the Northern Forum is the only organization which deals with 
all these issues and works with all the constituences of the northern 
regions’ (Eriksen, 1997). 
   The main concern of the Northern Forum is the economic 
development 
of the people in the north. The Tromsø declaration emphasizes that 
‘we have the right to use renewable resources responsibly for 
subsistence purposes, to develop an economy and to continue our 
unique lifestyle’ (Tromsø Declaration, 1993). Sustainable development 
in the Northern Forum is understood by the Rovaniemi Code of 
Conduct (1994, p.4) as:  
 
1) taking a long-term view which takes into consideration the interests of 
future generations, the co-existence of various industries and the health 
of local populations;  
2) adherence to environmental standards which prevent pollution and the 
degradation of the land and resources;  
3) accountability for environmental damage under which those who 
generate pollution pay for its consequences;   
4) non-renewable resource development should be accomplished 
utilising best management practices to avoid damaging renewable 
resources; and  
5) a precautionary principle to all development activities in the North, 
developing and using the best scientific information and technology 
available.   
 
Norwegian initiative in 1993 started Barents Euro-Arctic 
cooperation. By developing the region, the Norwegians hoped to ‘give 
it an eastern dimension by associating Murmansk and Archangel 
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counties politically with the Barents cooperation’ and ‘a southern 
dimension by placing developments in the Barents region in a wider 
European framework wherever appropriate’. As the region is called the 
‘Euro-Arctic region,’ it is ‘part of a Nordic policy towards Europe which 
ties together this region and developments in Eastern and Southern 
Europe’ (Stoltenberg, 1992, p.7).   
For Norwegian Prime Minister Stoltenberg: 
 
The Barents region will be an important part of the New Europe. It is 
richer in natural resources than any other region in Europe. The Barents 
Sea has Europe’s richest fish stocks. There are extensive mineral 
deposits and productive forests in the area, and probably vast petroleum 
reserves, particularly in Russia (Stoltenberg, 1992, p.8).   
 
  The aim of Barents cooperation is to ‘improve the conditions for 
local 
cooperation between local authorities, institutions, industry and 
commerce across the borders of a region’ (Kirkenes Declaration, 
1993). Collaboration on environmental issues is included in the 
Barents cooperation. The objective of the cooperation is to promote 
sustainable development in the region (see also Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council Environment Action Programme, 1994). 
The interpretation of the idea of sustainable development has 
taken very concrete form in the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation; the 
members of the committee for the environment and economic 
cooperation had a joint session where environmental considerations 
were included into economic and investment projects. Another reason 
for the integration of economic and environmental concerns is that 
purely environmental projects would hardly be financed but funding 
could be found for an economic project involving the environment 
(Mähönen, 1997a).  
Environmental cooperation in the ‘Euro-Arctic Barents Region’ 
has a European dimension, since two Arctic countries, Sweden and 
Finland, have become members of the European Union. Sweden has 
concentrated on presenting the Baltic region and its concerns within 
the European Union.  Arctic affairs are therefore the responsibility of 
Finland. Finland became interested in developing the ‘Northern 
Dimension of the European Union’  in the fall of 1997. Though its EU 
membership Finland has ‘the opportunity and the responsibility to 
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introduce Arctic issues into EU fora and to promote the integration of 
Arctic environmental questions into the environmental policy of the EU’ 
(Mähönen, 1997b, p.6).  
The region is being mainly marketed to the European Union as a 
rich resource area. As the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 
stated at a recent Barents conference in Rovaniemi, Finland in 
September 1997: ‘It is an area rich in resources, containing some of 
the world’s largest reserves of natural gas and oil, resources of 
strategic importance to the [European] Union’ (Lipponen, 1997, p.2).  
This region is described as ‘sparsely populated and the climate is 
harsh’. Not only were the oil and gas reserves of the region empha-
sized but also the importance of timber resources and the forest 
industries: ‘Russia’s forests comprise over 20 per cent of the world’s 
timber resources and  more than half of the world’s pine forests, giving 
a great potential to develop forestry and forest industries in 
Northwestern Russia’. The region has potential in terms of 
international trade: ‘The increasing volume of trade and economic 
cooperation requires the development of infrastructure, particularly 
East-West rail and road connections’ (Lipponen, 1997, p.2).  
The fragility of the region is recognized: ‘The guiding principles for 
all economic activities must be sustainable development. Arctic nature 
is highly vulnerable and has been exposed to serious pollution’ 
(Lipponen, 1997, p.4). The environmental problems are considered ‘so 
extensive’ that the political participation of groups outside of the 
Barents region is required.  The Finnish view that, ‘The opportunities 
of the European North are at the core of the evolving European 
Union’s Northern Dimension’ was how a recent Finnish report 
described the north (Nokkala, 1997, p.30). 
Governmentality produces ‘a mind’ of its own. These  process of 
discussing the mandate of the different Arctic fora  produces its own 
rationality. The environmental discourse reflects the values and choice 
modern societies see in their relationship with nature. In the end, it is a 
question of the rationale for institutional functioning. These 
discussions are important and relevant since sustainable development 
is a thought or ‘a state of mind’ more than anything else (see Griffiths 
and Young, 1989, p.6).  
By defining regimes differently the role of the cooperative 
arrangement in the Arctic can be appreciated. Regimes are not actors, 
all they do is constitute a specifically structured context within the inte-
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raction taking place (Rosenau, 1986, p.882). Instead of reifying a 
regime into a metaphysical agent, the identification of the respective 
regime as a discursively prestructured context allows us to appreciate 
and analyze the intersubjective processes that constitute the reality of 
the regime (Behnke, 1995, p.182). International society is understood 
as a notional: international society and its members, the sovereign 
states, are ‘par excellence, notional beings, they exist in the minds of 
men and therefore, they actually exist objectively out there’. 
International society exists in the ‘minds of many’ and most importantly 
it exists in the ‘minds of statesmen’ (Wilson, 1989, p.53). 
The different practices of cooperation in the Arctic make order in 
the region. As suggested by John Gerard Ruggie: ‘The concept of 
regimes encompasses also the question how the order is achieved - 
regime is used to refer to common, deliberative, though often highly 
asymmetrical means of conducting interstate relations’ (Ruggie, 
1993a, p.12). Constructivism emphasizes the purposiveness of human 
action in international relations.  Order is assumed to be desirable and 
disorder undesirable; where there is disorder, the aim of the restorati-
on of order can also be identified. Order is never uncontentious. 
Attempts by one party to achieve order or address a disorder can often 
result in conflict and controversy with another. Not only is the 
conception of order contentious but there are also competing 
conceptions of order that might be mutually incompatible (McKinlay 
and Little, 1986, p.8-9). 
Order is made by a community. For Norman Angell, who spoke of 
interdependence among the first in international relations, 
interdependence was ‘a community of fates which is characterized by 
an intertwining of interests and mutual influence’(Wilde, 1991, p.89). 
The old institutionalist’s view emphasizes the importance of a 
community among actors. The society, or community,  is based on 
relationships and ‘pull[s] people together in ways that are qualitatively 
different from the impersonal forces that create a system’ (Brown, 
1995, p.185; see also Waever, 1992). This view emphasizes the 
sense of community in international order; whatever order exists in a 
community it has a normative ground. For old institutionalists, order is 
a consequence of ‘a sense of common interests in the elementary 
goals of social life’ (Bull, 1977, p.65). E.H. Carr provides a deeply 
constitutive definition of a world community: ‘There is a world 
community for the reason (and for no other), that people talk and 
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within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community’ (Carr, 
1951, p.162).  
This is, indeed, true for the idea of sustainable development; it is 
hardly more than talk. Doubts have been raised on whether these 
efforts of order making in the Arctic or anywhere else make any 
difference to the state of the environment. moment. The idea of 
sustainable development has become the corner stone of efforts to 
create a new international order.  Yvonne Rydin asks: ‘Can we talk 
ourselves into sustainability?’ She questions whether through talk in 
different forums - local, regional and international - a new moral order 
based on ideas such as sustainable development can be created 
(Rydin, 1997). For example,  according to Geoffrey Palmer: ‘a strong 
argument can be made that during the times these instruments were 
being developed, the environmental situation in the world became 
worse and is deteriorating further’ (quoted in Koskenniemi, 1994, 
p.43). This point suggests that developing regimes, institutions and 
mechanisms at the international level do not really have anything to do 
with the actual efforts to solve environmental problems. The problems 
are managed and controlled through international cooperation, but not 
solved. The order is maintained at least for the moment. The danger of 
preempting the idea of sustainable development in the negotiation 
process continues until today; everybody talks about but it has no 
content. 
In the worst case, the tag ‘sustainable development’ can be 
added on whatever forms of cooperation are developed in the near 
future under the Arctic Council. Sustainability is accepted as such 
without questioning its basis. This is a real concern for the Arctic 
Council, too.  The concept of sustainable development in ‘empty’ as 
Lynton Caldwell has noted comparing to the concept to ‘a develop-
ment horse...  has pulled the cart of the economy, and the en-
vironment has been widely perceived as the paint on the cart’. The 
difficulty is that neither has a clearly defined destination (Caldwell,  
1990b, p.179). 
 
 
The Arctic and the Global 
 
Governmentalities in the polar regions differ considerably. In 1991, 
international efforts to protect the polar regions were a focus of atten-
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tion.  From an early stage of cooperation the Arctic case was 
compared with the experience of cooperation in  Antarctica. Finland, 
which made the initiative for a meeting on Arctic environmental 
protection, noted: 
  
We have had an interest in research activities in both Polar regions. 
Since 1984, we have paid increasing attention to the work in the 
Antarctic and supported measures aimed at promoting its sustainable 
development and in particular the preservation and conservation of its 
living resources (Bärlund, 1989, p.2). 
 
The Arctic and Antarctic environment were both considered 
unique: ’Environmental disturbances in this cold climate [in the Arctic] 
pose more serious problems to the ecological balance than in other 
regions with the exception of Antarctica’ (Statement of the Swedish 
Delegation, 1989, p.2). The development of contacts with the Antarctic 
Treaty System has brought the Netherlands and Chile into the work of 
the AEPS. The Antarctic Consultative Meeting in Seoul, in 1995, 
agreed to exchange of information on Arctic and Antarctic 
environmental issues (Chile, 1996).  
The participation of non-Arctic states in Arctic cooperation has 
been based on their interest in polar regions; for example, Poland 
reaffirmed ‘its interest in polar questions, both in Antarctic and in 
Arctica’ by participating in the cooperation as an observer (Michiewisz, 
1991, p.2).  
However, the rationalities of governing in these regions are very 
different from each other. Article 2 of the Madrid Protocol designates 
the Antarctic as ‘a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science’. The 
text in the Protocol continues:  
 
The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and asso-
ciated ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its 
wilderness and aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct 
of scientific research, in particular research essential to understanding 
the global environment, shall be fundamental considerations in the 
planning and conduct of all activities in the Antarctic Treaty area (In, 
Elliot, 1994, p. 223).  
  
John Vogler points out the significant change that appears to have 
taken place in the negotiation of the Madrid Protocol can be seen as a 
rejection of the principle of managed resource exploitation in favor of a 
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complete prohibition on the ‘wilderness and intrinsic values’ of the 
Antarctic environment. However, this conclusion is not without 
reservations; according to Vogler, ‘if there was any immediate likeli-
hood of economic exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources, the 
situation would, in all probability, be rather different’ (Vogler, 1996a, 
p.95).  The governmentality of the Antarctic is one of valuing the 
intrinsic merit of nature and the approach to the ecosystem. Through 
the established Antarctic Treaty system, and developing the protocol 
on environmental protection, the Antarctic is constituted as region with 
a totally different mentality to that of governing the Arctic.    
At the UNCED in 1992 the Arctic was not mentioned nor included 
on the agenda. In the preparations for the Nuuk ministerial meeting it 
was noted with a disappointment: ‘the meeting regretted the absence 
of an Arctic profile in the draft Rio declaration’ (Protecting the Arctic 
Environment, 1992, p.6).  Raising Arctic concerns at UN General 
Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), in New York in June 1997, 
advanced the recognition of the global dimension of Arctic problems. 
Arctic problems were raised by different states. 
The connection between circumpolar and global developments 
was emphasised. The Finnish minister of the Environment referred to 
‘the alarming state of the Arctic environment’. The Finnish view was 
that the Arctic is ‘a sink of pollutants from industrial regions’ because 
of the global circulation of the atmosphere and the oceans. The most 
alarming risks are caused by organic pollutants to human health 
(Haavisto, 1997b, p.2). The Norwegian prime minister described the 
Arctic as ‘one of the world’s least polluted regions’. However, the 
Norwegian view was that ‘risks to this area are real, largely caused by 
substances transported from sources outside the Arctic’ (Jagland, 
1997, p.2). The Canadian prime minister echoed these concerns: 
‘There is a growing global consensus that environmental harm caused 
by some is a threat to all’ (Chretien, 1997, p.2).  
According to Icelandic representative, ‘climate change and 
increased marine pollution threaten to have adverse effects and 
irreversible implications worldwide’. The Icelandic view is that the 
threat of pollution to the Arctic is real: ‘Dangerous levels of pollution 
are accumulating in the Arctic, its origins in diverse and remote parts 
of the place’ (Oddson, 1997, p.4).  
The report of the AMAP was presented in New York. The Danish 
prime minister stressed the priority for the protection of the Arctic 
124 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
environment at UNGASS (Rasmussen, 1997, p.2).  ‘The results of the 
AMAP program provide a strong message to the rest of the world. 
Pollutants do not accept borders...‘ according to the Danish views 
(Jensen, 1997, p.2).  Spreading information about the Arctic is 
considered important: 
 
People in non-Arctic countries are seldom aware of the consequences of 
their decisions on the Arctic and how dependent they themselves 
actually are on a healthy Arctic environment (Haavisto, 1997a, p.1).  
 
The UNGASS acknowledged that internationally a number of positive 
results were achieved in several social, economic and environmental 
components of sustainable development since Rio, in 1992. Some 
progress has been aimed at institutional development, international 
consensus-building, public participation, private sector action, and in 
curbing pollution and slowing the rate of resource degradation. 
However, the  
 
...states are deeply concerned that the overall look for sustainable 
develop-ment is not much better today than what it was in 1992 in many 
parts of the world, especially in the least developed countries (UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development, 1997).  
 
According to the participants, the general spirit at the Rio follow-up 
conference in New York in the summer of 1997 was disappointing. 
The progress five years after the Rio conference had not been as 
expected, nor were the results of the follow-up meeting as expected. 
Five years after UNCED the state of the global environment has 
continued to deteriorate and significant environmental problems 
remain deeply embedded in the socio-economic fabric of countries in 
all regions, according to the Report of the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development (A/S-19/14).  
At the Rio follow-up Arctic developments were, to some extent,  
recognized. The report on the adoption of Rio Declaration notes the 
Nuuk declaration made by the Arctic states in 1993 which 
acknowledges ‘the special role of indigenous peoples in environmental 
management and development in the Arctic and of the significance of 
their knowledge and traditional practices, and will promote their 
effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development 
in the Arctic’ (E/CN17/1997/8).Compared with other cooperative efforts 
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in the region, the Arctic Council is the one that recognizes the role and 
status of indigenous peoples for sustainable development by granting 
them the status of ‘permanent participants’ (see The Earth Summit, 
1993, p.415-416).    
 
Regime Theory, Order and the Environment 
 
Discourses and the Problem of Order 
 
The discourses in cooperation are all efforts to make order in the 
Arctic. The problem of the environment is, above all, a problem of 
order. First, it is a problem since many environmental problems do not 
respect the borders of states. However, making order of problems is 
not only in the hands of the politicians, diplomats and government 
officials in international negotiations but these problems are a concern 
for  many other actors as well. Second, it is a problem of making 
sense of the vast amount of information on the condition of the Arctic 
environment. It is a problem of ordering both the threats of today and 
the expectations of the future. Different reports and the work of 
researchers suggest the order of priorities. Finally,  it is a problem of 
order in redefining the relations between states, other actors and 
institutions. It is a problem of order in the sense of finding a balance 
between different levels of international action. 
Through constructing regimes, states make order or at least try to 
make order.  International environmental regime-building depends on 
intersubjective meanings. As a phenomenon to be studied, regimes 
are experienced as having an existence beyond the individuals who 
happen to embody them at the time. Emphasizing the intersubjective 
quality of regimes underlines the fact that regimes are ‘human 
artifacts’ which have no existence in meaning apart from individuals or 
groups of human beings (Young, 1989, p.82).  
The claim of this work is that human beings are enmeshed within 
webs of environmental relations and those relations are 
intersubjectively constituted. Therefore, the environment is a social 
construction. The environment is signified as ‘whether a given aspect 
of social reality is a matter of contention or is regarded as natural and 
unproblematic, meaning is always imposed, not discovered, for the 
familiar world cannot be separated from the interpretative practices 
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through which it is made’ (Shapiro, 1989, p.11).   
It has been a great challenge to include the ideas of Foucault into 
the regime analysis. The relationship between constructivist analysis 
and Foucaultian idea in this work has been complimentary; without the 
ideas of constructivist writers, there is little opportunity to use the 
Foucaultian ideas to study international regime building.  Foucault’s 
ideas on the other have provided a critical means to analyse the 
dynamics of regime-building.  
Foucaultian order is not similar to the order of system theorists.  
For new institutionalists social order is seen as a consequence of 
instrumental relations among individual actors. Its individualism 
emphasizes the primacy of individual actors rather than of social 
collectives. Social order for a utilitarian is a derivative relation. Order 
derives entirely from equilibria in the instrumental relations and mutual 
expectations among rational egoistic individuals. This view suggests 
that whatever rules and regularities exist in the world it is a  product is 
of an interplay of forces and lacking any kind of norm content; that is, it 
is a system (Ashley, 1986, p.274-275). 
For a constructivist, order is not a pattern: humans endow their 
behavior with purpose and meaning. It is essentially based on the idea 
of a community and on a shared set of rules, or as Foucault would 
prefer, on certain practices.  
One implication of the constructivist argument is that there is no 
conceptual difference between different levels of structure and order in 
the international system (see also Young, 1996, p.2-3). Following this 
idea, regimes are embedded in a fundamental institutional structure 
which constitutes the identity of the international society. As Nicholas 
Onuf points out, constructing levels of analysis is a practice of, 
‘ordering sets of relations, not as such, but as represented in our 
theories’ (Onuf, 1995, p.52). For the constructivists, all institutions in 
the international system in fact order international life in both ways - 
structuring and ordering. Thus, the cooperative arrangements that the 
new institutionalists call regimes are not intrinsically different from the 
‘deep structural’ institutions of the state system (Wendt and Duvall, 
1989, p.63). 
The Arctic effort at establishing order over a variety of 
environmental concerns and threats is a clear example of order 
making efforts in the international community. According to Foucault, 
regimes give order to a public space or realm of action. Foucault 
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brings the idea of individualized regimes as ‘localized power/know-
ledge’ or ‘localized orders’ into the discussion. If a regime is a discour-
se/discipline set, it gives specific definition and order to a public space 
or realm of action (Keeley, 1990, p.96). Foucault directs our attention 
to patterns of understanding and organization which may not be 
shared by all but around which an order may be constructed. 
Foucault’s focus is on local orders and local struggles. He allows 
the treatment of regimes as efforts to organize a realm of action 
without overlooking fundamental contests. He looks at order-induced 
behavior and behavior that make sense only within the frameworks of 
a construction of reality. This construction of reality may affect, as well 
as reflect, networks of relations in a society (Keeley, 1990, p. 90).  
Finally, this world is messy despite the continuous efforts of 
governing. The world is ‘messy’ because of the growing number of 
environmental problems or maybe more accurately because of a 
growing awareness of those environmental problems. This messiness, 
from the point of view of modernity, is temporary and eventually 
reparable; it can be replaced by the orderly and systematic rule of 
reason. Taking a more postmodern look means ‘above all the tearing 
off the mask of illusions; the recognition of certain pretenses as false 
and certain objectives as neither attainable nor for that matter desira-
ble’. A postmodern look on the messiness is that it will stay whatever 
we do or know. The little orders and systems that we carve out in the 
world are ‘brittle, until-further-notice and as arbitrary and in the end 
contingent as their alternatives’ (Bauman, 1993, p.33). 
 
The Effects of Power 
 
The standard view of regimes is that they are contracts when actors 
with long- term objectives seek to ‘structure their relationships in a 
stable and mutually beneficial way’ (Keohane, 1982, p.330). The 
contractarian view is based on a liberal approach which encourages 
regimes to be regarded as benevolent and voluntary associations 
(Keeley, 1990, p.84; see also Young, 1995b, p.189).The mainstream 
regime theory states that the problem facing an individual government 
is how to benefit from international exchange while maintaining as 
much autonomy as possible. Therefore, the problem in dealing with 
the commons is ‘the management of interdependence in a system of 
sovereign states lacking the kinds of central authorities which are 
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assumed to be providing order and regulation within domestic 
societies’ (Vogler, 1996b, p.8). Many regime theorists focus on the 
observable political effects of institutions (Underdal 1995; see also 
Young and von Moltke, 1994; Underdal, 1992; Levy, 1993; Andresen 
and Wettestad, 1995; Bernauer, 1995). It appears for a realist that 
‘international collective self-regulation’ denotes nothing more than the 
sum or regimes’ contractual arrangements and international 
organizations (Behnke, 1995, p.189).  
From a constructivist point of view regimes produce something 
more than just regulations for states. In emphasizing this aspect, 
international society is not only mediated and regulated by norms and 
rules but per se constituted by rules and norms which govern an 
actor’s behavior. Studying these efforts of order-building challenges 
the view typical for realists and neorealists, international anarchy 
fosters competition and conflict between states and prevents 
cooperation even when they share common interests. Regimes are 
more than ‘rare islands of cooperation in a sea of anarchy’ possible 
under specific, circumscribed conditions (Behnke, 1995, p.187). They 
are also more than ‘a small step removed from the underlying power 
capabilities that sustain them’ (Krasner, 1982, p.191). 
The rule of sovereignty is, of course, essential. Robert Keohane 
points out that the significance of international regimes does not lie in 
their formal legal status. The actions of sovereign states can overturn 
any practices of legal liability and property rights in international 
politics (Keohane, 1984, p.89). For ‘new institutionalists’, operational 
sovereignty within international institutions is distinguished from formal 
sovereignty. Operational sovereignty is understood as the legal 
freedom of the state to act under international law and formal sove-
reignty is defined in terms of the state´s legal supremacy and 
independence. International institutional arrangements to deal with 
environmental problems, for example, constrain operational sove-
reignty but formal sovereignty remains largely intact (Levy, Keohane 
and Haas 1993, p.416-417; see also Krasner, 1989; Barkin and 
Cronin, 1994). 
For ‘old institutionalists’, international  institutions represent  
shared intersubjective understandings about the preconditions for 
meaningful state action. They constitute state actors as subjects of 
international life in the way as they make meaningful interaction by the 
latter possible. The old institutionalists were concerned with the ways 
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in which international institutions structure those practices, the 
practices of state actors and their ordering (Wendt and Duvall, 1989, 
p. 53).  
According to old institutionalists, human beings discover and 
express their individuality in communities and associations and 
practices which, for the most part, are not strictly contained within any 
specific state. International society is ‘a social construction’ (Dunne, 
1995a and 1995b). International society exists when ‘a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in 
the working of common institutions’ (Bull, 1977, p.13). 
Institutions in international society, according to old 
institutionalists, are ‘recognized and established usages governing the 
relations between individuals or groups’ (Wight, 1992, p.140-141). 
Their understanding of institutions is as a cluster of social rules, 
conventions, usages and practices. Institutions are a set of 
conventional assumptions held prevalently among the society 
members to provide a framework for identifying what the done thing is 
in appropriate circumstances (see Suganami, 1983, p.2365). 
The rule of state sovereignty cannot be anything else but proble-
matic: ‘Politics is about the rule’ (Ruggie, 1993b, p.151). The most 
important point in a recent debate on sovereignty was that state sover-
eignty is not a permanent principle of political life, because ‘the 
appearance of permanence is simply an effect of complex practices 
working to affirm continuities and to shift disruptions and dangers to 
the margin’, explains R.B.J Walker (Walker, 1993, p.163). The idea of 
continuous reconstitution of practices of power and sovereignty is 
repeated by Nicholas Onuf. He claims ‘sovereignty is like an ideal that 
is never reached’ (Onuf, 1989, p.142). 
Instead of ‘effectiveness’ of cooperation, the concern here is the 
‘effects’ of power in cooperation.  Such an approach is not easily fitted 
in the expectations of ‘effectiveness’ of mainstream regime theories. 
Foucault suggests that power should be understood in terms of 
conduct; conduct is, simultaneously, to lead others and a way of 
behaving within a mostly open field of possibilities. Governing is the 
rationalization of the use of power. The exercise of power consists in 
guiding the possibility of conduct and putting the possible outcome in 
order. 
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The Question of S 
 
It is, therefore, interesting to study how sovereignty over the 
environment is constituted and reconstituted - even in the circumpolar 
region. A recent Canadian government report notes that ‘on the 
question of sovereignty, the Arctic Council cannot help to resolve long-
standing disputes between members’. Nevertheless, the report 
expects that over time such disputes are likely to become less 
important as regional cooperation replaces national sovereignty as a 
priority for the Arctic states. (Report of the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1997, 
p.81).  
In speaking of sovereignty as domination, Foucault does not have 
in mind the solid and global kind of domination that one person 
exercises over others, or one group over another but the manifold 
forms of domination that can be exercised within society (Foucault, 
1980a, p.96). Regarding the relations between states and indigenous 
peoples, the Foucaultian approach means that  sovereignty should be 
carefully studied as a theory and practice of power. This line of thought 
seeks to question conventional political thought ‘couched in terms of 
sovereignty to understand the complexity and diversity of modern 
power’. Foucault suggests that the focus should not be the juridical 
edifice of sovereignty, the state apparatuses and the ideologies which 
accompany them (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, p.44). 
The point is not to study the ‘dark side of law’ but disciplinary 
mechanisms of power. Therefore sovereignty, neither as a form of law 
nor domination, should be taken as granted but looked at closely as 
how it is maintained by a particular set of practices by states.  
However, from a Foucaultian point of view, this collective existence is 
of domination. Foucault’s view is that rules and rights in particular 
should be viewed not in terms of legitimacy to be established but in 
terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates (Foucault, 1980a, 
p.95-96). 
As Alan James notes ‘states may not be verbally explicit about 
the nature of their sovereignty ...But their actions make the meaning 
which they attach to the term sovereignty entirely plain’ (James, 1986, 
p.22). The actions of the Arctic Council in handling the environmental 
challenge advances the importance and role of the states. National 
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responsibilities for protecting the Arctic environment are emphasized 
by the AEPS. According to the Canadian representative, it is clear that 
‘circumpolar cooperation, bilaterally and multilaterally, flows naturally 
from our domestic priorities’. International cooperation is connected to 
national or domestic concerns:  
 
We [Canadians] did not adopt a policy of promoting cooperation merely 
because it seemed like an interesting idea. We adopted it because we 
saw that increased cooperation with our circumpolar neighbors would 
help us meet the many practical economic, environmental, social and 
cultural challenges we face as an Arctic nation (Campeau, 1990, p. 4).  
 
The AEPS was meant to be implemented ‘through national 
legislation and in accordance with international law’ (AEPS, 1991, p.3). 
The national responsibilities of each state were emphasized in Nuuk; 
according to the ministers, ‘effective domestic environmental 
legislation is a prerequisite to the protection of the environment’. The 
ministers committed themselves to promote the legislation required for 
the conservation of the Arctic environment (The Nuuk Declaration on 
Environment and Development in the Arctic, 1993).   
The importance of national measures was stressed by the AMAP. 
According to the AMAP report: 
 
  Arctic countries should take all necessary steps to ensure that their 
domestic responsibilities and arrangements to reduce contaminant  
inputs to the Arctic 
 region are fully implemented (AMAP, 1997, p.xii). 
 
If these responsibilities are not addressed, ‘the justification for 
recommending actions aimed at reducing transboundary contaminants 
with sources outside of the Arctic will be accordingly diminished’ 
(AMAP, 1997, p.xii).  
The practice of state sovereignty is the main concern here: As 
Carl Hild 
(1996) from Alaska explained, ‘the AEPS is cooperation, government 
to governments; indigenous peoples’ organizations are allowed to 
observe the negotiations’. A discussion on the relations of sovereignty, 
self-determination and environmental concerns are unavoidable in the 
AEPS and trying to make the Arctic Council work. The states, in 
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particularly the United States, prefer clear limits in the role of the IPO’s 
in the work of the Arctic Council. A good example of this is the problem 
with using the word ‘peoples’ which emerged in the fall 1995 Arctic 
Council negotiations. The United States suggested that instead of 
using the words ‘indigenous peoples’ (with s) the words ‘indigenous 
people’ should be used in the declaration text (Arctic Council 
Declaration Draft, October 20, 1995). The U.S. representatives pointed 
out that ‘Indigenous Peoples’ should not be capitalized throughout the 
text since it was not a proper name. The use of ‘s’ on peoples was 
questioned and the U.S. recommended that it be dropped (Arctic 
Council Declaration Draft, October 20, 1995). 
Through this rather minor issue of one letter, Arctic environmental 
cooperation cannot be separated from the efforts of international 
society to advance the rights of indigenous peoples. The 1989 ILO 
Convention speaks of indigenous peoples thus: ‘the use of the term 
´peoples´ in this convention shall not be construed as having any 
implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under 
international law’. However, this note in the ILO Convention did not 
prevent the Arctic Council papers including a note about the use of the 
word ‘peoples’. This note stresses that use of the word  ‘peoples’ 
should not be understood to refer to the rights of peoples according to 
 international practice. This note is now added practically everywhere 
in the AEPS papers, mainly because of the demand by the US 
representatives. In the final version of the declaration establishing the 
Arctic Council there was a note  attached to the text stating that ‘the 
use of the term ´peoples´ in this declaration shall not be construed as 
having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the 
term under international law’ (Declaration on the Establishment of the 
Arctic Council, 1996).  
Unless one considers the issue of sovereignty, the concern of the 
U.S. representatives is difficult to understand. The interesting point is 
how the issues of sovereignty, self-determination and governmentality 
are embedded into Arctic environmental cooperation.With the AEPS 
and the Arctic Council, the rule of sovereignty does indeed collapse 
into practices of power. The success in the Arctic is in the hands of the 
states. Studying the discourse on sovereignty suggests considering 
the cooperation as an event in the use of power, both in its restrictive 
and productive sense, in defining the relationship between the state 
and its indigenous peoples.     
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In the Foucaultian sense, regimes as social institutions work 
within the thin but entangling webs of power relations. Power relations 
are not external to a regime. Foucault’s view is that power is always 
present in social arrangements and it is always exercised. Institutions 
are ‘the most readily definable macro-objects, grosser instruments for 
the finer, more elemental workings of power’. Institutions are relevant 
in terms of places where power ‘becomes embodied in techniques and 
equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of 
material intervention’ (Caputo and Yount, 1993, p.9). Foucault 
suggests studying geographical dimensions as, ‘tactics and strategies 
of power which deployed through implantations, distributions, 
demarcations, control of territories and organizations of domains...‘ 
form a region (Foucault, 1980c, p.77).  
The logic of governmentality makes indigenous peoples 
participants in the  
cooperation with the states and users of the resources in the region, 
but not owners of these resources. The issues of sovereignty, self-
determination and governmentality are embedded into Arctic 
environmental cooperation making states to emphasise national 
responsibilities and state sovereignty in the region. With the AEPS and 
the Arctic Council, the rule of sovereignty does  collapses into 
practices of power. More important than finding solutions to the 
problems at hand was to secure  existing power relations both inside 
and outside individual Arctic states, including avoiding the problem of 
dealing with the demands of self-government and land ownership 
increasing among different groups of indigenous peoples in the Arctic. 
Telling the story of the Arctic cooperation including the views of 
indigenous peoples has not been an easy task.  As far I understand, 
the task of an intellectual is not to shape the political will of another nor 
take sides on behalf of anybody else. Indigenous peoples have to fight 
their own struggles. However,  I’m aware that my actions as a 
researcher may have consequences, even political ones. It is possible 
that my actions make no difference at all. I have, however, tried to 
follow the logic suggested by Foucault: 
 
... to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to 
disturb people's mental habits, the way they do and think things, to 
dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and 
institutions...  to participate in the formation of a political will (Foucault, 
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1988b, p.xvi). 
 
I do hope that I have managed to shake some of ‘mental habits’  
created in the Arctic cooperation so far as well as some of those in my 
own field - international relations. 
  
  
 135 
 
 
 
 
 132 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
Unpublished Material and Documents 
 
Address of the Soviet Representative (Unofficial translation) (1989), in 
Consultat- 
ive Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and 
Annex III:1-25 of the Final Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 
989, Helsinki. 
AEPS (1991), Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Rovaniemi, Finland. 
AEPS (1995), Procedures for Observer Participation and Accreditation (Draft). 
SAAO Meeting, Toronto, Canada, November 29 - December 1, 1995. 
Aikio, P. (1990),  ‘The Circumpolar Peoples and the Protection of the Arctic 
Environment. A Saami Viewpoint’,  in Protecting the Arctic Environment. 
Report on the  Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, Annex II:18, Yellowknife, 
NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Alta Declaration on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (1997), Alta, 
Nor- way, June 12-13, 1997, http://arctic-council/usgs.gov, 26.8.1999. 
Arctic Council Declaration Draft, June 20, 1995. 
Arctic Council Declaration Draft, August 16, 1995. 
Arctic Council Declaration Draft, October 20, 1995. 
Arctic Council Declaration Draft, January 15, 1996. 
Arctic Council Declaration Draft, April 19, 1996. 
Arctic Council Declaration Draft, June 9, 1996. 
Arctic Council SAO (1997), in Arctic Council Meeting of SAOs and Permanent 
Participants. Information Kit, Ottawa, Canada, October 7-9, 1997. The 
Arctic Environment (1993), Report: Second Ministerial Conference 16 
September 1993 - Nuuk Greenland,  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Copenhagen. 
A/S-19/14,  Report of the Commission on Sustainable Development on 
Preparat- 
ions  for the Special Session of the General Assembly for the Purpose of 
an Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of Agenda 21, 
gopher:// gopher.un.org:70/00/ga/s-19/plenary/AS19--14.EN. 25.6.1997. 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council Environment Action Programme (1994), Bodø, 
Nor- way, June 15, 1994. 
Bärlund, K. (1989), Opening Statement, in Consultative Meeting on the 
Protection 
of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and Annex III:1-25 of the Final 
Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, Helsinki.  
    Bibliography 133 
 
 
Berntsen, T. (1997), Statement, in AEPS Ministerial Meeting, Alta, Norway, 
June 12-13, 19997 in Arctic Council Meeting of SAOs and Permanent 
Participants. Information Kit, Ottawa, Canada, October 7-9, 1997. 
Bjarnason, G. (1997), Opening Statement, in AEPS Ministerial Meeting, Alta, 
Nor- way, June 12 -13, 1997. 
Brelsford, T. (1995), A Compilation and Summary of Ethical Principles for 
Arctic 
Research, CAFF Working Group, For Consideration by the SAAOs, Iqaluit, 
Canada, March 15-17, 1995. 
Brelsford, T. (1996b), Status Report on Development of Ethical Principles for 
Arctic Research. Presented to the CAFF Working Group Meeting, 
Rovaniemi, Finland, September 9-12, 1996. 
CAFF  (1994), The State of the Protected Areas, CAFF. 
CAFF (1995), Paper on Integration of Indigenous Knowledge. 
CAFF (1995-1996), Annual Workplan 1995-1996.   
CAFF (1996), Co-Operative Implementation Strategy for the Convention of 
Biological Diversity in the Arctic Region, Draft February 1996.  
CAFF (1997a), Habitat Conservation Report, Report No. 2, 
http://www.grida.no/ caff/hcr2.htm, 25.6.1997 
CAFF (1997b), Threats to Arctic Species and Ecosystems, 
http://www.grida.no/  
caff/threats.htm, 25.6.1997. 
Campeau, A. (1990),  ‘Notes by Special Advisor on International Affairs to the 
Minister of the Environment, on behalf of the Honourable Lucien 
Bouchard, Minister of the Environment, to the Yellowknife Preparatory 
Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment’, in Protecting the 
Arctic Environment. Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, 
Annex III:12, Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Chile (1996), Statement,  at the Third AEPS Ministerial Meeting, Inuvik, 
Northwest 
Territories, Canada, March 20-21, 1996. 
Chretien, J. (1997), Notes for an Address on the Occasion of the United 
Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on Sustainable Development, 24 June 
1997, gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/docs/S-19/statements/gov/ 
CHRETIEN. TXT. 
Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment (1989),  
Report 
and Annex 1:1-7, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, Helsinki. 
Dahl, B. (1991),  Statement, in Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the 
Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Danilov-Danilian, V.I. (1993), The Address of the Russian Delegation Head at 
the 
134 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Countries, Nuuk, Greenland, 
September 16, 1993. 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (1996), Ottawa, 
Canada, 
September 19, 1996, http://arctic-council/usgs.gov/, 26.8.1999. 
Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment (1991), Rovaniemi, 
Finland, June 14, 1991,  http://arctic-council/usgs.gov/, 26.8.1999. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/8, Human Rights and the Environment. Preliminary Report 
by 
Mrs. Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur, pursuant to Sub- 
Commission Resolutions 1990/7 and 1990/27, in Commission on Human  
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, 43rd Session. 
E/CN17/1997/8, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 
Application 
and Implementation. Report of the Secretary General, 
gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/esc/cn17/1997/off/97--8.EN, 25.6.1997. 
EPPR (1996), Status Report For the Period between the Ministerial Meeting in 
Nuuk, Greenland 16 September 1993 and the Ministerial Meeting in 
Inuvik, Canada, 20-21 March 1996. 
Eriksen, S. (1997), Letter to Mary Simon, Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, 
September 18, 1996, in Arctic Council Meeting of SAOs and Permanent 
Participants, Information Kit, October 7-9, 1997 Ottawa, Canada. 
Final Draft WG1 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (1991), in Protecting 
the Arctic Environment, Kiruna Preparatory Meeting, January 15-17, 1991.  
Gudnason, E. (1991), Statement, in Ministerial Conference on the Protection of 
 the Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Haarder, B. (1991), Statement, in Ministerial Conference on the Protection of 
the 
Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Haavisto, P. (1997a), Opening Statement, at the AEPS Ministerial Meeting, 
Alta, 
Norway, June 12-13, 1997. 
Haavisto, P. (1997b),  Statement, at the Special Session of the UN General 
Assem- 
bly for the Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of  Agenda  
21. New York, June 25, 1997, gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/docs/S-
19/statements/gov/HAAVISTO.TXT. 
Halonen, L. (1991), Statement,  in Ministerial Conference on the Protection of 
the 
Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Halonen, L. (1996b), Arktisk miljö- og annet samarbeid, in Samenes 16. Konfe- 
rens og Barents Urfolkskonferense, 15-18.10.1996 i Murmansk. 
    Bibliography 135 
 
 
Henriksen, John B. (1996), The Legal Status of Saami Land Rights in Finland, 
Russia, Norway and Sweden, Sami Council. 
Huntington, H. (1997), Presentation at the Conference on Environmental Pollu-
tion in the Arctic, Tromsø, Norway, June 4, 1997. 
ICC (1990),  ‘Proposed Objectives for an Arctic Sustainable and Equitable 
Develop- 
ment Strategy. Submitted by Mary Simon, President’, in Protecting the 
Arctic Environment. Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, 
Annex II:15, Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
ICC (1995a),  Report to the Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Prepar- 
edness and Response for the Norilsk Meeting, August 1995. 
ICC (1995b), Collapse of the Arctic Seal Skin Market: Retrospective Study and 
Sustainable Options, Prepared for the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy  Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization.  
Iceland (1990), Statement, in Protecting the Arctic Environment. Report on the 
Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting,  Annex III:8, Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, 
April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Introductory Statement by Assistant Under-Secretary, Desiree Edmar (1990), 
in 
Protecting the Arctic Environment. Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory 
Meeting, Annex III:6. Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 1990, 
Ottawa. 
Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development 
in the Arctic (1996), Inuvik, Northwest Territories, Canada, March 21, 
1996, 
http://arctic-council/usgs.gov, 26.8.1999. 
Jaakkola, E. (1989),  ‘Conservation of Arctic Living Resources’, in Consultative 
Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and 
Annex III:1-25 of the Final Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 
1989, Helsinki. 
Jagland, T. (1997), Statement, at the General Assembly 19th Special Session 
on the 
Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of Agenda 21. New York, 
June  
23,1997, gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/docs/S-19/statements/gov/jag 
land.txt. 
Jensen, M. (1997), Opening Statement, at the AEPS Ministerial Meeting, Alta, 
Nor- 
way, June 12-13, 1997. 
Kirk, E.J. (1997), Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Russian North 
West. Paper presented at the 37th Annual Convention of the International 
Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 18-20,1997. 
Kirkenes Declaration (1993), Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region,  
136 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kirkenes, Norway, 11 January 1993. 
Kjellen, B. (1997), Statement in the AEPS Ministerial Meeting, Alta Norway, 
June 
12-13, 1997, in Arctic Council Meeting of SAOs and Permanent 
Participants. Information Kit, October 7-9, 1997 Ottawa, Canada.  
Kuokkanen, R. (1997),  ‘Statement by Sami Council’, in Commission on 
Human 
Rights. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Preventionof 
Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Fifteenth Session 
28 July-1 August 1997,  Item 5 (a) Environment, land and sustainable 
development. 
Kuptana, R. (1996), Opening Remarks, in  Third AEPS Ministerial Meeting, 
Inuvik, 
Northwest Territories, Canada, March 20-21, 1996.  
Lipponen, P. (1997), The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern 
Dimension in Barents Region Today Conference, Rovaniemi, Finland, 
September 15, 1997. 
Lock, G.S.H. (1995), Arctic Science Policy and Advice. Presented at the 
International Conference for Arctic Research Planning, sponsored by the 
International Arctic Science Committee and the Polar Research Board of 
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation 
of the United States. Dartmouth College, Hanover, USA, December 5-9, 
1995. 
Lynge, A. (1991), Statement, in Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the 
Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland,  June 13-14, 1991. 
Lynge, A. (1997), Statement in AEPS Ministerial Meeting, Alta, Norway, June 
12- 
13, 1997,in Arctic Council Meeting of SAOs and Permanent Participants. 
Information Kit, October 7-9, 1997 Ottawa, Canada.  
Meeting of Working Group on Permanent Participants (1995), Arctic Council  
Discussions, November 26, 1995, Toronto. 
Michiewisz, J. (1991), Statement, in Ministerial Conference on the Protection of 
 the Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991.  
Nurmi, M. (1996), Address by Head of the Finnish Delegation, at Third AEPS 
Ministerial Meeting,  Inuvik, Northwest Territories, Canada, March 20-21, 
1996. 
The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development on the Arctic (1993), 
 Nuuk, Greenland, 16 September, 1993. 
Oddson, D. (1997), Statement, at the UN 19th Special Session., in UN Press 
Release GA/9264, ENV/DEV/430, June 24, 1997.  
Olsen, O.R. (1991), Speech, in Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the 
Arctic Environment,  Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Opening Statement by Head of the Norwegian Delegation, Mr. Dagfinn Steneth 
    Bibliography 137 
 
 
 (1990), in Protecting the Arctic Environment. Report on the Yellowknife 
Preparatory Meeting. Annex III:2. Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 
1990, Ottawa. 
Petersen, T. (1997), Presentation at the Conference on Environmental 
Pollution in the Arctic. Tromsø, Norway, June 4, 1997. 
Pietikäinen, S. (1991), Statement, in Ministerial Meeting on the Protection of 
the 
Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Prokosch, P. (1997),  ‘An Application to Arctic Council for Observer Status, 
WWF,  
July 23, 1997', in Arctic Council Meeting of  SAOs and Permanent Partici-
pants. Information Kit, October 7-9, 1997 Ottawa, Canada. 
Proposal by the Government of Canada (1990), in Protecting the Arctic 
Environ- 
ment. Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, Yellowknife, NWT, 
Canada, April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Protecting the Arctic Environment (1990), Report on the Yellowknife Prepara-
tory 
Meeting. Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Protecting the Arctic Environment (1991), Kiruna Preparatory Meeting, January 
15-17, 1991.  
Protecting the Arctic Environment (1992), Summary Report of a Meeting in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, April 23-24, 1992. 
Rasmussen, P.N. (1997), Statement,  at the UN 19th Special Session of the 
General  
Assembly (UNGASS) 23-27 June, 1997, New York, June 23, 1997, 
gopher:// 
gopher.un.org/00/docs/S-19/statements/gov/RASMUSSEN.TXT. 
Reimer, C. (1996), Financing Indigenous Peoples' Participation in the Arctic 
Council. A Discussion Paper for Presentation to the AEPS and Arctic 
Council Senior Arctic Officials, November 1996. 
Report of the CAFF Chair and Secretariat (1996), in Meeting of the Senior 
Arctic 
Affairs Officials and Third Ministerial Conference, Inuvik, Northwest 
Territories, Canada, March 18-21, 1996. 
Report of the Third Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic 
Environment (1996), Inuvik, Northwest Territories, Canada, March 20-21, 
1996. 
Roots, F. (1991), Remarks, in Ministerial Conference on Protection of the 
Arctic 
Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Rovaniemi Code of Conduct (1994), Northern Forum. 
138 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996), Highlights from the Report of 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. People to People, Nation to 
Nation, http://www.inac.gc.ca/rcap/report/index.html, 10.6.1997. 
Rydin, Y. (1997), Can We Talk Ourselves into Sustainability? Plenary Speech 
at 
the Research Conference  ‘The Environment, Society and Sustainability - 
A Nordic Perspective’, August 25-27, 1997, in Oslo, Norway.  
SAAO (1995), Final Minutes, March 15-17, Iqaluit, Northwest Territories, 
Canada. 
SAAO (1997), SAAO Report to the Ministers for the Fourth Ministerial Confer- 
ence on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), Alta 
Norway, June 12-13, 1997.  
Sámi Programme of the Environment (1990 [1986]), in Protecting the Arctic 
Envi- 
ronment. Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, Annex II:17, 
Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Scully, T. (1997), Statement in AEPS Ministerial Meeting, June 12-13, 1997, in  
Arctic Council Meeting of SAOs and Permanent Participants. Information 
Kit, October  7-9, 1997 Ottawa, Canada.   
Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (1996), 
Conference 
Statement, Yellowknife, Canada, March 14, 1996,  http://www.grida.no/ 
parl/conf/index.htm, 26.8.1999. 
Siddon, T. (1991), Notes for Remarks, in Ministerial Conference on the 
Protection 
of the Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Simon, M. (1990),  ‘Towards an Arctic Sustainable and Equitable Development 
  
Strategy; Some Preliminary Views’,  in Protecting the Arctic Environment. 
Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, Yellowknife, NWT, 
Cana-da,  April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Simon, M. (1995), Keynote Speech, in International Conference for Arctic 
Research Planning’, Hanover, NH, 5-9 December, 1995.  
Simon, M. (1997a), Speaking Notes for Opening Statement, at the  AEPS -
Ministe- 
rial Conference, Alta, Norway,  June 12, 1997. 
Simon, M. (1997b), Closing Remarks, at the AEPS  Ministerial Conference, 
Alta, 
Norway, June 13, 1997. 
Solovyanov, A. (1997), Statement, in AEPS Ministerial Meeting, Alta, Norway, 
June 
12-13, 1997 in Arctic Council Meeting of SAOs and Permanent 
Participants. 
    Bibliography 139 
 
 
Information Kit, October 7-9, 1997 Ottawa, Canada. 
Statement by the Canadian Delegation (1989), in Consultative Meeting on the 
Protection of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and Annex III:1-25 of 
the Final Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, Helsinki.  
Statement by the Chair (1990),  in Protecting the Arctic Environment. Report 
on 
 the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting,  Annex II:5, Yellowknife, NWT,  
Canada, April 18-23, 1990. Ottawa. 
Statement by the Danish Delegation (1989), in Consultative Meeting on the 
Protection of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and Annex III:1-25 of  
the Final Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, Helsinki.  
Statement by the Finnish Delegation (1989), in Consultative Meeting on the 
Protection of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and Annex III:1-25 of 
the Final Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, Helsinki. 
Statement by the Swedish  Delegation (1989), in Consultative Meeting on the 
 Protection of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and Annex III:1-25 
 of the Final Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, 
Helsinki.  
Statement from the Soviet Delegation (1990), in Protecting the Arctic Environ- 
ment. Report on the Yellowknife Preparatory Meeting, Annex III:7, 
Yellowknife, NWT, Canada, April 18-23, 1990, Ottawa. 
Statement of ECE (1989), in Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the 
Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and Annex III:1-25 of the Final Report, 
Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, Helsinki. 
Statement of the Norwegian Delegation (1989), in Consultative Meeting on the 
Protection of the Arctic Environment, Annex II:1-12 and Annex III:1-25 of 
the Final Report, Rovaniemi, Finland, September 20-26, 1989, Helsinki.  
Stoltenberg, J. (1991), Statement, in Ministerial Conference on the Protection 
of the Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
Stone, D. (1997), Opening Speech by the AMAP Working Group Chairman at 
the 
Conference on Environmental Pollution in the Arctic, Tromsø, Norway, 
June 1-5, 1997. 
TFSDU (1994), Terms of Reference and Workplan. 
TFSDU (1995a), Summary of the Meeting of the Task Force on Sustainable 
Development and Utilization, March 13-14, 1995. 
TFSDU (1995b), Regional Application of Agenda 21 in the Arctic (Draft), 
November 1995. 
TFSDU (1996), Review of Work in Progress.  
Towards an Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy (1986),  ICC Environmental 
Commission. 
Trade Barriers Affecting Products from the Arctic (1995), Discussion Paper. 
Tromsø Declaration (1993), Northern Forum. 
140 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development, Revised Draft Political 
Statement 
(1997), proposed by the Mostafa K. Tolba and Monica Linn Locher, 
gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/ga/docs/S-19/plenary/DRAFTS, 25.6.1997. 
Utsi,  N. (1996), Statement on behalf of the Saami Council, in Third AEPS 
Ministerial Conference, Inuvik, Northwest Territories, Canada, March 20-
21, 1996. 
Weinman, J.G. (1991),  Remarks,  in Ministerial Conference on the Protection 
of the Arctic Environment, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 13-14, 1991. 
WWF (1995), Comments to the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic 
Council. 
WWF (1997), Statement, at the  AEPS Ministerial Meeting,  Alta, Norway, June 
12- 
13, 1997. Young, O.R. (1993a), Regions in International Society, Mimeo. 
Young, O.R (1995a), The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: Looking 
Back 
ward, Looking Forward, An Essay Based on Presentations Made at the 
Annual Danish/American Greenland Science Conference Held in 
Copenhagen, Denmark on 7 April 1995 and at the Session of the 1995 
Calotte Academy Held in Inari, Finland on 21 May 1995. 
Young, O.R. (1996), Arctic Governance: Meeting Challenges of Cooperation in 
the High Latitudes, An Essay Prepared for Discussion at the Second 
Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, 13-14 March 1996 
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, Canada. 
Young, O. (1997), International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) Comments, 
in 
SAAOs/SAOs Meeting, 9-10 June 1997. 
 
 
Interviews and Personal Communication 
 
Brelsford, T. (1996a), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Anchorage, Interview, 
February 1996. 
Clark, J. (1996), Northern Forum Secretariat, Anchorage, Interview, February 
1996. 
Cline, D. (1996), National Audubon Society, Anchorage, Interview, February 
1996. 
Cochran, P. (1996), Alaska Native Science Commission, Anchorage, Interview, 
February 1996. 
Elling, H. (1996), Danish Polar Centre, Copenhagen, Personal communication, 
June 
1996. 
    Bibliography 141 
 
 
Fenge, T. (1995), Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Interview (by 
phone), 
October 1995. 
Gibson, M. (1995), Arctic Network, Anchorage, Interview (by phone), October 
1995. 
Gibson, M. (1996), Arctic Network, Anchorage, Interview, February 1996.  
Halonen, L. (1996a),  Sami Representative to AEPS,  Interview, August 1996. 
Hild, C. (1996), Rural Cap, Anchorage, Interview, February 1996. 
Hilden, M. (1996), Arctic EIA Project, Finnish Environment Agency, Helsinki, 
Interview, March 1996. 
Huntington, H. (1995), ICC, Environmental Coordinator, Interview (by phone), 
 October 1995. 
Huntington, H. (1996),  ICC, Environmental Coordinator, Interview, February 
1996. 
Hurst, R. (1996),  AEPS Secretariat, Environment Canada, Hull,  Interview, 
January 
1996. 
Hurwich, E. (1995), Circumpolar Conservation Union, Interview (by phone), 
October1995. 
Kankaanpää, P. (1996), Finnish AEPS Coordinator, Ministry of the 
Environment, 
Helsinki, Inteview, October 1996. 
Lassig, J. (1996), Finnish Representative to PAME, Ministry of the 
Environment, 
Helsinki, Interview, March  1996. 
Lekanof, F. (1996),  Aleutian/Pribilof Islands Association, Environmental 
Program 
 Coordinator, Anchorage, Interview, February 1996. 
Liljelund, L-E. (1996), AMAP Assessment Working Group Chair, Ministry of the 
Environment, Stockholm, Interview, June 1996.  
Lindström, G. (1996), Executive Secretary, Nordic Council of Ministers, 
Helsinki,  
Interview, March 1996. 
McCloskey, M. (1995), Sierra Club, Interview (by phone), October 1995. 
Mähönen, O. (1996), Finnish AEPS Coordinator, Ministry of the Environment, 
Hel- sinki, Interview, May 1996. 
Mähönen, O. (1997a), Finnish AEPS Coordinator, Environment Agency, 
Rovaniemi 
Personal communication, June 1997. 
Matero, S. (1997), Sami Programme on Sustainable Development, Finnish 
Sami 
Parliament, Personal communication, April 1997. 
142 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Mayo, R. (1996), Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments, Fairbanks, 
Interview, 
February 1996. 
Mills, C. (1995), Dene Nation, Personal communication, December 1995. 
Nenonen M.-L. (1996), Finnish AMAP Representative, Environment Agency, 
Ro- vaniemi, Interview, May 1996. 
Pahkala, O. (1996), Finnish representative in the EPPR, Ministry of the 
Environment, Helsinki, Interview, March 1996. 
Pagnan, J. (1996), CAFF Secretariat, Environment Canada, Hull, Interview, 
January  
1996. 
Petersen, T. (1996),  Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, Acting Executive 
Secretary, 
Copenhagen, Interview, June 1996. 
Prokosch, P.  (1996), WWF Arctic Program, Oslo, Personal communication, 
June 
1996. 
Puurunen, H. (1996), Finnish SAAO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki,  
Interview, April 1996. 
Reimer, C. (1995), ICC, Research Director, Interview (by phone), October 
1995. 
Reiersen, L.-O. (1996), Executive Director, AMAP Secretariat, Oslo, Interview, 
June 1996. 
Rouhinen, S. (1996), Finnish Representative to TFSDU, Ministry of the 
Environment, Helsinki,Interview, March 1996. 
Senseney, R. (1996), U.S. SAAO, State Department, Washington DC, 
Interview, 
February 1996.  
Simon, M. (1996), Canadian Arctic Ambassador, Ottawa, Interview, January 
1996.  
Skåre, M. (1996), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legal Adviser, Oslo, Interview, 
June 
1996. 
Snider, A. (1996), AEPS Secretariat, Environment Canada, Hull, Interview, 
January 
1996. 
Sondergård, J. (1996), Greenlandic Home Rule Office, Copenhagen, Interview, 
June 
1996.  
Torikka, R. (1996), Sami Representative to CAFF, Interview, April 1996. 
Whitby, L. (1996), Canadian SAAO and Chair of the TFSDU, Environment 
Canada, 
Ottawa, Interview, January 1996. 
    Bibliography 143 
 
 
Wohl, P. (1996), Northern Forum Secretariat, Environmental Health and 
Emergency 
Response, Anchorage, Interview, February 1996. 
 
Published Documents and Literature 
 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (1972),  Stockholm, Sweden, 5-16 June 1972. 
Adler, E. and Haas, P.M. (1992), ‘Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World  
Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program’, International 
Organization, vol. 46, 1, pp.367-390. 
Alia, V. (1991), ‘Aboriginal Perestroika’, Arctic Circle, vol.2, 3, pp.23-29. 
Alkuperäiskansat mukana arktisten alueiden ympäristökonferenssissa 
(1991),  Pohjolan Sanomat, 12.6.1991 
Alkuperäiskansojen yhteistyö tiivistynyt arktisessa ympäristönsuojelussa 
(1991),  Uusi Suomi, 12.6.1991. 
AMAP (1993a), Report to Ministers on Issues of Concern to the Arctic Environ-
ment, Including Recommendations for Action. A Report from the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Task Force (AMATF),  AMAP Report 93:4, 
AMAP, Oslo. 
AMAP (1993b), Audit report: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 
 AMAP Report 93:5, AMAP, Oslo.   
AMAP (1995), Guidelines for the AMAP Assessment, AMAP Report 95:1, 
AMAP, 
 Oslo. 
AMAP (1996),  Minutes from the Fourth Meeting of Assessment Steering 
Group 
(ASG) of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Winnipeg, 
Ontario, Canada, April 14-18, 1996, AMAP Report 1996:1, AMAP, Oslo. 
AMAP (1997), Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment 
Report, 
 AMAP, Oslo. 
AMEC (1997), Information Kit. 
Andresen S., Skodvin T., Underdal A. and Wettestad J. (1994), 'Scientific' 
Manage- 
ment of the Environment? Science, Politics and Institutional Design, 
CICERO Working Paper 94, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
Andresen, S. and Wettestad, J. (1995), ‘International Problem-Solving 
Effectiveness. The Oslo Project So Far’,  International Environmental 
Affairs, vol.7, 2, pp.127-149. 
Archer, C. (1988), The Soviet Union and Northern Waters, Routledge, London 
and New York. 
144 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Archer, C. and Scrivener, D. (eds) (1989), Northern Waters. Security and 
Resource 
 Issues, Croom Helm, London and Sydney. 
Arctic Council Panel (1991), To Establish Arctic Council,  CARC, Ottawa.  
Arnold, R.D. (1976), Alaska Native Land Claims,  The Alaska Native 
Foundation, 
Anchorage. 
Ashley, R.K. (1986), ‘The Poverty of Neoralism’, in R.O. Keohane (ed.), 
Neo-realism  and Its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 
pp.255-300. 
Assies, W.J. (1994),  ‘Self-Determination and the 'New Partnership'’, in W.J. 
Assies and A.J. Hoekama (eds), Indigenous Peoples Experiences with 
Self-Government. Proceedings of the Seminar on Arrangements for Self-
Determination by Indigenous Peoples within National States, 10 and 11 
February 1994, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, IWGIA 
Document 76,  IWGIA, Copenhagen, pp.31-72. 
Austin, J.L. (1962), How to Do Things with Words, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge.  
Barkin, S.J. and Cronin, B. (1994) , ‘The State and the Nation: Changing 
Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations’,  
International Organization, vol.48, 1, pp.107-130. 
Bartelson, J. (1995),  A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge University 
Press, 
Cambridge. 
Barth, F. (1969), ‘Introduction’, in F. Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries: 
The Social Organization of Cultural Difference, Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, pp. 9-38. 
Bauman, Z. (1993), Postmodern Ethics,  Blackwell, Oxford. 
Beach, H. (1994), ‘The Saami of Lapland’, in Polar Peoples: Self-
Determination and Development, Minority Rights Group, London, 
pp.147-205. 
Behnke, A. (1993), Structuration, Institutions and Regimes. The Case of the 
 CSBM, Stockholm International Studies 93:1, Stockholms Universitet, 
Stockholm. 
Behnke, A. (1995), ‘Ten Years After: The State of the Art of Regime Theory’, 
Co-operation and Conflict, vol.30, 2, pp.179-197. 
Bell, R.K. (1994), ‘Indigenous Knowledge, Sustainable Development and 
Cooperative Management (The FJMC Experience)’, in B.V. Hansen (ed.), 
 Arctic Environment. Report on the Seminar on Integration of Indigenous 
Peoples Knowledge. Reykjavik, Iceland, September 1994, AEPS, 
Copenhagen, pp.186-201. 
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1966), The Social Construction of Reality. A 
    Bibliography 145 
 
 
 Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge,  Doubleday & Co, New York. 
Bergesen, H.O., Moe, A. and Ostreng, W. (1987),  Soviet Oil and Security 
Interests 
in the Barents Sea, Pinter, London. 
Bernauer, T. (1995), ‘The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: 
How 
We Might Learn More’, International Organization, vol.49, 2, pp.351-377. 
Bernes, C. (1996), Arktisk miljö i Norden - orörd, exploaterad, förorenad? 
 NORD 1996:21, Nordiska ministerrådet och Naturvårdsverket, 
Växjö. 
Björklund, C. (1995), A Comparison of the Legal Environmental Regimes in the 
Arctic and the Antarctica, in V.G. Martin and N. Tyler (eds), Arctic Wilder-
ness. The  5th World Wilderness Congress, Tromsø, 27th September-1st 
October, 1993, North American Press, Golden, pp.139-147. 
Bloom, W. (1990),  Personal Identity, National Identity and International Rela- 
tions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Bonham, G.M., Jönsson, C., Persson, S. and  S. Shapiro M.J. (1987), 
‘Cognition and 
International Negotiation: The Historical Discovery of Discursive Space’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol. XXII, 1, pp.1-19. 
Borgos J. (1993), ‘Tradisjonell Samisk Kunnskap og Forskning’,  Diedut,  5,  
pp.7- 
21. 
Boyle, A. (1996), ‘The Role of International Human Rights Law in the 
Protection of 
the Environment’, in A.E. Boyle and M.R. Anderson (eds), Human Rights 
 Approches to Environmental Protection, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, pp.43- 
69. 
Brantenberg, O.T. (1991), ‘Norway: Constructing Indigenous Self-Government 
in a  
Nation-State’, in P. Jull and S. Roberts (eds), The Challenge of Northern 
Regions, Northern Territory, Australian National University, Darwin, 
pp.66-128.  
Breyman, S. (1993), ‘Knowledge as Power: Ecology Movements and Global 
Environmental Problems’, in R.D. Lipshutz and K. Conca (eds), The State 
and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics, Columbia University 
Press, New York, pp.124-157. 
Brock, L. (1991), ‘Peace Through Parks: The Environment of the Peace 
Research  
Agenda’,  Journal of Peace Research, vol.28, 4, pp.407-423. 
Bromley, D.W. (1991), Environment and Economy. Property Rights and Public 
Policy, Blackwell, Oxford. 
146 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Bröms, P., Eriksson J. and Svensson, B. (1994), Reconstructing Survival. 
Evolving 
Perspectives on Euro-Arctic Politics, Fritzen, Stockholm. 
Bröms, P. (1995), Environmental Security Regimes: A Critical Approach, Re-
search Report 23, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 
Stockholm. 
Bröms, P. (1997), Crossing the Threshols: The Forming of an Environmental  
Security Regime in the Arctic North, Research Report 28, The Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm.  
Brooke, L.F. (1993), The Participation of Indigenous Peoples and the 
Application 
of their Environmental and Ecological Knowledge in the Arctic Environ- 
mental Protection Strategy, vol. 1,  ICC, Ottawa. 
Brown, C. (1995), ‘International Theory and International Society. The Viability 
of the Middle Way?’, Review of International Studies, vol.21, 2, pp.183-
196. 
Brown, S., Cornell N.W., Fabian L.L., and Weiss, E.B. (1977), Regimes for the 
Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather, The Brookings Institution, Washington 
D.C. 
Bull, H. (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,   
Columbia University Press, New York. 
Caldwell, L.K. (1990a),  International Environmental Policy. Emergence and 
Dimensions, Duke University Press, Durham and London. 
Caldwell, L.K. (1990b), Between Two Worlds. Science, the Environmental 
Move- 
ment, and Policy Choice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Camilleri, J.A. and Falk, J. (1992), The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a 
 Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 
Caporaso, J.A. (1993),  ‘Toward a Sociology of International Institutions: Com-
ments on the Articles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jönsson’,  
International Social Science Journal, vol.138, pp.479-489. 
Caputo, J. and Yount, M. (1993), ‘Institutions, Normalization and Power’, in J. 
Caputo and M. Yount (eds) Foucault and the Critique of Institutions,  
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, pp.3-23. 
Carr, E.H. (1949), The Moral Foundations for World Order, The University of 
 Denver Press. 
Carr, E.H. (1951), Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the 
Study 
of  International Relations, MacMillan & Co, London. 
Castberg, R., Stokke, O.S., and Ostreng, W. (1994),  ‘The Dynamics of the 
Barents 
Region’, in O.S. Stokke and O. Tunander (eds), The Barents Region. 
Cooperation in the Arctic, Sage, London, pp.71-83. 
    Bibliography 147 
 
 
Choucri, N. (1993),  ‘Introduction: Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Perspecti-
ve’, 
in N. Choucri (ed.), Global Accord. Environmental Challenges and Interna-
tional Responses,  MIT Press, Cambridge, pp.1-40 
Clark, M.I. and Dryzek, J. (1987),  ‘The Inuit Circumpolar Conference as an 
Interna- 
tional Nongovernmental Actor’, in M. Stenbaek (ed.), Arctic Policy, Papers 
Presented at the Arctic Policy Conference, September 19-21, 1985, 
Centre for Northern Studies and Research in Conjunction with the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference and the Eben Hobson Chair, Centre for Northern 
Studies and Research, McGill University, Montréal, pp.215-230.  
Clegg, S.R. (1989), Frameworks of Power,  Sage, London. 
Colby, M. (1990), Environmental Management in Development. The Evolution 
of 
Paradigms, World Bank Discussion Paper 80, World Bank, Washington 
D.C.. 
Conca, K. (1994),  ‘In the Name of Sustainability: Peace Studies and Environ-
mental 
Discourse’, in. J. Käkönen (ed.), Green Security or Militarized Environ-
ment, Dartmouth, Aldershot, pp.7-24. 
Cortell, A.P. and Davis, J.W. Jr. (1996),  ‘How Do International Institutions 
Matter? 
The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms’, International 
Studies Quarterly, vol.40,4, pp.451-478. 
Creery, I. (1994),  ‘The Inuit (Eskimo) of Canada’, in Polar Peoples: Self-
Determi- 
nation and Development, Minority Rights Group, London, pp.105-146. 
Czempiel, E-O. and Rosenau, J.N. (1989), Global Changes and Theoretical 
Chal- 
lenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, Lexington Books, 
Lexington. 
Dahl, J. (1993),  ‘Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic’, in Arctic Challenges, in 
Arctic 
Challenges, Report from the Nordic Council's Parliamentary Conference 
in Reykjavik, 16-17 August, 1993, NORD 1993:31, Nordic Council, 
Stockholm, pp. 103-127. 
Dahl, J. (1996),  ‘Arctic Peoples, Their Lands and Territories’, in I. Seurujärvi-
Kari 
and U-M. Kulonen (ed.), Essays on Indigenous Identity and Rights,  
Helsinki University Press, Helsinki, pp.15-31. 
Dalby, S. (1992),  ‘Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold 
War 
Security Discourse’,  Alternatives, vol.17, 1, pp.95-134. 
148 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Dallman, W. (1994),  ‘Kulturer ved Kanten av Stupet. Urbefolkninger i de 
russiske og sibirske norområdene’, in Polarboken 1993-94, Norsk 
Polarklubb, Oslo, pp.44-62. 
Davis, R.A., Richardson W.J., Thiele, L., Dietz, R. and Johansen, P. (1991),  
‘Report 
on Underwater Noise’, in The State of the Arctic Environment Report, 
Arctic 
Centre Publications 2, Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi, pp.154-269. 
Dellenbrant, J-Å. and Olsson, M-O. (1994), The Barents Region. Security and 
Economic Development in the European North, CERUM, Umeå. 
Deudney, D. (1990),  ‘The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation 
and 
National Security’, Millennium, vol.19,  3, pp.461-476. 
Dillon, M. (1995),  ‘Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of 
the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problems of the World Order’,  
Alternatives, vol. 20, 3, pp.323-368. 
Dosman, E. (1989), Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic, Routledge, London 
and  
New York. 
Douglas, M. and Wildavsky A. (1983), Risk and Culture. An Essay on the 
Selection 
of Technological and Environmental Dangers, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, LA and London. 
Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. (1982), Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism 
and 
Hermeneutics,  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Dryzek, J. S. (1987), Rational Ecology. Environment and Political Economy,  
Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Dryzek, J.S. (1990), Discursive Democracy. Politics, Policy, and Political 
Science, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Dryzek, J.S. (1997), The Politics of the Earth. Environmental Discourses, 
Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Dunne, T. (1995a),  ‘The Social Construction of International Society’, 
European 
Journal of International Relations, vol.1, 3, pp.367-389. 
Dunne, T. (1995b),  ‘International Society. Theoretical Promises Fulfilled?’, Co-
operation and Conflict, vol.30, 2, pp.125-154. 
The Earth Summit (1993), The United Nations Conference on Environment 
and 
Development (UNCED), Introduction and Commentary by Stanley P. 
Johnson Graham&Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, Boston and Dordrecht. 
    Bibliography 149 
 
 
Eckersley, R. (1992), Environmentalism and Political Theory. Towards an 
Ecocentric Approach, UCL Press, London. 
Eidheim, H. (1995),  ‘On the Organisation of Knowledge in Sami Ethno-
Politics’, in T. Brantenberg, J. Hansen and H. Minde (eds), Becoming 
Visible. Indigenous Politics and Self-Government, Proceedings of the 
Conference on Indigenous Politics and Self-Government in Tromsø, 8-10 
November 1993,  The University of Tromsø, Centre for Sami Studies, 
Tromsø, pp.73-78. 
Elliott, L.M. (1994), International Environmental Politics. Protecting the Antarc-
tic. St. Martin's Press, Houndmills. 
Faegteborg, M. (1993), Towards an International Indigenous Arctic Policy 
(Arctic 
Leaders Summit), Arctic Information Forlag, Copenhagen. 
Fairclough, N. (1992), Discourse and Social Change, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Fay, B. (1987),  ‘An Alternative View: Interpretive Social Science’, in M.T. 
Gibbons  
(ed.), Interpreting Politics, Blackwell, Oxford, pp.82-100. 
Fienup-Riordan, A. (1992),  ‘One Mind, Many Paths: Yup'ik Eskimo Efforts to 
Control Their Future’,  Etudes/Inuit/Studies, vol.16, 1-2, pp.75-83. 
Finkelstein, L.S. (1995),  ‘What is Global Governance’, Global Governance, 
vol.1, 
1,  pp.367-372. 
Finnemore, M. (1996),  ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from 
Sociol- ogy's Institutionalism’, International Organization, vol.50, 2, 
pp.325-347. 
Flanders, N.E. (1989),  ‘The ANCSA Amendments of 1987 and Land 
Management in Alaska’,  Polar Record, vol.25, 155,  pp.315-322. 
Fleras, A. and Elliott, J.L. (1992), The  ‘Nations Within’. Aboriginal-State Rela-
tionship in Canada, the United States and New Zealand, Oxford University 
Press, Ottawa. 
Florini, A. (1996),  ‘The Evolution of International Norms’, International Studies 
Quarterly, vol.40, 3, pp.363-389. 
Fondahl, G. (1995),  ‘The Status of Indigenous Peoples in the Russian North’,  
Post- 
Soviet Geography, vol.36, 4, pp.215-224.   
Foucault, M. (1970), The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sci- 
ences.Tavistock Publications, London. 
Foucault, M. (1972), Archaeology of Knowledge, Tavistock Publications, 
London. 
Foucault, M. (1977),  ‘Nietzche, Genealogy, History’, in D.F. Bouchard (ed.),  
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, 
Blackwell, London, pp.139-164. 
150 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Foucault, M. (1980a),  ‘Two Lectures’,  in  Power/Knowledge. Selected 
Interviews 
and Other Writings 1972-1977, Harvester Press, Brighton, pp.78-108. 
Foucault, M. (1980b),  ‘Afterword’,  in Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews 
and 
Other Writings 1972-1977,  Harvester Press, Brighton, pp.229-259. 
Foucault, M. (1980c),  ‘Questions on Geography’,  in  Power/Knowledge. 
Selected  
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Harvester Press, Brighton, pp. 
63- 
77. 
Foucault, M. (1982a),  ‘Afterword. Subject and Power’, in H.L. Dreyfus and 
P.
  
Rabinow (eds), Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
 The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.208-226. 
Foucault, M. (1982b),  ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in 
Prog- 
ress’, in H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds), Michel Foucault. Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, pp.229-252. 
Foucault, M. (1984a),  ‘Introduction’, in M. Foucault,  The Foucault Reader (ed. 
by 
Paul Rabinow), Pantheon Books, New York, pp.3-29. 
Foucault, M. (1984b),  ‘Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume II’, in M. 
Fou- 
cault, The Foucault Reader (ed. by Paul Rabinow),  Pantheon Books, New 
York, pp 333-339. 
Foucault, M. (1984c), ‘What is Enlightenment’, in M. Foucault, The Foucault 
Reader (ed. by Paul Rabinow),  Pantheon Books, New York, pp.32-50. 
Foucault, M. (1988a),  ‘Practicing Criticism’, in L.D. Kritzman (ed.), Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984), Routledg-
e, London and New York, pp.152-156.  
Foucault, M. (1988b),  ‘Introduction’ in L.D. Kritzman (ed.), Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, Routledge, London and 
New York, pp.ix-xxv.  
Foucault, M. (1991a),  ‘Questions of Method’,  in  G. Burchell, C. Gordon and 
P.  
Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality. With two 
Lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.73-86. 
Foucault, M. (1991b),  ‘Governmentality’, in  G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. 
Miller 
    Bibliography 151 
 
 
(eds), The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality, With two Lectures 
by and an interview with Michel Foucault,  The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, pp.87-104. 
Foucault, M. (1991c),  ‘Politics and the Study of Discourse’, in  G. Burchell, C. 
Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect. Studies in Government-
ality. With two Lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault,  The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.53-72. 
Freeman, M.M.R. and Carbyn L.N. (1988), Traditional Knowledge and Renew-
able 
Resource Management in Northern Regions, A Joint Publication of the 
IUCN Commission on Ecology and the Boreal Institute for Northern 
Studies, Occasional Publication 23, Boreal Institute for Northern Studies. 
Freeman, M.M.R. (1992),  ‘Ethnoscience and Arctic Co-operation’, in F. 
Griffiths 
(ed.), Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North, 
Canadian Papers in Peace Studies no. 3, Science for Peace and Samuel 
Stevens, Toronto, pp.79-93. 
Futsaeter, G., Eidnes, G., Halmo, G., Johansen, S., Mannvik, H.P., Sydnes 
L.K., and 
Witte, U. (1991),  ‘Report on Oil Pollution’, in The State of the Arctic Envi-
ronment Report, Arctic Centre Publications 2, Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi, 
pp.270-334. 
Gehring, T. (1994), Dynamic International Regimes. Institutions for 
International 
Environmental Governance, Peter Land, Frankfurt am Main.  
Gorbachev [Gorbatsov], M. (1987),  ‘Mihail Gorbatsovin puhe Murmanskissa’, 
So-sialismin teoria ja käytäntö, 994, 15.10.1987, pp.1-24. 
Gordon, C. (1991),  ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’, in G. Burchell, 
C. 
Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect. Studies in 
Governmentality. With two Lectures by and an interview with Michel 
Foucault,  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.1-52. 
Griffiths, F. (1988),  ‘Introduction: The Arctic as an International Political 
Region’, in K. Möttölä (ed.), The Arctic Challenge. Nordic and Canadian 
Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International 
Region, West- 
view Press, Boulder and London, pp.1-14. 
Griffiths, F. and Young, O.R. (1989), Sustainable Development and the Arctic. 
Impressions of the Co-Chairs, Working Group on Arctic International Rela-
tions, Second Session, Ilulissat and Nuuk, Greenland 20-24 April, 1989, 
Report and Papers 1989-1. 
Griffiths, F. (1992),  ‘Epilogue: Civility in the Arctic’, in F. Griffiths (ed.), Arctic 
152 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North, Canadian 
Papers in Peace Studies no. 3, Science for Peace and Samuel Stevens, 
Toronto, pp.279-309. 
Grubb, M. et al. (1993), The  ‘Earth Summit’ Agreements: A Guide and 
Assess- 
ment. An Analysis of the Rio '92 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development,  Earthscan, London. 
Haas, E.B. (1975), ‘Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, 
Inter- 
      dependence, and the Construction of International Regimes’, International 
 Organization, vol.29, 3, pp.827-876.  
Haas E.B., Williams M.P. and Babai D. (1977), Scientists and World Order. 
The 
Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Relations, University of Cali-
fornia Press, Berkeley. 
Haas, E.B. (1980), ‘Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International 
Regimes’, 
World Politics, vol. 32, 3, pp.357-405. 
Haas, E.B. (1990), When Knowledge Is Power. Three Models of Change in 
Inter- 
national Organizations, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Haas, P.M. (1992a), ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy 
Coordination’, International Organization, vol.46, 1, pp.1-35. 
Haas, P.M. (1992b), ‘Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Efforts to 
Protect 
 Stratospheric Ozone’, International Organization, vol.46, 1, pp.187-224. 
Haggard, S. and Simmons, B. (1987), ‘Theories of International Regimes’, 
Interna- 
tional Organization, vol. 41, 3, pp. 491-517. 
Hansen, B.V. (ed.) (1994), AEPS and Indigenous Peoples Knowledge. Report 
on 
Seminar on Integration of Indigenous Peoples Knowledge, Arctic Environ-
mental Protection Strategy, Reykjavik, September 20-23, 1994. 
Hansen, J.R., Hansson, R. and Norris, S. (eds) (1996), The State of the Euro-
pean 
Arctic Environment, EEA Environmental Monograph No. 3,  European 
Environ 
ment Agency and Norwegian Polar Institute, Copenhagen. 
Harris, R. (1988), Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein. How to Play Games 
with 
Words, Routledge, London and New York. 
    Bibliography 153 
 
 
Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P. and Rittberger, V. (1996), ‘Interests, Power, Know-
ledge:  
The Study of International Regimes’, Mershon International Studies 
Review, vol. 40, suppplement 2,  pp.177-228. 
Heath, M. (1994), ‘Birdlife International: Observer Presentation’, in CAFF 
Interna- 
tional Working Group Proceedings, Third Annual Meeting, Reykjavik, 
Iceland, September 26-28, 1994, CAFF, pp.95-101. 
Heininen, L. (1991), Sotilaallisen läsnäolon riskit Arktiksessa: kohti Arktiksen 
säätelyjärjestelmää, Tutkimuksia 43, Tampere Peace Research Institute, 
Tampere.  
Hekman, S.J. (1995), Moral Voices, Morals Selves. Carol Gilligan and Feminist 
Moral Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Helander, E. (1993), ‘The Role of Sami Tradition in Sustainable Development’, 
in J. 
Käkönen (ed.), Politics and Sustainable Growth in the Arctic,  Dartmouth, 
Aldershot, pp.67-80. 
Helander, E. (ed)  (1996), Awakened Voice. The Return of Sami Knowledge, 
Diedut 4. 
Hettne, B. (1994), The Globalization of Development Theory and the Future of 
Development Strategies, Padrigu Papers, Göteborg. 
Hinsley, F.H. (1986), Sovereignty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Hjelmar, U. (1996), ‘Constructivist Analysis and Movement Organizations: 
Concep- 
tual Clarifications’,  Acta Sociologica, vol.39, 2, pp.169-186. 
Hjorth, R. (1992), Building International Institutions for Environmental Protec- 
tion. The Case of Baltic Sea Environmental Cooperation,  Linköping Univer-
sity, Motala. 
Hoel, A.H., Karlsen, G.R. and Breivik, A. (1993), ‘Resources, Development and  
Environment in the Arctic’, in Arctic Challenges, Report from the Nordic 
Coun- 
cil’s Parliamentary Conference in Reykjavik, 16-17 August 1993, NORD 
1993:31, Nordic Council, Stockholm, pp.65-100. 
Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1991), Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Huitfeldt T., Ries T., and Øyna, G. (1992), Strategic Interests in the Arctic, 
 Forvarsstudies 4, Institutt for Forvarsstudies, Oslo. 
Hunt A. and Wickham, G. (1994), Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of 
Law 
as Governance,  Pluto Press, London. 
Huntington, H.P. (1994), ‘Traditional Ecological Knowledge of Beluga Whales: 
A 
154 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Pilot Project in the Chuckchi and Northern Bering Seas’, in B.V. Hansen 
(ed.), 
Arctic Environment. Report on the Seminar on Integration of Indigenous 
Peoples Knowledge, Reykjavik, Iceland, September 1994,  AEPS, 
Copenhagen, 
 pp.86-106. 
Hurrell, A. (1993), ‘International Society and the the Study of Regimes. A 
Reflec- 
tive Approach’, in V. Rittberger with assistance of Peter Mayer (ed.), 
Regime Theory and International Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.49-
72. 
Hurrell, A. (1995), ‘Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World 
Politics’, 
Review of International Studies, vol. 21, 4, pp.331-358. 
Hurst, R. (1994), ‘Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilisation’, in 
B.V. 
Hansen (ed.), Arctic Environment. Report on the Seminar on Integration of 
Indigenous Peoples Knowledge, Reykjavik, Iceland, September 1994, 
AEPS, Copenhagen, pp.121-129.  
Hurwich, E. (1994), ‘Circumpolar Conservation Union: Observer Presentation’ , 
in  
CAFF International Working Group Proceedings, Third Annual Meeting, 
Reykjavik, Iceland, September 26-28, 1994, CAFF, pp.103-104. 
IASC Founding Articles (1990), IASC, Oslo. 
IASC Council Meeting (1991), Report, IASC, Oslo. 
IASC Council Meeting (1992), Report, IASC, Oslo. 
IASC Council Meeting (1993), Report, IASC, Oslo. 
IASC Council Meeting (1994), Report, IASC, Oslo. 
IASC Council Meeting (1995), Report, IASC, Oslo. 
IASC Meeting (1996), Report,  IASC, Oslo. 
ILO Convention 169 Concerning  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent 
Countries (1989), in E. Gayuim, The UN Draft Declaration on Indigenous  
Peoples. Assessment of the Draft Prepared by the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations,  Juridica Lapponica 13,  Institute of Northern 
Environmental and Minority Law, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, pp.98-
114. 
Indigenous Peoples of the Soviet North (1990),  IWGIA Document 67, IWGIA, 
 Copenhagen.  
Inglis, J.T. (1993), Traditional Ecological Knowledge. Concepts and Cases, 
International Program on Traditional Ecological Knowledge and 
International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa. 
    Bibliography 155 
 
 
IPS Information (1996), Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, Copenhagen. 
James, A. (1986), The Sovereign Statehood. The Basis of International 
Society, 
Allen & Unwin, London. 
Järvikoski, T. (1996), ‘The Relation of Nature and Society in Marx and Durkhe-
im’, 
 Acta Sociologica, vol.39, 1, pp.73-86.  
Jensen, J. (1991), ‘Report on Organochlorines’, in The State of the Arctic 
Environ- 
ment Report, Arctic Centre Publications 2,Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi, 
pp.335-384. 
Jönsson, C. (ed.) (1982), Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics, Pinter, 
 London. 
Jönsson, C. (1993), ‘Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics’, in V. Rittberger 
with 
assistance of Peter Mayer (ed.), Regime Theory and International Theory. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.202-222. 
Kaitala, S. (1994), ‘World Conservation Monitoring  Centre: Observer 
Presenta- 
tion’, in CAFF International Working Group Proceedings, Third Annual 
Meeting, Reykjavik, Iceland, September 26-28, 1994, CAFF, pp.91-92. 
Käkönen, J. (1996), ‘North Calotte as a Political Actor’, in J. Käkönen (ed.), 
Dreaming of Barents Region. Interpreting Cooperation in the Euro-Arctic 
Rim, Research Report 73, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, 
pp.55-88. 
Kalland, A. (1994), ‘Indigenous Knowledge - Local Knowledge. Prospects and 
Limitations’, in B.V. Hansen (ed.), Arctic Environment. Report on the 
Seminar 
on Integration of Indigenous Peoples Knowledge, Reykjavik, Iceland, 
Septem- 
ber 1994,  AEPS, Copenhagen, pp.150-167. 
Kasayulie, W. (1992), ‘The Self-Determination Movement of the Yupiit in 
Southern 
Alaska’,  Etudes/Inuit/Studies, vol.16, 1-2, pp.43-45. 
Keeley, J.F. (1990), ‘Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes’, 
International Organization, vol.44, 1, pp.83-105.  
Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. Jr. (1977), Power and Interdependence. World 
 Politics in Transition, Little, Brown & Co.,  Boston and Toronto. 
Keohane, R.O. (1982), ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, International 
Organization, vol.36, 2,  pp.325-355. 
Keohane, R.O. (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 
156 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Keohane, R.O. (1988), ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, 
International 
Studies Quaterly, vol.32, 4, pp.379-396. 
Keohane, R. O. (1989), International Institutions and State Power. Essays in
 International Relations Theory, Westview Press, Boulder. 
                   Keohane, R.O., Haas, P.M. and Levy, M.A. (1993), ‘The Effectiveness of Inter- 
national Environmental Institutions’ in P.M. Haas, R.O.Keohane and M.A. 
Levy (eds), Institutions for the Earth. Sources of Effective International 
Environmental Protection,  MIT, Cambridge, pp. 3-24. 
Kleivan, I. (1992), ‘The Arctic Peoples' Conference in Copenhagen, November 
22- 
23, 1973’,  Etudes/Inuit/Studies, vol.16, 1-2, pp.227-236. 
Klotz, A. (1995), ‘Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and 
U.S. 
Sanctions Against South Africa’, International Organization, vol.49, 3, 
pp.451- 
478. 
Korpijaakko-Labba, K. (1989), Saamelaisten oikeusasemasta Ruotsi-
Suomessa,  
Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, Helsinki. 
Korsmo, F. (1993), ‘Swedish Policy and Saami Rights’,  The Northern Review, 
vol. 
11,  pp.32-55. 
Koskenniemi, M. (1994), ‘Mitä kansainvälinen ympäristöoikeus on? Ajatuksia 
ympäristönsuojelun kansainvälisistä strategioista’, in. E.J. Hollo and J.K. 
Park- 
kari (eds), Kansainvälinen ympäristöoikeus, Gummerus, Jyväskylä. 
Krasner, S.D. (1982), ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as  
Intervening Variables’, International Organization, vol.36, 2, pp.185-205. 
Krasner, S.D. (1985), Structural Conflict. The Third World Against Global 
Liberalism,University of California Press, Los Angeles and London. 
Krasner, S.D. (1989), ‘Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective’, in J.A. Capor-
aso 
(ed.), The Elusive State. International and Comparative Perspectives, 
Sage, Newbury Park, pp.69-96. 
Kratochwil, F. (1984), ‘The Force of Prescriptions’, International Organization, 
vol. 38, 4, pp.685-708. 
Kratochwil, F. and Ruggie, J.G. (1986), ‘International Organization: A  State of 
the 
 Art or an Art of the State’, International Organization, vol.40, 4, pp.753-775. 
Kratochwil, F.V. (1989), Rules, Norms and Decisions. On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Affairs and Domestic Affairs,  
    Bibliography 157 
 
 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Kullerud, L. (1994), ‘Global Resources information Database-(GRID)- Arendal’, 
in CAFF International Working Group Proceedings, Third Annual Meeting, 
Reykjavik, Iceland. September 26-28, 1994, CAFF, pp.92-93. 
Langlais, R. (1995), Reformulating Security. A Case Study from Arctic Canada, 
Humanekologiska Skrifter 13, Göteborg Universitet, Göteborg. 
Larsen, F.B. (1992), ‘The Quiet Life of a Revolution: Greenlandic Home Rule  
1979-1992’, Etudes/Inuit/ Studies, vol.16, 1, pp.199-226. 
Lauritzen, P. (1983), Oil and Amulets. Inuit: A People at the Top of the World 
(ed. 
R.E. Bouchler),  Breakwater Books, Canada.  
Lemert, C.C. and Gillan, G. (1982), Michel Foucault. Social Theory and Trans- 
gression, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Levy, M.A. (1993), ‘Political Science and the Question of Effectiveness of 
Interna- 
tional Environmental Institutions’,  International Challenges, vol.13,  2, 
pp.17-35. 
Levy, M.A., Young O.R. and Zürn, M. (1995), ‘The Study of International 
Regimes’, 
 European Journal of International Relations,vol.1, 3, pp.267-330. 
Litfin, K. (1994), Ozone Discourses. Science and Politics in Global Environ-
men-  
tal Cooperation, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Lynch, C. (1994), ‘E.H. Carr, International Relations Theory, and the Societal 
Ori- 
gins of International Legal Norms’,  International Organization, vol. 23, 3,
 pp.589-619. 
Lynge, A. (1992), ‘Declaration of the ICC - Inuit Circumpolar Conference’,  
IWGIA 
 Newsletter, 1, pp.7-9. 
Lynge, F. (1992), Arctic Wars, Animal Rights and Endangered Peoples, 
University 
 Press of New England, Hanover. 
McCormick, J. (1989), Reclaiming Paradise. The Global Environmental Move- 
ment, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis. 
McKinlay, R.D. and Little, R. (1986), Global Problems and World Order,  
Pinter,  
London. 
McNay, L. (1992), Foucault and Feminism, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Mähönen, O. (1997b), Background Information on Arctic Environmental 
Cooper- 
ation and the Environmental Policy of the European Union, Ympäristömi- 
nisteriön moniste 18, Ympäristöministeriö, Helsinki. 
158 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Mayall, J. (1990), Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Melnikov, S.A. (1991), ‘Report on Heavy Metals’, in The State of the Arctic 
Environment Report, Arctic Centre Publications 2,  Arctic Centre, 
Rovaniemi, pp.82-153. 
Merchant, C. (1980), The Death of Nature. Women, Ecology and the Scientific 
Revolution, Harper & Row, San Francisco. 
                               Mersheimer J.J. 1994-95), ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, 
Inter- 
national Security, vol.19, 3, pp.5-49. 
Milner, H. (1991), ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in IR Theory: A Critique’, 
Review 
of  International Studies, vol.17, 1, pp.76-85. 
Milner, H. (1992), ‘International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations:  
Strengths and Weaknesses’,  World Politics, vol.44, 3, pp.466-496. 
Milner, H. (1993), ‘International Regimes and World Politics: Comments on the 
Arcticles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jönsson’,  International Social 
Science 
Journal, vol.138,  pp.491-497. 
Minde, H. (1995), ‘The International Movement of Indigenous Peoples: An 
Histori- 
cal Perspective’, in T. Brantenberg, J. Hansen and H. Minde (eds), 
Becoming Visible. Indigenous Politics and Self-Government, Proceedings 
of the Conference on Indigenous Politics and Self-Government in Tromsø, 
8-10 November 1993, University of Tromsø, Centre for Sami Studies, 
Tromsø, pp.9-26. 
Morehouse, T. (1989), ‘Sovereignty, Tribal Government, and  the Alaska 
Native 
Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987’, Polar Record, vol.25, 154, 
pp.197-206. 
Möttölä, K. (ed.) (1988), The Arctic Challenge. Nordic and Canadian 
Approaches 
to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region, Westview 
Press, Boulder and London. 
Myerson, G. and Rydin, Y. (1996), The Language of Environment. A New 
Rhetoric, 
 UCL Press, London.  
Myntti, K. (1995), ‘The Right to Political Participation of Indigenous Peoples. 
The 
Case of the Finnish Sami’,  in E. Gayim and K. Myntti (eds), Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Rights 1993 and After, Juridica Lapponica 11, Northern 
Institute 
    Bibliography 159 
 
 
of Environmental and Minority Law, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 
pp.130- 
168. 
Myntti, K. (1996), ‘National Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Various Modes 
of  
Political Participation’, in F. Horn (ed.), Minorities and their Right of Political  
Participation, Juridica Lapponica 16,  Northern Institute of  Environmental 
and 
Minority Law, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, pp.1-26. 
Nenonen, M. (1991), ‘Report on Acidification in the Arctic Countries: Man-
made 
Acidification in a World of Natural Extremes’, in The State of the Arctic Envi- 
ronment Report, Arctic Centre Publications 2, Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi, 
 pp.7-81. 
Nettheim, G. (1988), ‘Peoples and Populations: Indigenous Peoples and the 
Rights 
of Peoples’, in J. Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peoples,  Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, pp.107-126. 
Neufeld, M. (1995), The Restructuring of International Relations Theory, Cam- 
bridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Neumann, I.B. (1994), ‘A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe’, 
Review 
of International Studies, vol.20, 1,  pp.53-74. 
Nilson, H. R. (1996), ‘Environmental Factors in Multilateral Cooperation  - 
Euro- 
peanization of the Barents Region and the Organization of Environmental 
Co- operation’, in J. Käkönen (ed.), Dreaming of the Barents Region. 
Interpreting Cooperation in the Euro-Arctic Rim, Research Report no. 73, 
Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, pp.251-295.  
Nilson, H.R. (1997), Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS): Process  
and Organization 1991-1997. An Assessment, Rapportserie No. 103, 
Norwe- 
gian Polar Institute, Oslo. 
Nokkala, A. (1997) (ed.), The European North - Challenges and Opportunities. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki. 
Northern Contaminants Program (1997), Canadian Arctic Contaminants 
Assess- 
ment Report, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Ottawa 
Nunavut Agreement (1993), Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut 
Settle- 
ment Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Indian and 
Northern 
Affairs, Ottawa. 
160 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Nuttall, M. (1992), Arctic Homeland. Kinship, Community and Development in 
Northwest Greenland, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 
The Nuuk Conclusions and Recommendations on Indigenous Autonomy and 
Self- 
Government (1991), IWGIA Newsletter, 2, pp.9-20. 
O’Meara, R.l. (1984), ‘Regimes and their Implications for International Theory’,  
Millennium, vol.13, 3, pp.245-264. 
Onuf, N.G. (1989), World of Our Making. Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 
South Carolina. 
Onuf, N.G. (1995),  ‘Levels’, European Journal of International Relations,  
vol.1, 
 1, pp.35-58. 
Oreskov, C. and Seijersen, F. (1993),  ‘Arctic: The Attack on Inuit Whale 
Hunting by  
Animal Rights Groups’,  IWGIA Newsletter, 3, pp.10-16. 
Osherenko, G. and Young, O.R. (1993), ‘The Formation of International 
Regimes: 
 Hypotheses and Cases’, in Young, O.R. and Osherenko, G. (eds) (1993), 
Polar  
Politics. Creating International Environmental Regimes, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, pp.1-21. 
Osherenko, G. and Young O.R. (1989), The Age of the Arctic. Hot Conflicts 
and 
Cold Realities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Osherenko, G. (1995),  ‘Property Rights and Transformation in Russia: Institu-
tional 
Change in the Far North’,  Europe-Asia Studies, vol.47, 7, pp.1077-1108. 
Paakkola, O. (1991),  ‘Report on Radioactivity in the Arctic Region’ , in The 
State 
of the Arctic Environment Report, Arctic Centre Publications 2, Arctic 
Centre, 
Rovaniemi, pp.385-405. 
PAME  (1996), Report to the Third Ministerial Conference on the Protection of 
 the Arctic Environment, 20-21 March 1996, Inuvik Canada,  Ministry of the 
Environment, Oslo. 
Passmore, J. (1974), Man's Responsibility for Nature. Ecological Problems and  
Western Traditions, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 
Peltonen, M. (1992), Matala katse. Kirjoituksia mentaliteettien historiasta, 
Hanki 
ja jää, Tampere. 
Peluso, N.L. (1993),  ‘Coercive Conservation: The Politics of State Resource 
Con- 
    Bibliography 161 
 
 
trol’, in R.D. Lipshutz and K. Conca (eds), The State and Social Power in 
Global Environmental Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 
pp.46-70. 
Poelzer, G. (1995),  ‘Devolution, Constitutional Development and the Russian 
 North’, Post-Soviet Geography, vol.36, 4, pp.204-214. 
Porter, G. and Brown, J.W. (1991), Global Environmental Politics,  Westview
 Press, Boulder. 
Price, R.E. (1982), Legal Status of the Alaska Natives. Report to the Alaska 
State- 
hood Commission, Department of Law, State of Alaska. 
Princen, T. and Finger, M. (eds) (1994), Environmental NGOs in World Politics. 
 Linking  the Local and the Global, Routledge, London and New York. 
Princen, T. (1994),  ‘NGOs: Creating a Niche in Environmental Diplomacy’, in 
T.  
Princen and M. Finger (eds) (1994), Environmental NGOs in World Politics. 
Linking the Local and the Global, Routledge, London and New York, pp.29-
47 
Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy (1992), ICC. 
Prokosch, P. (1992),  ‘Working for the Arctic Wilderness’, in T. Greiffenberg 
(ed.), 
Sustainability in the Arctic, Proceedings from Nordic Arctic Research Forum 
Symposium, Aalborg University, Aalborg. 
Puchala, D.J. and Hopkins, R.F. (1982),  ‘International Regimes: Lessons from  
Inductive Analysis’, International Organization, vol.36, 2, pp.245-275. 
Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (1997), Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting 
the 
Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century, Ottawa. 
Ringold, P.L. (1994),  ‘The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program’, Arctic 
Research of the United States, 8, pp.101-104. 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), in The Earth 
Summit. 
The  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED),  
(Introduction and Commentary by Stanley P. Johnson),  
Graham&Trotman/Mar- 
tius Nijhoff, London, Boston and Dordrecht, pp.117-122. 
Rolston, H. III (1988), Environmental Ethics. Duties to and Values in the 
Natural 
World, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. 
Rood, J.Q.Th. (1989),  ‘The Functioning of Regimes in an Interdependent 
World’ in  
J.N. Rosenau and H. Tromp (eds), Interdependence and Conflict in World  
162 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Politics, Avebury, Aldershot, pp.61-82. 
Roots, E.F. (1992),  ‘Co-operation in Arctic Science: Background and Require- 
ments’, in F. Griffiths (ed.),  Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the 
Circumpolar North, Canadian Papers in Peace Studies no. 3, Science for 
Peace  
and Samuel Stevens,  Toronto, pp.136-155. 
Roots, E.F. (1993),  ‘The Arctic Region - Challenges and Opportunities’, in 
Arctic 
Challenges, Report from the Nordic Council's Parliamentary Conference in 
Reykjavik, 16-17 August 1993, NORD 1993:31, Nordic Council, Stockholm, 
 pp.143-154. 
Rosenau, J.N. (1986),  ‘Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes and Habit-
Driven  
Actors in World Politics’, International Organization, vol.40, 4, pp.849-894. 
Rosenau, J.N. (1990), Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, E.-O. (eds) (1992), Governance without Govern-
ment: 
 Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Rothwell, D.R. (1994),  ‘Polar Lessons for an Arctic Regime’,  Cooperation and 
Conflict, vol. 29, 1, pp.55-76. 
Rothwell, D.R. (1995),  ‘International Law and the Protection of the Arctic 
Environ- 
ment’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly,vol. 44, part 2, pp.280- 
312.  
Rothwell, D.R. (1997), The Polar Regions and the Development of 
International 
Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Ruggie, J.G. (1982), ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, vol. 
36, 2, pp. 379-414. 
Ruggie, J.G. (1993a),  ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations’, International Organization, vol.47, 1, pp.139-174. 
Ruggie, J.G. (1993b),  ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, in J.G. 
Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institu- 
tional Form. Columbia University Press, New York, pp.3-47. 
Sambo, D. (1992),  ‘The Emerging Indigenous Human Right to Development’,  
 IWGIA Yearbook 1991,  IWGIA, Copenhagen, pp.167-189. 
Sanders, D. (1993),  ‘Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples’, in C. 
Tomuschat 
    Bibliography 163 
 
 
(ed.),  Modern Law of Self-Determination, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 
pp.55-81. 
Sanghi, M. (1996),  ‘Interview (April 1991) with the President of the Association 
of 
the Small Peoples of the Soviet North by A. Pika’, in A. Pika, J. Dahl and 
I.Lar- 
sen (eds), Anxious North. Indigenous Peoples in Soviet and Post Soviet 
Russia, IWGIA Document 82, IWGIA, Copenhagen, pp.65-74. 
Schwartz, B. (1986), First Principles, Second Thoughts: Aboriginal Peoples, 
Constitutional Reform and Canadian Statecraft,  The Institute for Research 
on Public Policy, Montréal.  
Scrivener, D. (1996), Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy 
to 
Council,  Security Policy Library No. 1/1996, The Norwegian Atlantic 
Commit- 
tee, Oslo.  
Scrivener, D. (1997),  ‘What Lies Ahead?’, WWF Arctic Bulletin, 1, pp.5-6. 
Searle, J.R. (1969), Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, 
Cam- 
bridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Senseney, R.S. (1997),  ‘Science and Public Policy - an Arctic Perspective’, A 
Paper 
Presented to the International Arctic Science Committee, May 5, 1997, St. 
Petersburg, Russian Federation, in IASC Annual and Council Meetings 
1997, Reports, IASC, Oslo.   
Sergejeva, J. (1995),  ‘The Situation of the Sami in Kola’, in E. Gayim and K. 
Myntti 
(eds), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights 1993 and After, Juridica 
Lapponi 
ca 11,  Northern Institute of Environmental and Minority Law, University of 
Lapland, Rovaniemi, pp.176-188. 
Seurujärvi-Kari, I. (1994),  ‘Saamelaiset alkuperäiskansojen yhteisössä’, in  
U.M  
Kulonen, J. Pentikäinen ja I. Seurujärvi-Kari  (ed.), Johdatus 
saamentutkimuk-seen,  Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Helsinki, pp.171-189.  
Shapiro, M.J., Bonham, G.M. and Heradstveit, D. (1988),  ‘A Discursive Prac-
tices 
Approach  to Collective Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, 
vol.32, 4, pp.397-419. 
Shapiro, M.J. (1989),  ‘Textualising Global Politics’, in J. Der Derian and M.J. 
Shapiro (eds), International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of  
World Politics, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA and Toronto, pp.11-22. 
164 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Sillanpää, L. (1994),  Political and Administrative Response to Sami Self-
Determi 
nation. A Comparative Study of Public Administration in Fennoscandia on 
the 
Issue of Sami Land Title as an Aboriginal Right, Comment. Scientarium 
 Socialium 48, Societas Scientarum Fennica, 
Helsinki. 
Simon, M. (1987),  ‘The Role of Inuit in International Affairs’, in M. Stenbaek 
(ed.), 
Arctic Policy, Papers Presented at the Arctic Policy Conference, September 
19- 
21, 1985, Centre for Northern Studies and Research in Conjunction with 
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the Eben Hobson Chair, Centre for 
Northern Studies and Research, McGill University, Montréal, pp.69-76.  
Simons, J. (1995), Foucault & the Political, Routledge, London and New York. 
Slezkine, Y. (1994), Arctic Mirrors. Russia and the Small Peoples of the North, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. 
Smith, C. (1991),  ‘Indigenous Peoples and the State: Some Basic Legal 
Principles 
Seen from a Nordic Point of View’, in P. Seyersted (ed.), The Arctic: 
Canada  
and the Nordic Countries, The Nordic Association for Canadian Studies, 
Lund, 
pp.123-128.  
Smith, S.J. (1997),  ‘Time for a Change. Financing  the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS) and its Working Groups’, WWF Bulletin, vol. 4, 
1,  
pp.8-9.  
Sprout, H. and Sprout, M. (1971), Toward a Politics of Planet Earth, Van No-
strand 
Reinhold Co., New York. 
Statement of Intent (1990), in Cooperation in a Changing World, Third 
Northern  
Regions Conference, Anchorage, Alaska.  
Stavenhagen, R. (1994),  ‘Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems. 
Indigen- 
ous Peoples' Experiences with Self-Government’, in W.J. Assies and A.J. 
Hoe-kama (eds), Indigenous Peoples Experiences with Self-Government. 
Proceedings of the Seminar on Arrangements for Self-Determination by 
Indigenous Peoples within National States. 10 and 11 February 1994, 
Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, IWGIA Document 76,  IWGIA, 
Copenhagen, pp.9-29. 
    Bibliography 165 
 
 
Stokke, O.S. (1990),  ‘The Northern Environment: Is Cooperation Coming’, in 
M. O.  
Heisler (ed.),  ‘The Nordic Region: Changing Perspectives in International 
Relations’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Nov. 1990. 
Stokke, O.S. and Tunander, O. (1994), The Barents Region: Cooperation in 
Arctic 
Environment, Sage, London. 
Stoltenberg, T. (1992),  ‘The Barents Region: Reorganizing Northern Europe’, 
 International Challenges, vol.12, 4, pp.5-12. 
Strange, S. (1982),  ‘Cave Hic Dragones!’, International Organization, vol.36, 
2, 
 pp.479-496. 
Suganami, H. (1983),  ‘The Structure of Institutionalism. An Anatomy of British 
Mainstream International Relations’, International Relations, vol.7, 5, 
pp.2363-2381. 
Suganami, H. (1989), The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, 
Cam- 
bridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Taylor, P. (1986), Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics, 
Prince- 
ton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Taylor, C. (1987),  ‘Language and Human Nature’, in M.T. Gibbons (ed.), Inter- 
preting Politics,  Blackwell, Oxford, pp.101-132. 
Thornberry, P. (1991), International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 
Clarendon  
Press, Oxford. 
Tikkanen, E. (ed.) (1995), Kuolan  saastepäästöt Lapin metsien rasitteena. Itä- 
Lapin metsävaurioprojektin loppuraportti, Gummerus, Jyväskylä. 
Tomasevski, K. (1995),  ‘Environmental Rights’, in A. Eide and C. Krause (ed.), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Textbook,  Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, pp.257-269. 
Touraine, A. (1981), The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Turner, R.K. (1988),  ‘Sustainability, Resource Conservation and Pollution 
Control: 
An Overview’, in K. Turner (ed.), Sustainable Environmental Management: 
Principles and Practice, Belhaven Press, London.   
Underdal, A. (1992),  ‘The Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness'’, Cooperation 
and 
 Conflict, vol. 27, 3, pp.227-240. 
Underdal, A. (1995),  ‘The Study of International Regimes’, Journal of Peace 
Re- 
166 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
search, vol.32, 1, pp.113-119. 
United States Announces New Policy for the Arctic Region (1995), MAB NSN  
Newsletter, p.17. 
Vakhtin, N. (1992), Native Peoples of the Russian Far North, Minority Rights 
Group International Report 5,  Free Press, Manchester. 
Väliverronen, E. (1996), Ympäristöuhkan anatomia. Tiede, mediat ja metsän 
sairaskertomus, Vastapaino, Jyväskylä. 
Vogler, J. (1996a), The Global Commons. A Regime Analysis, John Wiley, 
Chicester. 
Vogler, J. (1996b),  ‘The Environment in International Relations: Legacies and 
Contentions’, in J. Vogler and M. Imber (eds), The Environment and 
International Relations,  Routledge, London and New York, pp.1-21. 
Waever, O. (1992),  ‘International Society - Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol.27, 1, pp.97-128. 
Walker, R.B.J. (1989),  ‘History and Structure in the Theory of International 
Rela- 
tions’,  Millennium, vol.18, 2, pp.163-183. 
Walker, R.B.J. and Mendlovitz, S.H. (1990),  ‘Interrogating State Sovereignty ’, 
in  
R.B.J Walker and S.H. Mendlowitz (eds), Contending Sovereignties. 
Redefining Political Community, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp.1-12. 
                             Walker, R.B.J. (1993), Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political 
Theory,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Weiss, T.G. and Gordenker, L. (eds) (1996), NGOs, The UN & Global Govern-
ance,  
 Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London. 
Wendt, A.E. (1987),  ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
 Theory’, International Organisation, vol.41, 3, pp.335-370. 
Wendt, A. and Duvall, R. (1989),  ‘Institutions and International Order’, in E-O. 
Czempiel and  J.O. Rosenau (eds), Global Changes and Theoretical 
Challenges. Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, Lexington, 
Lexington and Toronto, pp.51-73. 
Wendt, A. (1994), ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’,  
American Political Science Review, vol.88,  2,  pp.384-396. 
Wendt, A. (1996), ‘Identity and Structural Change in International Politics’, in Y. 
Lapid  and F. Kratochwil (eds), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR 
Theory, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp.47-64. 
Wenzel, G. (1991), Animal Rights, Human Rights: Ecology, Economy and 
 Ideology in the Canadian Arctic, Belhaven, London.  
 
Wettestad, J. (1994), ‘LRTAP: The Jewel in the Crown for Discursive Diploma- 
cy’, in Implementing Environmental Conventions, Papers from the Second 
    Bibliography 167 
 
 
High-Level Nordic Policy Seminar. Copenhagen, Denmark October 27 and 
28, 1994,  Scandinavian Seminar College, Ringkjobing, pp.68-76. 
Wight, M. (1992), International Theory. The Three Traditions (ed. by G. 
Wight 
and B. Porter), Holmes & Meier, New York. 
Wilde, J. de (1991), Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First 
half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and  
Complex 
Interdependence, Dartmouth, Aldershot. 
Willetts, P. (ed.) (1982), Pressure Groups in the Global System. The Trans- 
 
national Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organization, 
 Pinter, London. 
Wilson, P. (1989), ‘The English School of International Relations: A Reply to 
Sheila Grader’, Review of International Studies, vol.15, 1, pp.49-58. 
Wind, M. (1997), ‘Nicholas G. Onuf: The Rules of Anarchy’, in I.B. Neumann 
and 
O. Waever (eds), The Future of International Relations. Masters in the 
Making? Routledge, London and New York, pp.236-268. 
Woolin, S.S. (1988), ‘On the Theory and Practice of Power’, in J.Arac (ed.), 
After 
Foucault. Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges, Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick and London. 
              World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Common  
Future. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
World Conservation Strategy (1980), Prepared by the International Union for  
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), IUCN, UNEP, 
WWF. 
Young, O.R. (1980),  ‘International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation’, 
World Politics, vol.32, 3, pp.331-356. 
Young, O.R. (1989), International Cooperation. Building Regimes for Natural  
Resources and the Environment, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and  
London.  
Young, O.R. (1990),  ‘Global Environmental Change and International Gover- 
nance’, Millennium, vol.19, 3, pp.337-346. 
Young, O.R. (1992), Arctic Politics. Conflict and Cooperation in the Circum-
polar 
North, University Press of New England, Hanover and London. 
Young, O.R. and Druckman, D. (eds) (1992), Global Environmental Change. 
Understanding the Human Dimensions,  National Academy Press, 
Washington D.C. 
Young, O.R. (1993b), Public Policy and Natural Resources: Choosing Human/ 
168 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
Nature Relationships,  Occasional Paper Series 3, The Nelson A. 
Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences at the Dartmouth College, 
Dartmouth. 
Young, O.R. and Osherenko, G. (1993), Polar Politics. Creating International 
Environmental Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. 
Young, O.R. and Moltke, K. von (1994),  ‘The Consequences of International 
Environmental Regimes. Report from the Barcelona Workshop’,  
International Environmental Affairs, vol.6, 4, pp.348-370. 
Young, O.R. (1995b), International Governance. Protecting the Environment 
in 
a Stateless Society, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. 
 
    Bibliography 169 
 
 
 
 
 162 
Index 
 
 
 
 
AEPS  
and the Arctic Council 94-97, 
99, 
102-103, 113-116  
and the  IASC 55-58  
as a regime 20-23, 102-103 
conservation in 21, 82 87-89, 
96 
discourse in 10, 80-81 
environmental NGOs 108-111 
environmental security  90, 91,  
history of 1, 6, 12, 80-81 
identities  75 
indigenous knowledge 62-63, 
66-69 
indigenous peoples  36-41 ,59, 
106-108, 114-116 
state sovereignty 14 
sustainable development  
80-83, 94 
working groups of 20, 81 
Agenda 21 82, 96, 99, 107, 113 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
25 AMAP  
and the Arctic Council  97 
and the IASC 56, 57 
establishment of 20,47 
indigenous peoples 61, 69-73  
the state of the environment 
47-50, 
55, 122  
the work of 50-52,113, 116, 
129 
Antarctica 120-121 
Arctic Council 
as an organization 113-114 
discourse in 10, 94-99 
environmental NGOs  111 
environmental security 90, 91 
history of 1-2 
identity 93 
indigenous peoples 39-43, 99-
101 
knowledge 56-58 
order 116-120, 123-126 
programme of 111-113 
state sovereignty 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sustainable development 94-99 
Association of Indigenous Minorities 
of North, Far East and Siberia of 
Russian Federation 23, 28-29, 37-38, 
79, 108 
 
Barents region 2, 3, 117-119 
biodiversity  
CAFF 21  
indigenous peoples 89 
in the AEPS 86-89, 
in the Arctic Council 89, 96 
the state of the environment 53, 
55 
UNCED 87-88 
 
CAFF  
and the Arctic Council 97 
biodiversity in 88-89 
conservation in 21, 82, 87, 89, 
96  
environmental NGOs 109, 110 
establishment of 20, 21 
indigenous peoples  29, 32, 38, 
63, 66-67, 70, 89, 107  
the work of 113 
Canada   
and the AEPS 19, 81, 102, 113, 
128 
and the Arctic Council 2 
and U.S. 14 
ecosystem approach 85-86 
environmental NGOs 81, 110 
identity 16, 76 
 
 163 
indigenous knowledge 60, 67 
indigenous peoples 16, 23, 25-
26, 29, 100 
indigenous peoples’ 
participation  
37, 40, 41, 68, 99-100, 106-
107, 115-116 
state sovereignty 14, 127-128 
the state of the environment 
54-55, 122  
view on interdependence 1  
constructivism  
and discourse 9 
identities 15, 32-33, 105-107 
institutions 92 
knowledge 58, 61, 63-64 
order 119, 124-125, 127 
regime theory 4, 119, 122-124, 
126 
regions 3-4 
rules  22 
state sovereignty 23 
the environment 3, 6-8, 9, 11, 
91- 
92, 124 
 
Denmark 
and Greenland 24, 36-38 
and the AEPS 122  
identity 15, 77 
indigenous knowledge 62 
indigenous peoples 23-24, 31, 
36, 99 
indigenous peoples’ 
participation 36, 38, 62, 68, 
114-116 
sustainable development 77, 
99-100 
the state of the environment 
122 
discourse  
in the AEPS  10, 11-12 
in the Arctic Council 10, 11-12, 
111 
ethics 83, 91, 93, 95, 100 
Foucaultian analysis  9 
identities in 4, 75, 105, 111 
in institutions 62, 66, 105 
knowledge 59, 61-62, 66, 72-
73, 
111 
on rights 43 
on the environment 9, 80-86, 
119, 123  
order 123-124 
practices 9, 86-87 
regime 125 
region 4 
sovereignty 129-130 
 
environmental security  2, 90, 93, 99 
EPPR 20, 68 
ethics  
about the environment 12, 83, 
91 
identities 100-101 
in governmentality 91, 93 
of research 66-67, 71  
European Union 99-100, 107, 117-
118 
 
Finland  
and the AEPS 1, 15-16, 17, 47, 
102, 113 
and the Arctic Council 39, 113 
and the European Union 118 
identity 15-16, 77, 119, 120 
indigenous knowledge 69 
indigenous peoples 23, 38 
indigenous peoples’ 
participation 116 
sustainable development 77 
the state of the environment 54, 
120, 122 
 
governance 7, 8, 33, 42 
governmentality  
and constructivism 12,  97, 98, 
101 
and polar regions 121 
ethics  91, 93, 97, 100 
identities 33-35, 100, 105 
indigenous peoples 42-43, 100, 
130 
institutions 5, 130 
  
in the Arctic  42-43, 69-73, 91, 
93, 98, 100-101, 120-121, 129-
130 
knowledge  69, 71, 72 
order  8 
power 10, 35-36, 43, 127, 128-
130 
practices 5, 100 
regimes 5, 9, 12, 119, 124-126 
sovereignty 130 
sustainable development 118-
119 
the environment 9, 12, 119 
Greenland 
identity 15, 26 
indigenous peoples 24, 37 
indigenous peoples’ 
participation 36-38, 107, 114-
115 
self-determination 27 
 
IASC 51, 55-57, 60-61, 67 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference ICC  
conservation 106-107 
environmental rights 77  
identity 106-107 
indigenous knowledge 64, 
67-69, 71 
participation of 20, 37-38, 39-
41, 
115-116  
sustainable development 77- 
78, 80,  
99 
Iceland  
and the AEPS 44, 103 
identity 15, 122  
indigenous peoples 23, 62, 115 
identity 
and the AEPS 75 
and the Arctic Council 93, 98, 
100 
ethics 100-101 
governmentality 69, 98, 100 
indigenous peoples 24, 26-27, 
30, 32-34, 99, 106-108  
knowledge 100 
NGOs 105-106 
of the Arctic  3, 74-77, 93, 98, 
100 
power 105 
regimes 22 
region 3-4 
sovereignty 13, 105 
states 15-16  
the environment 4 
indigenous knowledge  
governmentality  65-73, 108, 
111 
in the AEPS  59, 62-63, 70  
the environment 63-65, 89 
institutions 
and constructivism 124-125 
ethics 91 
governmentality 5, 35-36,  86, 
91, 119, 124, 130 
identity 93 
knowledge 58, 61-62, 63-66, 
105 
meanings 7 
new institutionalism 10, 113, 
124, 
 126 
practices 10, 86 
old institutionalism 119-120, 
124, 
127 
order 8-9, 124-125 
power 5, 35, 58, 126, 130 
regimes 4, 7, 9, 22, 23, 83, 
86,124- 
125 
the environment 7, 92, 120 
International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights  31, 34 
International Labour Organization 30, 
31, 
 32, 34, 129 
intersubjectivity  
and meanings 7 
communication 61 
constructivism 92 
ethics 101, 119 
in institutions 9 
power 35 
regimes 22, 119, 124 
the environment 126 
 
   Index 165 
 
 
knowledge  
epistemic community 58 
governmentality 5, 8-11, 52, 
61-62, 65-66, 69-73 , 91, 100-
101 
indigenous peoples 28, 30, 62-
64, 
66-73, 107-108, 111, 114-115  
in the AEPS 21, 58-59, 89, 103, 
123 
in the Arctic Council 56-57 
knowlege broker 59 
NGOs 111 
power relations 58-59, 61-62, 
65-66, 
125 
regimes 49-50, 52, 55-56, 58-
59, 61- 
62, 125 
the environment 11-12, 44-46, 
47-50, 52-55 
 
meaning  
and ethics 101 
in discourse 9-10, 92 
governmentality 23, 69, 98 
identities 75, 98, 101 
institutions 9 
interdependence 92 
knowledge 65, 111 
NGOs 40 
of cooperation 7-8, 102-103  
of development 30 
order 9, 124-25,127  
power 7 
practices 9, 103, 124, 128 
regimes 7-8, 90, 93, 102-103, 
124  
research of  9-10, 23,  
sovereignty 128 
the environment 6-8, 10, 92, 
124 
NGOs 37, 40, 56, 104, 108-111, 113 
Northern Forum 116-117 
Norway 
and the AEPS 19, 103, 113  
and the AMAP 52 
and the Arctic Council 103 
Barents Euro-Arctic 
Cooperation 
117 
environmental NGOs 110 
environmental security 91 
identity 15, 74, 77 
indigenous peoples 23, 31, 38, 
115- 
116 
state sovereignty 14 
sustainable development 85 
the state of the environment 
122 
Nunavut 26, 29 
 
order   
and discourse 123-124 
governmentality 8, 124-126 
identity 13 
in the Arctic  93, 97 
regimes 8-9, 119-120, 124, 
126-127 
state sovereignty 13, 126-127 
the environment 123-124 
 
PAME 20, 21, 68, 97 
power  
and discourse 11, 66, 93 
and ethics 91 
identity 33-34, 69, 105 
indigenous peoples 32, 33, 
59,61, 71, 106-108, 111  
institutions 5, 130 
governmentality 5,10, 42, 43, 
66, 71, 
124-12, 130 
knowledge 58-59, 61, 62, 65-
66, 71 
practices of 5, 23,32-36, 42, 
127-130  
regimes 7, 105, 125, 126-127, 
128 
self-determination 25-27, 129-
130 
state sovereignty 13, 22, 23, 
42, 129-130 
practices 
166 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
discourse 10, 73, 86-87, 90 
ethics 100 
governmentality 20, 32, 33, 43 
identities 33, 75, 100  
institutions 5,9-10, 124-125, 
127 knowledge 59,62 , 64, 71, 
73, 91 meanings 98 
order 119, 124-125 
regimes 5   
rules 10, 42, 103 
of cooperation 81, 86-87, 
90,123, 103-104, 111 
of power 23,33,43, 127, 130 
of state sovereignty 13, 23, 32, 
111, 126-128, 130 
the environment 10, 78, 124  
 
regimes  
as practices 103 
as an organization 113 
constructivism 4, 5-9, 92,103, 
119, 123-124, 126 
discourse in 9, 93, 123-124 
ethics 75, 83, 90, 91, 93 
governmentality 5, 125, 127-
1
3
0   
identities 75,105 
institutions 5, 130 
knowledge 49-50, 58-59, 61-62, 
65- 
66, 91  
meanings 7, 22-23, 75, 91, 93, 
119 
new institutionalism 8, 103, 
1
1
3,  
125-126 
order 8-9, 119-120, 124-125  
power 7, 90, 130 
rules 21-22 
sovereignty 126-127 
study of 4-5, 9-10 
the environment 7 
region  
and the AEPS 75 
and the Arctic Council 93, 98, 
100 
governmentality 130 
polar regions 120-121 
study of  3, 4 
the Arctic as a region 3, 8, 
13-16, 
 
   Index 167 
 
 
the Arctic as a conserved region 
87-88 
the Arctic as a militarized region 
74, 90-91  
the Arctic as a polluted region 
44-46, 
 47-49, 52-55, 75  
the Arctic as an utilized region 
76-80, 93, 116-119 
rights  
and the environment 16.-17, 18, 
27-32, 77-79, 84 
governmentality 33, 43 
indigenous peoples 24-29, 106, 
129-130 
in regimes 22, 126-128 
international mechanisms 31-34 
Rio Declaration  
environment and development 
30, 123 
in the  AEPS 80-81, 120 
in the Arctic Council 96, 99, 113, 
121-122 
principle on indigenous peoples 
30, 123 
principle of state sovereignty 13 
rules  
and discourse 105 
ethics 83, 100 
governmentality 5, 10, 32, 100, 
103- 
104,128 
in regimes 4, 21-23, 103 
institutions 124,127 
in the AEPS 18, 19 
of communication 61 
of state sovereignty 13-14, 22  
order 124-126 
power 32, 105, 128 
practices 10, 23, 103  
Russia (USSR) 
and the AEPS 17-18, 114  
and the Arctic Council 103 
identity 15, 74, 76 
indigenous peoples 23, 25, 28, 
indigenous peoples’ participation  
37-38, 41, 68,  115-116  
initiative of 1 
interdependence 92 
environmental security 91 
sustainable development 85, 
100 
 
Sámi Council  
and the AEPS 37, 38, 68, 79, 
79, 116 
and the Arctic Council 42 
environmental rights 27-28  
identity 107-108 
indigenous knowledge 68, 69, 
108  
self-determination 24, 28 
sustainable development 28, 
78- 80 
self-determination  
and the AEPS 26, 129-130 
and the Arctic Council 26, 129-
130 
governmentality 105, 129-130  identity 24, 26, 29, 33 
knowledge 63, 65-66  
the environment 24, 29-31 
sovereignty   
and the AEPS 14-15, 26 
and the Arctic Council 129-130 
as practices of power 13, 23, 
128 
governmentality 42, 43, 128-
130 
identity 13 
indigenous peoples 23-26, 29, 
30, 
32 
institutions 126-128 
NGOs 104-106 
order 13 
states 13-15, 22-23,32 
the environment 13-14, 30 
sustainable development  
and the  AEPS 80-81, 83-87 
and the Arctic Council  94-99, 
111-113, 122-123 
as a practice  81-83, 86-87, 98-
99, 116-118 
definitions of 77-81, 83-87, 92, 
97-99, 120 
168 Arctic Environmental Cooperation 
 
 
governmentality 91, 93, 98 120-
121 indigenous peoples 30, 62, 
78, 99- 
100, 106, 123 
UNCED 1, 80-81, 93, 96, 98 
Sweden  
and the AEPS 18, 19, 103 
and the European Union 118 
environmental NGOs 108-109 
identity 16, 121 
indigenous peoples 23, 37 
indigenous peoples’ participation 
116 
knowledge 55 
state sovereignty 13 
sustainable development 84-85 
 
TFSDU 
Agenda 21 82, 113 
and the Arctic Council 82-83 
establishment of 81 
indigenous peoples 99-100, 107 
sustainable development 81 
work of 81-83, 113 
 
UNCED  
Arctic concerns in 1, 122-123 
biodiversity 88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
development 30 
indigenous peoples 30 
the principle of state 
sovereignty 13 
UNCHE 13 
UNGASS 122-123 
U.S.  
and the Arctic Council 1-2, 103 
biodiversity 89-90 
environmental NGOs 109, 110, 
111 
environmental security 90-91 
identity 16, 74-75 
indigenous knowledge 69  
indigenous peoples 25, 129-
130 
indigenous peoples’ 
participation 
39-41, 69, 115 
knowledge 57 
sovereignty 14 
sustainable development 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
